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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Previous empirical studies have shown that when decisions are made under 
uncertainty and adjustment costs are fixed or linear in structure (non-convex), firms do 
not permanently adjust employment in order to accommodate demand shocks. 
Consequent to this, periods of inertia would emerge and that is sufficient to produce 
hysteresis. 
This dissertation studies the existence of hysteresis in the dynamic path of  
employment at the firm and aggregate level. Firstly, we describe the path of micro-level 
employment and we establish its relationship with three sources of inertia: i) the 
existence of non-convex costs of adjustment; ii) uncertainty concerning the dynamics of 
aggregate product demand; iii) utilization of the intensive margin of adjustment of the 
labor input (adjustment through hours per employee). Secondly, we analyze the 
aggregate implications of the observed micro behavior.  
 If at the micro level models of hysteresis offer a good explanation for the 
empirical evidence, at the macro level it has been more difficult to identify the existence 
of hysteresis in the dynamics of employment. Aggregate series of employment tend to 
look smoother and, for that reason, they are apparently inconsistent with the presence of 
hysteresis. However, if we take into consideration the different properties of weak 
hysteresis (hysteresis at the micro level) and strong hysteresis (hysteresis at the macro 
level), and if we take into account firms’ heterogeneity, i.e. if the problem of 
aggregation is explicitly considered as it should be in the presence of non-convex costs 
of adjustment, it would still be possible to uncover signs of hysteresis at the macro-
level.      
     The empirical analysis was carried out with a monthly panel of Portuguese 
manufacturing firms spanning a period of eleven years. This dataset has information on 
both employment and hours of work as well as on a good set of other variables that may 
be taken as proxies for shocks. To obtain a first insight into the process of employment 
adjustment, we provide some descriptive statistics on net employment changes, and to 
test the existence of hysteresis at the micro level we estimate a model of employment 
asymmetric response with path dependence interpreted under the Non-Ideal Relay 
model of hysteresis.  To test the existence of hysteresis in the aggregate employment 
dynamics, we apply tests constructed with the help of computational methods based on 
the Preisach Model and on the Linear Play Model of Hysteresis. To put our results in an 
 iv 
international setting, the aggregate analysis was also made with aggregate data from 
OECD and EUROSTAT.  
We conclude that: i) there are strong signs of the existence of sources of 
employment inertia at micro level, caused by non-convex adjustment costs and by the 
adjustment of labor input through the number of hours per employee; ii) signs of 
hysteresis commonly found at the micro level, do not completely vanish at the macro 
level; iii) hysteresis properties are particularly discernible for small firms even if they 
are less so in the case of larger units; vi) we find strong evidence of the interrelations 
between the flexibility of the labor input adjustment through hours of work and the 
existence of aggregate employment hysteresis, but only weak evidence of the 
interrelations between the existence of uncertainty in the dynamics of  aggregate 
demand and hysteresis.  
These findings imply that aggregate employment is significantly shaped by 
lumpy adjustment at the micro level.  
 
JEL Classification: E24, J23. 
 
Keywords: hysteresis, adjustment costs, employment, uncertainty, hours of work      
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RESUMO 
 
 Estudos empíricos anteriores mostram que quando as decisões são tomadas num 
contexto de incerteza e quando existem custos de ajustamento lineares ou fixos (não 
convexos), as empresas não ajustam continuamente o nível de emprego de forma a 
acomodar choques da procura do seu produto. Consequentemente, emergem períodos de 
inércia o que é suficiente para produzir histerese.  
 Nesta dissertação estuda-se a existência de histerese da dinâmica do emprego ao 
nível da empresa e ao nível agregado. Em primeiro lugar, efectua-se uma descrição do 
padrão de ajustamento do emprego a nível microeconómico e estuda-se a sua relação 
com três fontes de inércia: i) a existência de custos de ajustamento não convexos; ii) a 
existência de incerteza na dinâmica da procura agregada; iii) a possibilidade de 
utilização da margem intensiva de ajustamento do factor trabalho (ajustamento através 
do número de horas por trabalhador). Segundo, analisamos as implicações agregadas do 
comportamento microeconómico observado.     
 Se ao nível microeconómico os modelos de histerese oferecem uma boa 
explicação para a observação empírica, ao nível macroeconómico tem-se revelado mais 
difícil identificar a existência de histerese na dinâmica do emprego. De facto, as séries 
agregadas do emprego tendem a ser mais alisadas, e por essa razão, aparentemente 
inconsistentes coma existência de histerese. No entanto, se tivermos em conta as 
diferentes propriedades da histerese fraca (histerese ao nível micro) e da histerese forte 
(histerese ao nível macro) e se considerarmos a existência de empresas heterogéneas, 
isto é, se o problema da agregação for explicitamente considerado, como deve ser na 
presença de custos de ajustamento não convexos, então deverá ser possível verificar a 
existência de sinais de histerese ao nível macroeconómico.  
 A análise empírica foi efectuada com dados mensais de empresas industriais 
portuguesas ao longo de um período de 11 anos. A amostra contém informação sobre o 
nível de emprego e sobre o nível de horas de trabalho e sobre um conjunto de outras 
variáveis que podem ser utilizadas como proxies de choques. 
 No sentido de obter uma primeira aproximação ao processo de ajustamento do 
emprego, efectuamos uma análise descritiva sobre a variação líquida do emprego e 
testamos a existência de histerese ao nível da empresa através da estimação de um 
modelo de resposta assimétrica do emprego, interpretado á luz do modelo de histerese 
Non-Ideal Relay. 
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 De forma a testar a existência de histerese na dinâmica do emprego a nível 
agregado, aplicamos testes construídos com base em métodos computacionais baseados 
no modelo de Preisach e no Linear Play Model de histerese.  
 No sentido de comparar os resultados a nível internacional, aplicamos os testes 
referidos a dados agregados da OCDE e EUROSTAT de 19 países da OCDE.    
 Concluímos que: i) existem sinais claros da existência de inércia ao nível 
microeconómico causada pela existência de custos de ajustamento não convexos e pela 
possibilidade de ajustamento através da variação do número de horas de trabalho por 
trabalhador; ii) os sinais de histerese que normalmente se encontram ao nível 
microeconómico não se desvanecessem totalmente ao nível macroeconómico; iii) as 
propriedades de histerese são particularmente relevantes na dinâmica do emprego das 
empresas pequenas; iv) encontramos evidência significativa sobre a interacção entre a 
flexibilidade do ajustamento do factor trabalho através da variação do número de horas 
de trabalho por trabalhador e a existência de histerese no emprego. Ao contrário, não 
encontramos evidência significativa sobre a interacção entre a existência de incerteza na 
dinâmica da procura agregada e a existência de histerese no emprego.   
 Estes resultados mostram que a dinâmica do emprego a nível agregado é 
condicionada significativamente pela existência de um padrão de ajustamento discreto 
ao nível microeconómico.  
  
Classificação JEL  : E24, J23. 
 
Palavras-chave: histerese, custos de ajustamento, emprego, incerteza, horas de trabalho      
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RÉSUMÉ  
  
Des études empiriques précédentes ont montré que quand les décisions sont 
prises sous l'incertitude et les coûts d'ajustement sont fixés ou linéaires (non-convexe ), 
les entreprises ne changent pas leur niveau l'emploi pour faire face aux chocs de 
demande. Par conséquent, il y a des périodes d’inertie et c’est suffisant pour produire 
l'hystérésis.  
Cette thèse étudie l'existence d'hystérésis dans la dynamique d'emploi au niveau 
de l’entreprise et au niveau agrégé. Premièrement, nous décrivons la dynamique de 
l'emploi au niveau micro et nous établissons son relation avec trois sources d'inertie: i) 
l'existence de prix non-convexes d'ajustage; ii) l'incertitude concernant la dynamique de 
demande agrégé; iii) l'utilisation de la marge intensive d'ajustage de la main-d’œuvre 
(l'ajustage des heures par employé). Deuxièmement, nous analysons les implications 
agrégées de la conduite observée au niveau de l’entreprise.  
Si au niveau microéconomique, les modèles d'hystérésis offrent une bonne 
explication de l'évidence empirique, au niveau macroéconomique il a été plus difficile 
d'identifier l'existence d'hystérésis dans la dynamique d'emploi. La série totale d'emploi 
a tendance à sembler plus lisse et, pour cette raison, ils sont apparemment inconsistants 
avec la présence d'hystérésis. Pourtant, si nous prenons en considération les différentes 
propriétés de l’hystérésis faible (l'hystérésis au niveau micro) et de l’hystérésis forte 
(l'hystérésis au niveau macro) et si nous tenons compte de la diversité d’entreprises, 
c'est-à-dire si le problème d'agrégation est explicitement considéré, comme il devrait 
être en présence des prix non-convexes d'ajustage, il serait toujours possible de dévoiler 
des signes d'hystérésis au niveau macroéconomique.  
L'analyse empirique est faite avec l’information mensuelle des entreprises 
industrielles portugaises qui s'étendent pendant onze ans. Nous avons information sur 
l'emploi, sur les heures de travail, et sur un ensemble d'autres variables qui peuvent être 
prises comme les proxies pour les chocs.  
Pour obtenir une première représentation dans le processus d'ajustement 
d'emploi, nous fournissons un peu de statistique descriptive sur les change nets 
d'emploi, et pour évaluer l'existence d'hystérésis au niveau micro nous estimons un 
modèle d'emploi de réponse asymétrique, interprétée sous le modèle d'hystérésis Non-
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Ideal Relay. Pour évaluer l'existence d'hystérésis dans la dynamique d'emploi agrégé, 
nous appliquons des tests construits avec l'aide de méthodes quantificatives basées sur 
le Modèle de Preisach et sur le Linear Play Model d'Hystérésis. Pour mettre nos 
résultats contre un fond international, l'analyse agrégée a été aussi faite avec les données 
agrégées d'OECD et d'EUROSTAT.  
Nous concluons que : i) Il y a des forts signes sur l'existence de sources d'inertie 
d'emploi au niveau micro, provoqués par les coûts d'ajustage non-convexes et par 
l'ajustage de la main-d’œuvre par le nombre d'heures par employé; ii) les signes 
d'hystérésis communément trouvés au niveau micro, ne disparaissent pas complètement 
au niveau macro; iii) les propriétés d'hystérésis sont particulièrement visibles pour de 
petites entreprises; iv) nous trouvons une forte évidence sur les corrélations entre la 
flexibilité de l'ajustage de la main-d’œuvre avec les heures de travail et de l'existence 
d'hystérésis d'emploi. Nous ne trouvons pas d’évidence significative sur les corrélations 
entre l'existence d'incertitude dans la dynamique de demande agrégé et d'hystérésis. Ces 
conclusions impliquent que l'emploi total, est de façon significative, formé par 
l'ajustement  discret au niveau micro.  
 
Classification de JEL : E24, J23.  
 
Mots clé : hystérésis, cout d’ajustement, emploi, incertitude, heures de travail  
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I.1. MOTIVATION, RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The adjustment of the quantities of labor factor employed by firms is now 
widely recognized as discontinuous and lumpy as the result of the existence of non-
convex costs of adjustment and/or uncertainty in the path of product demand and 
factor costs1. Technically, we can say that labor demand at the firm level exhibits 
hysteresis in the sense that transitory changes in the labor demand forcing variables 
originate permanent variations in the level of employment.   
However, if at the micro level models of hysteresis offer a good explanation 
for the empirical evidence, at the macro level it has proven more difficult to identify 
hysteresis in the data. In fact, the aggregation of heterogeneous firms with 
asynchronic actions originates a smoother adjustment behavior of the labor factor that 
could seemingly be represented by a partial adjustment model, whose microeconomic 
foundation is the representative firm facing convex adjustment costs2. Moreover, the 
different behavior of the micro and macro series of the labor factor has contributed to 
the view that the existing non-convex adjustment costs at the micro level are not 
relevant in describing macroeconomic behavior.  
The original approach to explaining the apparent contradiction between micro 
and macro dynamics, was conducted in the field of retail inventories, and 
demonstrated the importance of the cross sectional distribution of the level of 
inventories for aggregate dynamics, under a (S,s) adjustment model (see Blinder 
1981; Caplin 1985; Caplin and Spulber 1987). A more elaborate approach linked to 
empirical work was initiated by Bertola and Caballero (1990). It was subsequently 
applied by Caballero and Engel (1993) and Caballero et al. (1997) to the study of the 
dynamics of employment, and by Caballero et al. (1995) to that of aggregate 
investment. 
 More recently, the Preisach Model (Cross 1995 and Piscitelli et al. 1999) and 
the Linear Play Model (Belke and Göcke 1999 and Göcke 2001) of strong hysteresis 
offered a different way of dealing with the aggregation of heterogeneous firms facing 
non-convex adjustment costs. These models have specific properties that can be tested 
empirically in order to verify the existence of hysteresis in the aggregate data. 
                                                 
1
 See Blinder (1981), Hamermesh (1989), Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) and Caballero et al. (1997). 
2
 See Cooper (2004). 
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  In this thesis, we contribute to this recent literature by studying the existence 
of hysteresis in the dynamic path of employment and hours of work at the firm and 
aggregate levels. The aim is to describe the path of micro-level employment in 
relation to the structure of the underlying costs of adjusting the labor input and to 
analyze the aggregate implications of the observed micro behavior. 
A demand side approach to hysteresis is adopted. Furthermore, hysteresis is 
given its original definition inherited from physics, because this interpretation reflects 
more accurately the theoretical hypothesis underlying its application to the study of 
the dynamics of either the employment or the unemployment rate.3 
 Our empirical strategy is: firstly, we check the existence of the necessary 
conditions for the existence of hysteresis, i.e., the existence of non-convex costs of 
adjusting employment and uncertainty, and its interaction with working time 
legislation4. Secondly, we analyze the existence of hysteresis at the firm level 
described by the Non-Ideal Relay Model of Weak Hysteresis (Visitin 1994, 
Mayergoyz 2003). Thirdly, we analyze the macroeconomic consequences of the 
presence of weak hysteresis using the Preisach Model (see Mayergoyz 2003) and the 
Linear Play Model of Strong Hysteresis (Visitin 1994). 
In all the empirical work, we use micro data on Portuguese manufacturing 
firms5. Portugal is a good case for studying labor demand driven hysteresis because it 
has one of the strictest employment protection legislation systems in Europe (OECD 
2004), which is a source of non-convexities in the adjustment technology. To test the 
existence of hysteresis in the dynamics of employment a monthly panel of Portuguese 
                                                 
3
 This approach proved to be successful in the study of the dynamic behavior of a number of economic 
variables, from labor demand (Amable et al. 1994; 1995, Cross 1995; 1997; 1998 and Piscitelli et al. 
1999; 2000), to international trade (Baldwin and Krugman 1989 and Göcke 2001) and investment 
(Dixit 1989; 1991; 1992 and 1997, Pindyck 1991, and Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
4
 In this thesis we only focus on the real sources of inertia. However, real inertia can interact with 
nominal inertia (inertia in the adjustment of nominal prices and wages) in shaping the employment 
adjustment process (see Andersen and Hylleberg 2000).   
5
 Due to data limitations, focusing on employment in the manufacturing sector is common in the 
literature. We are aware that the structure of the manufacturing sector is different from that of other 
sectors. Major differences are related to capital intensity, nature of the demand shocks, the ability to 
hold inventories and differences in labor relations. These factors might influence employment flows 
differently. In particular we expect less volatility of the employment adjustment in the manufacturing 
sector when measured by the job reallocation rate. However, the existence of a strong relationship 
between (negative) trend manufacturing employment growth and relative gross-flow volatility, 
documented by Foote (1998), can offset the effects of other factors. Actually Varejão (2000) found 
similar quarterly job reallocation rates (5.2%) in the manufacturing and services sectors in Portugal in 
the period from 1991 to 1995.    
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manufacturing firms spanning a period of eleven years is used. This dataset has 
information on employment, total hours of work, earnings and sales.    
To put our results in an international setting the aggregate analysis is also 
carried out with aggregate data from OECD and EUROSTAT.         
The thesis is organized as follows:   
Part I reviews the essential literature on the effects of non-convex costs of 
adjustment, and provides a broad characterization of the Portuguese labor market, 
highlighting the characteristics that could yield hysteresis.    
Part II is devoted to a review of the literature on models of hysteresis with 
application to the dynamics of employment. In this part, we distinguish the concepts 
of weak (micro) and strong (macro) hysteresis and their respective properties, 
showing that hysteresis is different from the existence of a unit root solution to 
difference equations. We show that the properties of strong hysteresis are different 
from those of weak hysteresis. In particular, aggregation over heterogeneous firms 
that exhibit hysteresis increases aggregate steadiness. Yet, this does not imply that 
hysteresis is not important for a characterization of aggregate employment. On the 
contrary, aggregation reinforces the property of remanence of the hysteretic process, 
and implies that aggregate employment will contain a memory of only the non-
dominated extreme values of the variables, which drive adjustment at the micro level. 
This distinction could be very useful in empirical investigations of the properties of 
aggregate time series of employment.  In this part, we also extend some models, 
which are existent in the literature, to analyze the effects of the interaction between 
the presence of non-convex costs of employment adjustment and the degree of 
flexibility of the adjustment through hours of work on the dynamics of employment.  
Part III offers preliminary evidence on the patterns of labor input adjustment 
that constitute an indirect test of the existence of hysteresis at the firm level. A 
descriptive approach is presented as well as some evidence on labor input adjustment 
patterns for firms in the manufacturing sector. We provide information on: a) job 
reallocation; b) the empirical distribution of the labor input adjustment; c) serial 
correlation of employment adjustment; d) interrelations between adjustments through 
the number of workers and through the number of hours per worker. We also 
implement a formal test of the existence of hysteresis at the micro level that focuses 
on the properties of path dependence and divergence of the linear response of 
employment to product demand shocks. 
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Part IV is dedicated to the existence of hysteresis at the aggregate level or 
strong hysteresis. In order to explain the aggregate dynamics of employment we apply 
the Preisach Model of Strong Hysteresis as a mathematical tool that could be used to 
reconcile the micro and macro evidence on employment adjustment. This model 
incorporates, explicitly, heterogeneity at firm level and asynchronous adjustment that 
is at the basis of the smoothness of aggregates.  
To study the effect of uncertainty and the effect of the existence of the margin 
of adjustment hours per worker at the aggregate level, we apply the Play Model of 
Strong hysteresis. We also analyze the effect of uncertainty by relating the frequency 
of structural break, caused by hysteresis, with the existence of uncertainty.  
Finally, in Part V we apply the strong hysteresis models to macro data from 
EUROSTAT and OECD. This part of the dissertation offers international evidence on 
the subject, and helps put the Portuguese case in the context of other industrialized 
countries.    
 
 
I.2. THE CONCEPT OF HYSTERESIS AND ITS APPLICATION IN LABOR ECONOMICS  
 
Some properties of hysteresis of economic systems were recognized earlier by 
Marshall (1890). Although he took a static view of a unique equilibrium between 
supply and demand, he also saw some limitations of this notion, at least if there were 
increasing returns to scale:  “… in fact under certain conceivable, though rare, 
conditions there can be two or more positions of real equilibrium of demand and 
supply, any one of which is equally consistent with the general circumstances of the 
market, and any one of which once reached would be stable, until some great 
disturbance occurred.” (Marshall 1890, p. 665)6. 
In Labor Economics, hysteresis was first used in the 1980s to describe the fact 
that unemployment remains high long after the temporary shocks that originated its 
growth have disappeared or, more formally, to describe the path dependence of the 
NAIRU (Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) on the actual rate of 
unemployment. 
                                                 
6
 Further references to hysteresis as a property required to explain the behavior of economic systems 
(in the context of equilibrium analysis) are found, after the 1930s, in the work of economists such as 
Kaldor, Schumpeter and Georgescu-Roegen. 
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 The use of the idea of hysteresis in the context of unemployment studies was 
justified on the grounds that the corresponding properties also seemed to be found in 
the dynamics of aggregate unemployment, especially in some European Countries. 
Firstly, data documented a non-linear relation between some macroeconomic shocks 
and unemployment. Shocks originating both on the demand and supply side of the 
labor market are found to have a permanent effect (remanence effect) on the 
unemployment rate, or at least to cause unemployment to return to its pre-shock level 
but at a very slow pace. Secondly, the experience of the 1980s and 1990s also 
indicates that the past values of the unemployment rate together with current 
macroeconomic shocks are important determinants of the current unemployment rate 
(a property known as path dependence).  
Clear-cut evidence of unemployment persistence emerged as a major 
challenge to standard economic theory and it ultimately led to the development of 
hysteresis-based theories of unemployment. Theories of hysteresis offer a new 
characterization of aggregate time series behavior that is derived from its micro 
foundations, revealing that the influence of labor demand shocks on employment is 
more specific than previously assumed. 
The notion of hysteresis, which is new to economic theory, was first 
introduced to the dynamics of unemployment by Edmund Phelps. Although he began 
by advocating that the equilibrium rate of unemployment is, in the long run, 
independent of the monetary policy, he later recognized that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment could depend upon the actual unemployment rate rather than being 
stable over time (Phelps, 1972)7.  
Although in his seminal work Phelps considered that hysteresis in the 
unemployment rate would arise from supply side mechanisms alone, such as the 
presence of unions, human capital depreciation, and wealth distribution (see Phelps 
1972), it is now undisputed that demand-side mechanisms, such as the presence of 
costs of adjustment in the labor input, may also cause hysteresis8. 
                                                 
7
 As the author puts it: “The transition from one equilibrium to the other tends to have long-lingering 
effects on the labor force, and these effects may be discernible in the equilibrium rate of unemployment 
for a long time. The natural rate of unemployment at any future date will depend upon the course of 
history in the interim. Such a property is sometimes called hysteresis.”  (Phelps 1972, p. xxiii). 
8
 The Insider-Outsider theory with its implications in terms of downward wage rigidity, and the Human 
Capital Theory via human capital depreciation, both offer a supply-side explanation for why there 
could be hysteresis in the unemployment rate. On the demand-side, the existence of costs of adjustment 
of the inputs, labor or other, as described by the dynamic theory of factor demand, could produce the 
same result. See Lindbeck and Snower (1986; 1988) and Blanchard and Summers (1986; 1987) for the 
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However, as economic theory seized the notion of hysteresis, it did so in a 
very loose way if we consider the actual properties of true hysteretic systems. For that 
reason, some authors consider that in most cases economics ‘bastardizes’ the use of 
the expression (Amable et al. 1994 and Cross 1995). In fact, in early models, 
hysteresis implies nothing more than persistent deviations of the actual 
unemployment rate from the natural rate. Layard et al. (1991) also use the word 
hysteresis to describe the fact that shocks could originate the departure of the actual 
unemployment from its level of equilibrium for some time, although the natural rate 
remains an attractor in the long run. Following the influential article of Blanchard and 
Summers (1986), hysteresis has also been used as synonymously to unit root solutions 
to difference equations, although in unit root processes a transient shock could leave 
the long run unemployment rate unchanged9. We stress that the true concept of 
hysteresis is different from some assertions currently used in economics, in particular 
those that approximate hysteresis with unit root processes. In contrast, unit root 
dynamics (frequently used as an equivalent to hysteresis) are only an approximation 
to describe the memory characteristics of hysteresis in a simple way that is not only 
different in theoretical terms but also observationally not equivalent to hysteresis.        
Moreover, such a deviation from the original meaning of hysteresis was not 
the result of an attempt to adapt the concept to the specific nature of economic 
phenomena but the inevitable outcome of the need to compromise with mathematical 
tractability and the ability to discriminate empirically between hysteresis and other 
non-linear processes. 
In its original formulation in the domain of physics of magnetism10, hysteresis, 
from the Greek ‘coming behind’, is the property of a system, in which some effects 
remain after the causes that originated them are removed11. Therefore, in this 
                                                                                                                                            
Insider-Outsider Theory and its explanation of the unemployment record, Becker, (1962) and 
Hargreaves-Heap (l980) for an application of Human Capital Theory, and for demand theories Dixit 
(1991; 1992) and Cross (1995; 1997) in the case of labor, and Sneessens and Drèze (1986), Layard and 
Nickel (1986) and Bean (1989) for investment. 
9
 Blanchard and Summers (1987, p. 289) recognized that they use the term hysteresis loosely compared 
with the original definition in physics to denote the cases where actual employment affects equilibrium 
unemployment for a long time.   
10
 The term hysteresis was firstly introduced by the physicist James Alfred Ewing in 1881, in the 
explanation of the behavior of electromagnetic fields in ferric metals (Cross 1995, p. 181). 
11
 “A mathematical modeling of hysteresis requires the consideration of a system subject to external 
action, i.e. an input-output system. Hysteresis is defined as a particular type of response of the system 
when one modifies the value of the input: the system is said to exhibit some remanence when there is a 
permanent effect on output after the value of the input has been modified and brought back to its initial 
position.” Amable et al. (1995, p. 155) 
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dissertation, hysteresis is given its original interpretation, i.e., implying the properties 
of remanence, non-linearity and selective memory12. This original definition of 
hysteresis reflects more accurately the theoretical hypothesis underlying the idea of 
hysteresis in employment dynamics, and its apparent properties seem to fit the 
theoretical dynamics of employment better (Amable 1995, Cross 1995). 
To illustrate the basic properties of hysteresis we assume that we can control 
the evolution of a scalar input variable (in its original formulation the magnetic field -
X , in Figure i.1), and we consider a black box, which transforms this input into an 
output variable (the magnetic induction -Y ) (Visitin 1994). Figure i.1 also shows that 
starting from a situation where a ferromagnetic substance is demagnetized (in the 
absence of electric current - X ) over point A, the magnetization occurs rapidly when a 
magnetic force is applied, until the point where the magnetic field (Y ) reaches a 
quasi-saturation (point B). When the magnetization force diminishes towards zero, the 
magnetic field diminishes to point C. The material stays permanently magnetized, i.e., 
it becomes a loadstone.  
Hysteresis typically exhibits hysteresis loops13, like the closed curve BCDEF 
(major loop) in Figure i.1. After increasing from zero to b, if X  decreases from b to 
a, the pair ( X ,Y ) moves along the curve BCDE; if, after reaching the quasi-
saturation point E  (for aX = ), X  increases from a to b, the pair ( X ,Y ) moves 
along the curve EFB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 See Visitin (1994) and Mayergoyz (2003) for more detail. 
13
 Note, however, that loops are not an essential characteristic of hysteresis. The definition of hysteresis 
emphasizes the fact that history-dependent branching constitutes the essence of hysteresis, while 
looping is a particular case of branching that occurs when the input varies back and forth between two 
consecutive extrema, while branching takes place for arbitrary input variation (Mayergoyz 2003, p. 
xviii). In economics, due to the fact that it is not possible to conduct experiments where we vary the 
input back and forth between two consecutive extrema, it is difficult to identify loops in response to the 
dependent variable. 
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Figure i.1. The Input-Output Diagram - The Hysteresis Loop 
 
 
Moreover, if X reverses its motion when X  lies between a and b, the pair 
( X ,Y ) moves to the interior of the region delimited by the curve BCDE generating 
sub-loops (Visitin 1994). The principal characteristic of this graph is that 
as X increases ( 0>X& ) and subsequently decreases ( 0<X& ), a family of continuous 
connected curves is generated. Yet there is no single function relating the input to the 
output. On the contrary, a family of functions is needed to represent the X /Y  
relationship. Furthermore, the complicated behavior represented by the sub-loops is 
especially relevant to economics given the tendency of the disturbances affecting the 
systems to be of an irregular rather than a regular cyclical nature (Cross 1980, p. 29) 
The hysteretic system described in Figure i.1 has three important 
characteristics: firstly, the system exhibits remanence and not merely persistence 
because after a temporary shock in the value of the input ( X ) the equilibrium value of 
the output (Y ) is permanently displaced from point A to point C (in physics, the 
distance AC is termed the remanence of the electromagnetic field)14. Secondly, the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable is non-
linear, in the sense that the trajectory followed by the value of the output as the value 
of the input increases (AB) is not reversed when the value of the input starts to 
decrease (the value of the output now followed the path BC). Thirdly, the system 
                                                 
14
 Note that, to regain the original field characteristics, a negative magnetizing force AD is required. 
AD is called coercivity – a measure of the extra force required to restore the original characteristics 
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has a selective memory, which means that only past extreme non-dominated shocks 
are retained in memory (see section II.4.3 for a detailed description of this property).  
 
 
I.3. SOURCES OF HYSTERESIS AT THE FIRM LEVEL AND AGGREGATE IMPLICATIONS 
 
  If it exists, strong hysteresis in employment results necessarily of the 
aggregation of weakly hysteretic processes of employment adjustment activated by 
heterogeneous micro-agents (Mayergoyz 2003).   
We know, at least since Oi (1962), that labor input, rather than being a 
variable factor, should be considered a quasi-fixed factor of production, i.e. one 
whose total cost is partially variable and partially fixed.  
Labor adjustment costs (also named one-time fixed costs Hamermesh (1993, 
p. 47) are costs that are incurred at one point in time, usually when workers are hired 
or dismissed, and take the form of irreversible costs, i.e., they are sunk costs. These 
costs may be lumpy (fixed costs of adjustment) or divisible (variable costs of 
adjustment) depending on how they vary with the size of employment adjustment (net 
or gross).  
Adjustment costs are fixed if the costs associated with employment change are 
invariant to the size of the change.  Examples of fixed adjustment costs include: a) 
costs of maintaining a personnel department; b) advertising costs; c) training costs 
that are independent of the number of workers trained; d) disruption in production 
caused by difficulties in re-scheduling the flow of workers across sites within the 
establishment; e) the fall in the firm’s productivity due to reduced morale of the 
workforce following mass-layoff episodes (Hamermesh 1993). 
Variable costs of adjustment are all adjustment costs that vary with the number 
of workers hired or fired (or the net variation in employment). They include: a) hiring 
costs, such as screening and interviewing applicants for the posting of job vacancies; 
b) training costs designed to enhance the productivity of the new workers; c) firing 
costs such as red-tape and severance pay. Variable costs of adjustment may be linear, 
if adjustment costs per worker are invariant to the size of employment changes, or 
quadratic, if adjustment costs per worker are increase in size employment change 
(Hamermesh 1993).  
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Adjustment costs, irrespective of their structure, are one possible source of 
fixity of the labor input, making firms adjust the level of employment slowly in 
response to shocks (Hamermesh and Pfann 1996, p. 1264). 
However, the response of labor demand to an exogenous shock depends not only 
on the source and magnitude of adjustment costs, but also on their structure. 
Moreover, the structure of adjustment costs has an impact on the firms’ employment 
path that cannot be confined to the short run.   
If non-convex (i.e. linear of fixed) adjustment costs are present, employment 
does not change in response to small macroeconomic shocks, but it adjusts fully to its 
target if the shock is large enough (or following a series of small cumulative shocks). 
As a result, the dynamics of employment at the firm level is characterized by a high 
frequency of long periods of inaction followed by rare episodes of large adjustments. 
There is, in fact, some evidence that labor adjustment costs are at least in part non-
convex, implying that at the micro-level employment proceeds in jumps (see 
Hamermesh 1989; 1993, Hamermesh and Pfann 1996 and Caballero et al. 1997, for 
example).  
A vast literature, theoretical and empirical, shows that when decisions are 
made under uncertainty and adjustment costs are fixed or linear in structure, periods 
of inertia would emerge and this is sufficient to produce hysteresis. 
 The recognition of the similarities between the behavior of some economic 
variables and some physical phenomena (see Dixit 1992) paves the way for importing 
into economics the models of hysteresis as originally stated in physics. 
At the micro level, some models of hysteresis easily generate an employment 
dynamics consistent with the empirical evidence available. At the aggregate level, 
however, employment series look smooth and appear to be well described by partial-
adjustment like models reflecting convex adjustment costs at the firm level.   
Actually, Hamermesh (1989 p. 75), in his analysis of monthly employment 
record of seven manufacturing plants of a large U.S. durable-goods producer between 
1977 and 1987, shows that whereas the pattern of individual plant adjustment exhibits 
substantial inaction punctuated by periods of large adjustment, aggregation over the 
seven plants produces a smooth path of employment. In the same vein, Varejão (2000) 
and Cooper (2004) also show that while the dynamics of employment at the micro 
level is supportive of the importance of non-convex adjustment costs, at the aggregate 
level there is more evidence in favor of the convex adjustment cost model. These 
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results, because they imply that lumpiness is a feature of individuals but not of 
aggregates, raise the issue of the irrelevance of micro models of employment 
adjustment to explain the dynamics of employment at the macro level.   
 In fact, aggregate series tend to look smoother and, for that reason, apparently 
inconsistent with the presence of hysteresis. However, if micro heterogeneity is 
properly accounted for, i.e. if aggregation is explicitly modeled as it should be in the 
presence of non-convex costs of adjustment, it will still be possible to uncover signs 
of hysteresis at the macro-level as well. 
  
 
I.4. BRIEF CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PORTUGUESE LABOR MARKET 
 
I.4.1. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS  
 
 In this section, we focus on two aspects of labor market regulations: 
employment protection legislation (protection of workers with permanent contracts 
and regulation of fixed-term contracts) and regulations on working time. We also 
present an overview of the major changes of legislation in our sample period from 
January 1995 to December 2005.  
 
 
I.4.1. LEGISLATION ON DISMISSALS OF REGULAR EMPLOYMENT 
 
To evaluate the strictness of employment protection legislation of workers 
with permanent contracts, we consider the following aspects of the legislation on 
individual and collective dismissals: a) reasons for dismissal; b) notice period; c) 
compensation; d) procedural obligations. These aspects were regulated by the Law of 
Termination of Contracts (DL 64-A/1989), by the Law of Dismissals by Failure to 
Adapt to Changes in the Nature of the Work (DL 400/1991) and now, they are 
regulated by the recent Labor Code (Law 99/2003). Except for the regulations 
concerning the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts, no major modifications 
have been introduced since 1989.   
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 Individual dismissals 
 
In Portugal, individual dismissals of employees with permanent contracts are 
permitted on disciplinary grounds in cases of employee’s culpable behavior15, and for 
reasons that are not the fault of the employee: i) extinction of the labor position16 and; 
ii) employee’s failure to adapt to changes in the nature of his work17. 
In all cases of dismissals for reasons not imputable to the worker, he or she is 
entitled to severance pay equal to one month’s pay for each year of service18 and a 
period of 60-days’ advance notice.   
 In all cases of individual dismissal, written notice of the impending dismissal 
is required for the employee and for the works council and/or union. This statement 
must give the reasons on which the dismissal is based. The worker and his 
representatives are given the opportunity to dispute the employer’s allegations. In case 
of economic redundancies, the worker may further ask for Labor Inspectorate 
intervention, in which case officials have to verify the validity of the arguments put 
forward by the employer. For all types of dismissal these procedures take at least three 
weeks 
 
Collective Dismissal 
 
Portuguese law establishes that a collective dismissal is the simultaneous 
dismissal or a successive dismissal within a period of three months of at least 2 
workers in micro or small firms (firms with fewer than 50 workers) and at least 5 
workers in medium or large firms (firms with more than 50 workers). These 
dismissals should be justified by the closure of the plant or an equivalent structure, or 
by the need to reduce the number of employees due to market, technological or 
structural reasons19. 
60-days’ advance notification of a collective dismissal is also required for the 
works council or union and for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The written 
notice should include: the reason for dismissal; the number of workers being 
                                                 
15
 DL- 64-A/89, No. 9. in its present version in Law 99/2003, No. 396. 
16
 DL- 64-A/89, No. 26, in its present version in Law 99/2003, No. 402. 
17
 DL- 400/91 No. 1, in its present version in Law 99/2003, No. 405, which emphasizes the incidental 
nature of the failure to adapt to changes in the nature of the work. 
18
 DL- 64-A/89, No. 13, in its present version in Law 99/2003, No. 401. 
19
 DL- 64-A/89, No. 16 and 26, in its present version in Law 99/2003, No. 397. 
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dismissed; the criterion used to select the individuals being dismissed; the method 
used to compute the corresponding compensation. Consultations between the three 
parties are mandatory within 15 days. Alternatives to redundancy, the number of 
dismissals, and ways to mitigate the effects of dismissal are all issues that must be 
addressed during this consultation process. Once an agreement is reached, each 
worker selected for dismissal must be notified of the impending job loss. This must be 
done at least 60 days before the date of dismissal. Otherwise, the worker is entitled to 
the corresponding pay20.     
As in the case of individual dismissals, employees are entitled to severance 
pay equal to one month’s pay for each year of service, subject to a minimum of three 
months’ pay21. 
In all cases of dismissals only courts may declare a dismissal unlawful, mostly 
on the grounds of the employer’s failure to comply with mandatory dismissal 
procedures. Consequences of such a court decision are the employer being obliged to 
reinstate the worker in his previous position and pay him an amount equal to what he 
would have received from the time he was last paid to the moment the decision was 
made. The worker may choose to quit, in which case he is entitled to an indemnity 
corresponding to one-month’s pay for each year of service (subject to a 3-month 
minimum).  
  
  
I.4.2. LEGISLATION ON FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS 
 
In assessing the strictness of legislation on fixed-term contracts we consider: 
a) the admissible grounds for entering into such contracts; b) the maximum number of 
contracts and the cumulative length of subsequent contract renewals; c) restrictions on 
termination of contracts. 
Fixed-term contracts are permitted under a specific set of circumstances22: i) 
temporary replacement of permanent workers; ii) exceptional and temporary 
workload; iii) seasonal activity; iv) time limited specific projects; v) business start-
ups; vi) launching of new activities of uncertain duration; vii) recruitment of workers 
                                                 
20
 DL- 64-A/89, No. 20 and 21, in its present version in the Law 99/2003, No. 398. 
21
 DL- 64-A/89, No. 17, with the redaction change of the Law 32/99 and with the minor alterations 
introduce in the actual law (Law 99/2003, No. 419).  
22
 DL 64-A/89, No. 41.  
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in search of their first job; viii) long-term unemployed. From 2003 this set of reasons 
should not be viewed as an exhaustive list of the objective grounds to enter into such a 
type of contracts. The general criterion is that the fixed-term contract is only allowed 
to satisfy firms’ temporary needs23.     
Since 1989, the duration of fixed-term contracts, cannot exceed three years 
(including renewals) and cannot be renewed more than twice24. The new Labor Code 
of 2003 added that after the period of three years or after two renewals, the contract 
could be renewed once more if its duration were between one and three years25.   
A fixed-term contract expires only if the employer notifies the worker eight 
days in advance that he does not intend to renew it; otherwise it is automatically 
renewed. If the maximum duration of the contract is exceeded, the contract 
automatically becomes permanent.     
 If the employer terminates the contract before its term, and the termination is 
unlawful, the worker is entitled to compensation equal to the pay loss from the 
dismissal to the date of the court’s decision or the term of the contract (whichever 
occurs first). He or she is also entitled to reinstatement if the term of the contract has 
not been reached. 
 Moreover, if, during the period of the contract the firm opens a vacancy for a 
permanent position, workers with fixed-term contracts who may qualify for the job 
are given priority over other applicants.  
 If, after an elapsed duration of twelve months, a contract is not renewed for 
reasons not imputable to the worker, he or she cannot be replaced within a period of 
three months.    
  
 
I.4.3. WORKING TIME REGULATIONS  
 
Working time provisions typically regulate: a) normal working period; b) 
medium duration of the working-week, including permitted overtime work; c) 
overtime work. 
                                                 
23
 Law 99/2003, No. 129.  
24
 DL 64-A/89, No. 44. 
25
 Law 99/2003, No. 139. 
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 In Portugal, since 1996, the standard working hours, set by law, cannot 
exceed 8 hours per day or 40 hours per week. The reduction of the standard hours can 
be established by collective agreement but it cannot result in lower pay. The normal 
period of work can be defined in average terms. The maximum number of hours of 
work per day can be extended by a maximum of 4 hours, as long as the maximum 
number of hours per week does not exceed 6026.  
The maximum number of average working hours per week (including 
overtime) cannot exceed 48 hours. The average number of working hours is computed 
over a period of time that is defined by collective bargaining, and may be as long as 
12 months (the legal default is 4 months)27.    
Overtime work is allowed if the firm faces a transitory increase in the work 
load that that does not justify hiring more workers28. Overtime hours are subject to a 
legal maximum that is equal to 175 hours per year, for micro and small firms, and 150 
hours for medium or large firms. The number of overtime hours can be extended to 
200 hours per year by collective agreement29.         
The overtime premium is set by law at 50% of the wage rate in the first hour, 
and at 75% in subsequent hours30. 
 
 
I.4.4. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF LABOR MARKET REGULATION 
 
Portugal ranks at the top in all indexes of employment protection (only 
Luxembourg has stricter employment protection legislation). Table i.1 reports three 
indexes of the strictness of the employment protection legislation: i) the OECD 2004 
index; ii) the 1995 value of the time series index from Labor Market Institutions 
Database, version 2.00, 2001, by Stephen Nickel, and; iii) an index reported by 
                                                 
26
 Until 1996 the normal period of work was 8 hours per day and 44 hours per week (DL 409/71). The 
present norm (Law 99/2003, No. 163 and 164) keeps the same normal period of worked established 
since 1996 (Law 21/96). 
27
 Until 1998 this limit was 50 hours per week on average (DL 409/71). The law currently in force 
(Law 99/2003, No. 169) maintains the same limit established since 1998 (Law 73/98). 
28
 Law 99/2003, No. 199. 
29
 Law 99/2003, No. 200. The maximum number of annual overtime hours was changed in 2003. 
Before 2003, the maximum number of annual overtime hours was 200 unrelated to the size of the firm 
(DL 421/1983).   
30
 Law 99/2003, No. 258, with no change since 1983 (DL 421/83).  
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Nunziata (2002)31. The overall index of employment protection legislation published 
by OECD follows Grub and Well’s (1993) methodology, ranking countries by the 
strictness of legislation concerning regular employment (including regular procedural 
inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, and 
difficulty of dismissal), temporary employment (including regulation on fixed-term 
contracts and regulations on temporary work agencies) and collective dismissals 
(including definition of collective dismissal, additional notification requirements, 
additional delays involved and other special costs to employers).  
The indexes indicate great heterogeneity in the legislation and practices across 
countries (see Table i.1). This heterogeneity is mainly due to the regulations 
concerning temporary employment and less so collective dismissals. Actually Table 
i.1 shows that the cross-country variability of the indexes is greater in the case of 
temporary contracts. Nonetheless, there is a positive correlation between the strictness 
of the regulations concerning permanent and temporary contracts (see Table i.2). 
Furthermore, Employment Protection Legislation is stricter in southern European 
countries and less restrictive in the USA, UK and Canada. According to these indexes, 
Portugal is one of the countries with the strictest employment protection legislation 
concerning regular and temporary employment.  
Concerning changes over time, Table i.1 shows a tendency for convergence in 
the strictness of the employment protection regulations of regular contracts between 
OECD countries (the variability of the indexes decreased from the late 1990s to 
2003), and a tendency for divergence in the case of the strictness of the regulations 
concerning temporary contracts and collective dismissals. Despite this time evolution, 
there was little change in the relative position of the countries. Moreover, Table i.1 
indicates a slight reduction in the strictness of the employment protection legislation 
in Portugal, due solely to the change in legislation concerning the protection of 
temporary employment32. 
 
                                                 
31
 In spite of being different, the three indexes are highly rank correlated (see Table i.2). 
32
 In spite of being widely used, there are problems of subjectivity in the construction of these 
indicators, and this could be especially relevant in the case of Portugal (Addison and Teixeira 2003). 
Concerning employment protection indexes, (Addison and Teixeira 2003, p. 91) consider that there are 
ambiguities related to: the number of categories over which one would wish to average the rankings; 
the implicit weighting scheme; the problem of ordinal rather than cardinal measures; the difficulty of 
attributing scores on the basis of the legislation that could be applied differently in practice.  
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Table i.1 
Indicators of the Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation1 
OECD Country Regular Employment Temporary Employment Collective Dismissals Overall EPL 
EPL 
LMID4 
 Late 1990s 2003 Late 1990s 2003 Late 1990s 2003 Late 1990s2 20033 1995 
EPI5 
Austria 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 3.3 3.3 2.4 (7) 2.2 (7) 1.30 (6) 12.3 (8) 
Belgium 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.6 4.1 4.1 2.5 (5) 2.5 (5) 1.19 (8) 15.28 (4) 
Canada 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 2.9 2.9 1.1 (15) 1.1 (16) 0.30 (12) 3.00 (12) 
Czech Republic 3.3 3.3 0.5 0.5 2.1 2.1 1.9 (10) 1.9 (12) - - 
Denmark 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.9 1.8 (13) 1.8 (13) 0.74 (10) 9.25 (10) 
Finland 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.2 (9) 2.1 (8) 1.08 (9) 11.65 (9) 
France 2.3 2.5 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.1 2.8 (3) 2.9 (4) 1.50 (2) 13.67 (6) 
Germany 2.7 2.7 2.3 1.8 3.5 3.8 2.6 (4) 2.5 (6) 1.41 (3) 16.05 (3) 
Hungary 1.9 1.9 0.6 1.1 2.9 2.9 1.5 (14) 1.7 (15) - - 
Japan 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.9 (11) 1.8 (14) 1.40 (4) 14.00 (5) 
Luxembourg - 2.6 - 4.8 - 5.0 - 3.9 (1) - - 
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 1.2 1.2 3.0 3.0 2.3 (8) 2.03 (10) 1.23 (7) 13.10 (7) 
Poland 2.2 2.2 0.8 1.3 4.1 4.1 1.9 (12) 2.1 (13) - - 
Portugal 4.3 4.3 3.0 2.8 3.6 3.6 3.7 (1) 3.5 (2) 1.91 (1) 18.03 (2) 
Slovak Republic 3.6 3.5 1.1 0.4 3.3 2.5 2.5 (6) 2.0 (11) - - 
Slovenia - - - - - - - - - - 
Spain 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.1 3 (2) 3.1 (3) 1.32 (5) 18.65 (1) 
UK 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.4 2.9 2.9 1 (16) 1.1 (17) 0.35 (11) 3.50 (11) 
USA 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2.9 2.9 0.7 (17) 0.7 (18) 0.10 (13) 1.00 (13) 
Average 2.31 2.31 1.55 1.71 3.05 3.13 2.11 2.16 1.06 11.50 
Stand. Dev. 1.02 0.96 1.08 1.29 0.71 0.85 0.76 0.82 0.53 5.73 
Max. 4.30 4.30 3.60 4.80 4.10 5.00 3.70 3.90 1.91 18.65 
Min. 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.30 1.50 1.50 0.70 0.70 0.10 1.00 
1    In all cases, the more rigid the legislation, the higher the index.  
2    EPL Late 90’s: Employment Protection Indicator from OECD – Employment Outlook 2004 (Table 2.A.2.4). 
3    EPL 2003:  Employment Protection Indicator from OECD – Employment Outlook 2004 (Table 2.A.2.4). Overall indexes are calculated according to a weighted average of the scores for regular, temporary contracts and 
collective dismissals  
4    EPL LMID:  Employment Protection Indicator from Labor Market Institutions Database, version 2.00, 2001, by Stephen Nickel  
5    EPI:  Employment Protection Indicator [0.20] from Nunziata (2002) (Table 1, p. 38). 
() ranking 
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Table i.2 
Spearman’s Rank Correlations Between Employment Protection Indicators 
 
 
The international comparison of strictness of the legislation concerning 
working time is more difficult than in the case of legislation on regular employment 
and fixed-terms contracts due to less availability of data. Nonetheless, we report some 
indicators in Table i.3. The first set of indicators is based on a survey of employers 
about their feelings on the strictness of legislation. This has the advantage of 
incorporating all potential influences, including negotiations with trade unions and 
political pressure, as well as legislation33. We also report a synthetic indicator 
constructed by Nunziata (2003) that uses information from OECD and EIRO.      
Table i.3 shows that Portuguese working time regulation is characterized by 
medium strictness compared to other countries. The UK, the USA and Japan are 
countries with very soft legislation concerning working time, while Spain, the 
Netherlands, France and Germany have stricter regulations. 
 
                                                 
33
 Some caution should be taken in order to compare the results of this survey across countries. The 
difficulty in comparing this kind of surveys results from: different employer’s attitudes; consistency of 
responses when economic conditions facing firms in the same sample differ, changes in the identity of 
the respondent managers, and even changes in the relevant question (Addison and Teixeira 2003, p. 
120). 
 
EPL 
2003 
EPL   
LMID EP 
Regular 
Employment 
Temporary 
Employment 
Collective 
Dismissals  
Overall EPL2003 1.00 0.80** (4.37) 
0.86** 
5.52 - - - 
EPL LMID 
 
- 1.00 0.85** 5.39 - - - 
EP 
 
- - 1.00 - - - 
Regular 
Employment 
 
- - - 1.00 0.59** (2.95) 
0.30 
(1.24) 
Temporary 
Employment 
 
- - - - 1.00 0.53* (2.48) 
Collective 
Dismissals - - - - - 1.00 
  
**significant at 1%; *significant at 5% 
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Table i.3 
Indicators of the Strictness of Working Time Legislation1 
Limitation to Working Time Flexibility 
Total Industry2 Service Sector3 Country 
 
Legal Contractual Readiness Legal Contractual Readiness 
WTR4 
 
Austria 42 25 22 33 17 20 8.33 (7)  
Belgium 42 28 37 56 38 9 0.00 (11) 
Canada - - - - - - 10.00 (3) 
Czech Republic - - - - - - - 
Denmark 15 53 35 - - - 5.00 (9) 
Finland 31 44 41 68 70 72 8.33 (7) 
France 57 44 31 58 55 32 10.00 (3) 
Germany 30 29 18 29 26 21 10.00 (3) 
Hungary - - - - - - - 
Japan - - - - - - 0.00 (11) 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - 
Netherlands 17 16 16 - - - 11.67 (2) 
Poland - - - - - - - 
Portugal 27 24 26 35 23 22 10.00 (6) 
Slovak Republic - - - - - - - 
Slovenia - - - - - - - 
Spain 26 30 22 51 57 65 20.00 (1) 
UK 12 10 6 12 10 12 0.00 (11) 
USA - - - - - - 3.33 (10) 
1 In all cases, the more rigid the legislation, the higher the index.  
2Limitations to Working Time Flexibility Index from European Economy – Supplement B (January 2000) (Table 6, p. 5). 
3Limitations to Working Time Flexibility Index from European Economy – Supplement B (December 1999) (Table 6, p. 5). 
- European Commission’s ad hoc surveys of 1999 and 2000 on whether insufficient flexibility in shedding staff is an obstacle to employing more people 
- The reported number is the coefficient of importance which ranges from 0 (if all respondents consider a factor to be ‘not so important’ ) to 100 (if all consider it ‘very important’) 
4WTR: Working Time Regulation Index from Nunziata (2003), (Table 1, p. 38). 
() rankings. 
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I.4.2. LABOR INPUT ADJUSTMENT AND HYSTERESIS  - A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL 
LITERATURE 
 
 
 To better characterize the Portuguese labor market, the analysis of the 
institutional framework, is, in this section, complemented by consideration of the 
results of the empirical studies on the outcomes of the labor market adjustment.  
  
 
I.4.2.1. PATTERNS OF LABOR INPUT ADJUSTMENT  
   
At the firm level, the empirical literature on employment adjustment shows, in 
general, a very unresponsive and discrete pattern of employment as a result of product 
demand shocks, which indicates the existence of significant non-convex costs of 
adjustment34. Examples are:   
Blanchard and Portugal (2001), who, using annual and quarterly data from the 
Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado and Quadros de Pessoal, show that job 
reallocation (especially job destruction) is lower in Portugal than in the U.S. when 
quarterly data is considered. This result is related to the fact that employment 
protection in Portugal may lead firms to smoother quarter-to-quarter movements in 
employment.  
Varejão and Portugal (2007), who, using an unbalanced panel of 10 673 
establishments from the Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado (Employment Survey) 
from the Portuguese Ministry of Employment, provide a descriptive analysis of labor 
market flows that show unequivocal signs of discrete adjustment consistent with the 
existence of fixed employment adjustment costs. The authors also estimated a 
Duration Model of Employment Adjustment showing that when unobserved 
                                                 
34
 Nonetheless, Addison and Teixeira (2001b) defend that Portuguese employment shows an apparent 
ability to accommodate changes in output demand in spite of the strictness of employment protection 
legislation summarized in OECD rankings. One possible way of explaining this dissociation between 
the high values that the country shows in indexes of employment protection and the existence of a 
relatively high speed of adjustment of employment to its long run equilibrium value is the weighting 
scheme that does not capture the importance of a relatively more favorable ranking concerning 
protection on collective rather than individual dismissals (Addison and Teixeira 2001b). Moreover, the 
practice of collective bargaining could also originate differences between the indexes of employment 
protection legislation and effective employment adjustment. Actually, in Portugal, contrary to what 
happens in many countries, the regulations cannot in general be exceeded under collective bargaining 
(the principal exception being severance pay). 
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heterogeneity is properly accounted for, the hazard function (the instantaneous 
conditional probability for an establishment to abandon the inaction regime – no 
adjustment of the labor force) is upward sloping. An upward sloping hazard function 
indicates that there is a non-convex component of the adjustment costs that is 
important enough to shape the process of adjusting employment.  
Varejão and Portugal (2000) estimated a Switching Model of Labor Demand in 
which a firm switches from inaction to action as the deviation of current employment 
from its equilibrium level changes in absolute terms from more than a non-negative 
parameter k positively related to the magnitude of the fixed cost of adjustment. Using 
data on 1 395 establishments from the Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado and 
Quadros de Pessoal over the period from the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter 
of 1995, the authors show that the switching regression performs quite well indicating 
the presence of important non-linearities in the employment path at the micro level. 
With the switching equation they obtain much higher output and wage elasticities than 
those estimated with the traditional partial adjusting model. These results indicate that 
the low elasticities associated with employment forcing variables and the very high 
coefficient associated with lagged employment are not the result of a slow adjustment 
to equilibrium level of employment with the firms closing a small fraction of the gap 
each quarter, but instead the result of long periods of inaction punctuated by large 
adjustment to match the equilibrium employment level.   
Addison and Teixeira (2001a) estimated by GMM a partial adjustment model 
of employment demand, using an annual sample of 1 970 firms in the period 1990-97 
from the Central de Balanços do Banco de Portugal (Balance Sheet Records of the 
Bank of Portugal). They obtain a lagged employment coefficient of 0.75 and 
comparing with aggregate results, they conclude that panel estimation with annual 
micro data yields more employment inertia.  
Despite not focusing on hysteresis, these studies provide some evidence of the 
presence of the necessary condition for its occurrence, i.e. the existence of non-
convex costs of employment adjustment at the micro level. 
 At the aggregate level, however, signs of inertia and discrete adjustment are 
not clearly observable.     
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Addison and Teixeira (2001a; 2001b) estimated a cointegrated demand 
equation with aggregate time series quarterly data on employment, output and relative 
price of energy over the period from the first quarter of 1977 to the fourth quarter of 
1997 from the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (Portuguese Statistics Office). From 
the first-stage cointegrating regression they obtained a low long run output elasticity 
of 0.4, which is significantly low when compared with Germany (0.84), UK (0.62) 
and Spain (0.74). However, by estimating a one-stage error correction model Addison 
and Teixeira (2001a, 2001b) found a relatively high speed of adjustment in 
conjunction with a low employment-output elasticity, which produces a fast 
convergence to the long-term path.   
Varejão and Portugal (2000), aggregating data on 1 395 establishments from 
the Inquérito ao Emprego Estruturado and Quadros de Pessoal over the period from 
1991 to 1995 estimated a partial adjustment model and concluded that at annual 
frequencies the coefficient of the lagged dependent employment at the highest level of 
aggregation (0.908) is very similar to the one obtained at the establishment level 
(0.904). However, passing from establishment level to higher levels of aggregation 
seems to originate more reasonable results for the partial adjustment model, meaning 
that the signs of hysteresis at the micro level tend to vanish at aggregate level.       
 
 
I.4.2.2. HYSTERESIS IN PORTUGUESE EMPLOYMENT 
 
Studies regarding the existence of hysteresis in employment (or in 
unemployment) series in Portugal are not abundant. Moreover, the few available 
studies were conducted assuming a great variety of hysteresis definitions with 
microeconomic foundations that focus only on the supply side of the labor market.    
To the best of our knowledge, no study addresses the issue of hysteresis on the 
Portuguese labor market from a demand perspective, exploring the link between the 
existence of non-convex costs of employment adjustment and hysteresis at the micro 
level, and investigating the aggregate consequences of such behavior. The studies that 
focus on the issue of hysteresis for the Portuguese Labor Market, either link hysteresis 
with the existence of unit roots in the unemployment series or identify hysteresis on 
the basis of the significance of unemployment change in a Phillips Curve equation, 
justified by mechanisms related to the supply side of the labor market.   
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Insider-Outsider Explanation   
 
From the labor supply side, and following the Insider -Outsider explanation of 
hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers 1986; 1997), Modesto et al. (1992), using semi-
annual data from the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (Portuguese Statistics Office) 
over the period from the first semester of 1977 to the second semester of 1988, 
conclude that while full hysteresis is rejected by the data hysteresis appears as an 
important source of unemployment persistence35.  
Along the same line, Duarte and Andrade (2000) apply in a different way 
Amable’s (1993) concepts of weak and strong hysteresis to characterize, respectively, 
the existence of a unit root and a near unit root36 in the series of unemployment rate. 
They implement unit root tests for the series of unemployment, unemployment rate 
and employment using annual (1953-1993), semi-annual (from the first semester of 
1974 to the second semester of 1998), quarterly (from the first quarter of 1983-
1988:4) and monthly (from January 1983 to December 1998) data from the Series 
Longas do Banco de Portugal and from the OECD.  They conclude for the existence 
of strong hysteresis based on the presence of a unit root in the unemployment series at 
all data frequencies.  
Carneiro and Portugal (2004), using annual data over the period from 1993 to 
1997 from the Social Audit (Balanço Social) and from the Quadros de Pessoal 
(Personnel Records), analyzed the weight of insider forces and the power of insiders 
in the wage negotiation. The authors conclude that insider forces, such as revenue per 
employee and market share have a significant weight on wage determination in all 
sectors. Concerning the power of insiders, when the conventional measure is used (the 
change in the number of insiders) in a wage equation, no robust evidence was found 
that insiders have an important role in wage determination. In fact, Carneiro (2004) 
found no evidence of membership hysteresis effect when the aggregate sample is 
used, but a positive and significant impact of the variation in the number of insiders 
on wage determination in the manufacturing sector.      
                                                 
35
 According to Blanchard and Summers (1986) full hysteresis exists only when the insiders cause a 
significant impact on the determination of the wage. When this happens, the wage is not affected by the 
level of the unemployment rate and the traditional Phillips curve with a constant natural unemployment 
rate is no longer valid. On the contrary, unemployment becomes dependent on past unemployment, i.e., 
it follows a random walk. 
36
 Stationary series, but with a long period of adjustment to the equilibrium value. 
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Pereira (1998) distinguishes pure hysteresis (when past unemployment has a 
permanent effect on the NAIRU implying that the unemployment rate follows a 
random walk) from partial hysteresis or persistence (when past unemployment has 
only a temporary effect on the NAIRU, implying that unemployment follows an 
autoregressive behavior with a coefficient of lagged unemployment close to but less 
than one)37. To test the existence of hysteresis, Pereira (1998) implemented unit root 
tests to the annual unemployment rate series over the period from 1964 to 1994 
concluding for the non-rejection of the existence of a unit root.  
 
Human Capital Depreciation Explanation   
 
According to the human capital explanation of hysteresis, pressure over the 
wage is a decreasing function of the duration of unemployment. Thus, only recently 
unemployed workers (measured by the variation in the unemployment rate) could 
have a significant impact on wages. 
Pereira (1998) estimated an augmented Phillips Curve that includes not only the 
level of the unemployment rate but also its change. In this context, pure hysteresis 
exists if the wage inflation depends negatively on the change in the unemployment 
rate, but not on its level. The microeconomic explanation lies in insider-outsider 
mechanisms or alternatively in the human capital explanation. His study reveals a 
significant coefficient associated with the unemployment rate level and with the 
unemployment rate variation, implying the rejection of pure hysteresis but the non-
rejection of partial hysteresis.  
In the same vein, Rosa (2004) used annual time series macro data from the 
Series Longas do Banco de Portugal over the period from 1954 to 1995 to conclude 
that the unemployment rate is not significant in the long run equation, but the change 
in the unemployment rate is significant, implying the non-rejection of the existence of 
a modified version of the Phillips Curve that allows for hysteresis.   
Again from the supply side of the labor market, Bover et al. (2000) found a 
decreasing hazard function (based on a sample of men aged 20-64 from quarterly 
labor forces surveys over the period from the second quarter of 1992 to the fourth 
quarter of 1997) reflecting a decreasing probability for a worker to leave 
                                                 
37
 The author recognized that this conception of hysteresis does not follow the properties of the original 
definition from physics 
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unemployment as the time spent unemployed increased, which seems to confirm the 
validity of the human capital theory of hysteresis. Addison and Portugal (2003) 
studied the determinants of unemployment duration in a competitive risk framework 
with two destination states; inactivity and employment. They estimated a polynomial 
hazard function using data from the Inquérito ao Emprego (Portuguese Quarterly 
Employment Survey) from the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (Portuguese Statistics 
Office) and they found that the employment hazard is decreasing over a large portion 
of the relevant range. 
 
 
I.5. CONTRIBUTION 
 
This thesis contributes, to the best of our knowledge, with some novel input to the 
vast subject of employment adjustment: 
 
• A global perspective of the employment adjustment is provided by linking the 
existence of hysteresis at the macro level to the discontinuous and infrequent 
behavior of employment demand at the micro level under the presence of non-
convex costs of adjusting the number of employees and uncertainty. To do so 
we join economic theory, empirical appropriated data (our macro series are an 
aggregation of the micro data of the firms that remain in the data set from the 
beginning to the end reflecting only the shock) and computational methods.    
 
• An extension of the Non-Ideal Relay Model of Weak Hysteresis to analyze the 
theoretical effect of the adjustment through hours of work upon the hysteresis 
band. 
  
• Codes which implement strong hysteresis models in a referenced high-level 
technical computing language and interactive environment (MATLAB) with 
superior numerical properties than the few at available in the literature. 
 
• Empirical analysis of the interaction between the adjustment of the labor input 
through the number of workers and through the number of hours per worker at 
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the micro level, and its implications to the width of the band of inertia at the 
aggregate level, in the framework of the Linear Play model of strong 
hysteresis. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF WEAK AND STRONG HYSTERESIS AND SOME 
MODELS WITH APPLICATION TO LABOR DEMAND 
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II.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of hysteresis is a source of considerable confusion since it has been 
used in economics in different assertions. The word hysteresis was initially applied to 
unemployment rate in the assertion that a temporary disequilibrium affects the position 
of the equilibrium point, or creates some friction on the way back to equilibrium (Phelps 
1972). Hysteresis is also used to describe persistence in deviations from equilibria. If 
shocks originate the deviation of unemployment rate from equilibrium rate, actual 
unemployment remains in disequilibrium for some time, though the equilibrium rate 
remains an attractor point in the long run (Layard et al., 1991). Moreover, after the 
influential article of Blanchard and Summers (1996), hysteresis is frequently associated 
with the presence of a unit root in a linear dynamic system (or zero root in continuous 
time difference equations).  
Nevertheless, hysteresis should not be mistaken with systems with zero-
eigenvalues or with unit roots in discrete time series. 
Firstly, hysteresis is a property of an input-output system in which the state 
variable is subject to an external action, while unit root process is a univariate process 
where shocks exert directly on the variable state. 
Secondly, the unit root process cannot exhibit the property of remanence but 
merely persistence (Amable et al. 1993; 1994). As an example, let us consider the 
random walk process: ttt nn ερ +×= −1 ,  with 1=ρ  and tε  a white noise stochastic 
term. This process exhibits a long memory because the shocks have a permanent effect 
on tn . However, whatever the magnitude of the shock that affects tε  is, the occurrence 
of a first shock followed by a second one of the same intensity but of opposite sign 
takes the univariate equation back to its initial level. On the other hand, in the case of 
hysteresis the response to an impulse is not linear. The impact of a shock depends on the 
previous non-dominated shocks, and a transitory change in the input variable leaves the 
output variable permanently changed (Amable et al. 1993, p. 128).  
Thirdly, the present value of the variable tn  keeps all the information of its 
trajectory over time, without showing any intrinsic dynamic of convergence to a mean 
value1. In a random walk process the shocks would cumulate over time, without 
                                                 
1
 Actually, if tn  follows a random walk process it can be written as: ∑
=
+=
t
j
jt nn
0
0 ε . 
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progressively vanishing, which implies that all innovations in tε  have an impact over 
the long run best forecast of the series (actually, at any moment tn  is the best long run 
forecast of the series itself). Unit root processes have a long or unselective memory of 
every past shock (Göcke 2002). Differently, in a system that exhibits hysteresis the 
output does not depend on all past values of the input but only on the non-dominated 
maximums and non-dominated minimums. The system possesses a selective memory. 
 The aim of this chapter is to present the concept of hysteresis, following more 
closely the original definition of the term stated in physics, highlighting the properties 
of remanence, nonlinearity and selective memory.   
Moreover, even though the basic idea is the same, hysteretic processe involves 
qualitative changes when we move from the individual firm to the macroeconomic 
level. This distinction also has important implications concerning the design of the tests 
implemented to verify the existence of hysteresis. Thus, we begin by describing the 
concept of weak hysteresis that characterizes the dynamics of employment at the micro 
level in the presence of non-convex costs of adjustment, and then, we present the 
concept of strong hysteresis adapted to the characterization of the dynamics of 
employment at the sector or the macroeconomic level.  
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II.2. WEAK HYSTERESIS VS. STRONG HYSTERESIS 
 
II.2.1 DEFINITION OF HYSTERESIS 
 
A hysteresis non-linearity is a kind of operator Γ , which relates the variable 
output ( )ty  to a variable input ( )tx . The hysteresis operator Γ  is not a single function 
because for the same current input value ( )tx*  different output values ( )ty  can be 
observed (see Figure i.1).  
The output ( )ty , after a certain reference time 0t , depends not only on the input 
value ( )tx , with 0tt ≥ , but also on an initial state ( ) ( )0twtw = of the operator Γ : 
  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )ttx,tw,tty 00Γ= ,  [ ]T,t 0∈∀                 (ii.1) 
 
We assume that [ ] )(w)t(x),(w, 000 =Γ , and that Γ  must be causal, i.e., it does not 
depend on [ ]Tx ,0 . Thus, Γ  is a memory operator (Visitin 1994). Moreover, weak 
hysteresis is characterized by the rate-independence property (Visitin 1994, p. 13). That 
means that the path of [ ])t(y),t(x  is invariant with respect to any increasing 
homoeomorphism [ ] [ ]T,T,: 00 →ϕ : 
 
( ) ( ) ϕϕ oooo )t(wx)t(wx ** Γ=Γ  in  [ ]T,0       (ii.2)
  
This property allows us to represent the hysteresis operator by branching and 
merging curves in the ( )y,x  plane, without specifying the velocity of ( )y,x  along the 
curves. Therefore, a hysteresis operator is a rate-independent causal operator, and scalar 
hysteresis can be viewed as non-linearity with a memory which reveals itself through 
branching (Mayergoyz 1993, p. xiv and Visitin 1994, p. 13).  
 Depending on the level of aggregation considered and on the degree of 
heterogeneity across agents, a weak (micro) form of hysteresis and a strong (macro) one 
can be distinguished. Both types of hysteresis are characterized as an input-output 
system with very specific properties and non-linear response to shocks (Amable et al. 
1994)  
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II.2.2. THE NON-IDEAL RELAY MODEL 
 
Weak Hysteresis appears at a micro level when a variable output is related to a 
variable input by a hysteresis operator. Hysteresis behavior at the micro level results 
from the existence of non-convex (fixed or linear) costs of adjustment that induce 
discrete adjustment and inertia, in the response of the output variable to small 
continuous fluctuations of the input variable. In economics, the presence of hysteresis 
can also result from the existence of uncertainty in the future path of the input variable. 
Among the few hysteresis operators at disposal we apply the Non-Ideal Relay 
Operator. The Non-Ideal Relay Operator is at the core of the classical Preisach Model of 
Strong Hysteresis. The Preisach Model is an aggregation procedure that allows 
approximation to a large class of continuous hysteresis laws, due to its 
phenomenological nature (Visitin 1994, Mayergoyz 2003). 
The Non-Ideal Relay Model is a simple model of discontinuous weak hysteresis. 
Suppose that the variable output )(ty can take one of two values (0 or 1), which means 
that the non-ideal relay operator2 ( βα ,R ) is either switched off or switched on, 
corresponding to ( )[ ] 0=txR
,βα  or ( )[ ] 1=txR ,βα  (as represented in Figure ii.1). 
               
     
( )[ ]txR)t(y
,βα=  
                                      path for decreasing input   
    
    
    1  
 
 
  
     path for increasing input   
  
 
                         0 
                           
                                                               α        ( )tx*        β                                  ( )tx   
 
Figure ii.1: The Non-Ideal Relay Operator 
 
The value of the variable output at a moment t can be represented by the 
following equation: 
                                                 
2
 This operator is also called the Elementary Preisach Operator or Elementary Preisach Hysteron.  
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which means that the output depends on the input variable )(tx  and on the initial state 
( )0tw  that can be either 0 or 1 (See Krasnosel’skii and Rachinskii 2003). It follows that 
in order to know the current value of the output it is not enough to look at the current 
value of the input. The previous value of the input summarized in ( )0tw  should also be 
taken into consideration. 
 
 
II.2.3. THE PARALLEL CONNECTION MODEL 
 
Macro Hysteresis, which emerges as the result of aggregation over 
heterogeneous micro elements that exhibit some bi-stability, is usually referred to as 
strong hysteresis (Amable et al., 1994).  This type of hysteresis requires the existence of 
micro units that adjust discontinuously to shocks, as the result of the presence of non-
convex adjustment costs and uncertainty and an aggregation over a heterogeneous 
population of different micro elements. 
An elementary aggregation procedure is to combine in parallel a finite number 
( n ) of heterogeneous Non-Ideal Relays (
ji ,
R βα , with nj,i ≤≤1 ), each of them having 
different activation ( β ) and deactivation (α ) triggers. If we associate some weights to 
the individual relays ( j,j,i ∀≥ 0µ ), which represent their contribution to the aggregate 
output, we can write ( )tY  as (see also Figure ii.2): 
 
 
[ ] ( ) ijn
j
ji
n
i
andtttxtRtY
ji
αβηµ βα ≥≥= ∑∑
==
00,0,
1
,
1
,)(             (ii.4) 
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……. 
 
              
nn ,
R βα        n,nµ  
            
 
 
Figure ii.2. Weighted Parallel Connection of a Finite Number of Non-Ideal Relays 
 
 
Figure ii.3 represents the aggregation procedure obtained by combining in 
parallel three individual Non-Ideal Relays. Starting from a initial value of the input 
variable equal to ( )0x  and the corresponding output ( ) 00 =Y , if the value of ( )tx  
increases monotonically from ( )0x  to ( )3x , the output of the system change to one when 
1β  is reached, to two when 2β  is passed and finally to three when ( ) 3β>tx . If the 
input variable returns to its pre-shock value, )0(x , the output of the system remains at 
three. The system exhibits remanence.  
Note that the aggregate output ( )tY  remains discontinuous, but the smoothness 
of the aggregate hysteresis loop increases due to heterogeneity.      
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Figure ii.3. Parallel Connection Model of Strong Hysteresis 
 
 
  
II.3 WEAK HYSTERESIS MODELS OF EMPLOYMENT DEMAND 
 
 II.3.1. NON-IDEAL RELAY MODEL UNDER CERTAINTY 
 
We adopt the Non-Ideal Relay Model of weak discontinuous hysteresis, 
described in mathematical terms in the last section, to describe the dynamics of 
employment at the firm level. This model is related to the firm’s profit maximization 
goal under the existence of non-convex costs of adjustment and it is suitable to 
represent the dynamics of employment caused by the entry and exit of a firm, or by the 
employment adjustment decision of a firm that is already in operation.  
To deal with the firm’s decision of whether to enter, to exit the market or to stay 
active/inactive, we apply a simple Non-Ideal Relay Model without uncertainty. To 
analyze the effects of uncertainty on the decision on when it is optimal to enter or to exit 
the market we apply a more elaborate version of the model3. Finally, we extend the 
model to analyze the effect of the existence of adjustment through variation in the 
number of hours of work. 
   
 
 
                                                 
3
 We follow Cross et al. (1994) and Belke and Göcke (1999, 2005a). 
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1. Assumptions      
 
1. The product market is perfectly competitive with M potential, risk neutral, 
(supplier) firms; 
2. When active, i.e., in the market, each price taker firm produces one unit of 
output sold at a price tP  (all the firms face a common demand schedule) and 
employs one unit of labor that costs jw 4. When out of the market, each firm 
produces no output and employs zero units of labor. Zero or one are the only 
possible values of the steady state level of firms employment5; 
3. Every individual firm must pay a fixed cost ( jH ) constant in time to enter 
the market, which is due to the costs of hiring and training the new worker;  
4. Suppose that every firm also faces a fixed cost to leave the market that is due 
to the cost of dismissing the worker ( jF ); 
5. Switching the state of activity leads to a complete depreciation of hiring or 
dismissal costs. Thus jH  and jF  are regarded as sunk costs; 
6. The demand for labor is immediately satisfied as there is involuntary 
unemployment; 
7. The firms are considered to be heterogeneous, in terms of the threshold 
values at which they hire or fire a worker. This heterogeneity is due to 
differences in the wage rate and in the adjustment costs and related to 
different technological and managerial abilities, size and maturity; 
8. We assume discrete time and an infinite plan horizon;  
9. We consider a discount factor 
i+
=
1
1δ , where i  is the risk free interest rate.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 We assume that the wage rate is constant in time, but could vary across firms.   
5
 Firms can be viewed as an individual unit and each of them can fill one labor position only. This 
assumption is not as unrealistic as it would seem, it corresponds to assuming firms to be divided into 
elementary production units where every unit is represented individually in the model (Belke and Göcke 
1998); 
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2. Unit cost function 
 
Each individual firm faces variable costs ( jw ) and fixed costs of hiring and 
training ( jH ) new workers and firing costs ( jF ). Then, the unit cost function to firm j  
in period t  is: 
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where t,jy  is the output level of firm j in period t.  
 
3. Gross Profit Function 
 
The gross profit of the firm j in period t (without considering hiring and firing 
costs) is: 
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t,j
t,jjt
t,j
yif
yifwP
R       (ii.6)
  
4. Supply Function (market participation condition) 
 
Assumption 2, implies that the amount offered by an individual firm in the 
planned horizon t  ( tjy , ), is a binary variable that could assume the values 1 and 0. 
The decision of whether or not the firm should enter the market, is reached by 
comparing the expected present values of the net returns ( t,jV ) if the firm is active in 
period t  with the expected present values of the net returns if the firm is inactive in 
period t . The firm should take into account: i) the state of activity in the preceding 
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period; ii) the present net revenues; iii) the influence of current activity decisions on the 
present value of future returns. The comparison of the present value of the alternatives – 
activity or inactivity is carried out by assuming, firstly, a previously active firm and, 
secondly, a previously inactive firm. 
 
4.1 Previously Inactive Firm – Entry Decision 
 
A firm that immediately enters the market (in period t ) will gain in period t  the 
gross revenue less the fixed costs of entering. Since it expects to earn the same gross 
profit from period 1+t  on, the net present value of an immediate enter is: 
 
  
δδδδ −
−
+−=
−
−
+−+−=++−= + 111
jt
j
jt
jtjt,jt,jj
entry
t,j
wP
H
wP
wPHVRHV           (ii.7) 
 
For a firm entering or remaining inactive is indifferent if the present value of 
continuous inactive (0) equals the present value of an instantaneous entry: 
 
δ−
−
+−=
1
0 jtj
wP
H          (ii.8) 
 
Solving Equation ii.8 for tP , we obtain the trigger price that induces entry under 
certainty: 
 
( ) jjjjc j,entry Hi
i
wHwp
+
+=−+=
1
1 δ      (ii.9) 
  
The firm j will enter the market if the price level exceeds c jentryp , . The entry 
decision depends on whether the unit revenue tP  covers at least the variable cost jw  
plus the interest cost of entry jHi
i
+1
. 
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4.2 Previously Active Firm – Exit Decision 
 
A firm which has been active in the preceding period and that will continue in 
activity in the future will gain: 
 
δ−
−
=
1
jt
j
wP
V                               (ii.10) 
 
If a previously active firm exits in period t , it has to pay firing costs jF , and it 
will receive nothing either in period t , or in the subsequent periods. The firm is 
indifferent between exiting in t  or remaining active if:  
 
jttt,j F
wPV −=
−
−
= δ1                              (ii.11)
  
Solving Equation ii.11 for tP  we obtain the trigger price that induces exit under 
certainty: 
 
( ) jjjtc j,exit Fi
i
wFwp
+
−=−−=
1
1 δ                (ii.12) 
 
The firm will stay active if the price covers at least the variable costs less the 
interest cost of exit. 
 Under the existence of fixed costs of hiring ( jH ) and firing ( jF ) the 
employment demand function of the individual firm j may be represented by6  
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6
 See Cross et al. (1995) and Göcke (2002). 
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where t,jn  is the level of employment of the firm j at time t7. It follows that the entry 
(expanding) trigger c j,entryP  is greater than the exit (contracting) trigger c j,exitP  and the 
difference between these threshold values, the band of inaction, is the interest cost of 
hiring and firing employees:     
 
( )jjc j,exitc j,entry FHiiPP ++=− 1                 (ii.14) 
 
Thus, each firm requires an aggregate demand shock c j,entryt PP >  to hire the worker, 
and an aggregate demand shock c j,exitt PP < to dismiss the worker. Demand shocks 
within the range c j,entrytc j,exit PPP << are consistent with inaction. 
The existence of a band of inaction implies that the current state of the system 
( t,jn ) is bi-stable and that the current value of the price (or any other shock variable) is 
not sufficient to determine the firm’s state of employment, because the whole history of 
the system summarized in 1−t,jn  needs to be considered. This path dependence is 
caused by the remanence effect of every transitory shock that induces a change in the 
firm’s state of activity. The employment demand behavior of the individual firm could 
be described by an elementary hysteretic loop (like the one represented in Figure ii.1), 
which is the consequence of the Non-Ideal Relay Operator (see Göcke 2002 for more 
detail). 
 
              
II.3.2. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
 In order to illustrate the effect of uncertainty on entry/job creation decision and 
on exit/job destruction decision, we assume a nonrecurring single stochastic change in 
the output price, which can be either positive ( µ+ ) or negative ( µ− ) in a discrete time 
model. We assume that both realizations of the shock have the same probability of ½. In 
                                                 
7
 In this Model, the employment demand function corresponds to the product supply function and can 
only assume two values: 1, if the firm is in the market with one worker or 0, if the firm is outside the 
market employing zero workers.  
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this case, ( ) tttt PPEPP =⇒±= ++ 11 µ  and from period 1+t  on the firm will decide 
under certainty again8.        
Admitting that the future path of the price is uncertain, waiting can have a 
positive value because it brings more information about the evolution of the price level. 
With uncertainty, a previously inactive/active firm has three possible strategies: i) stay 
inactive/active; ii) enter/exit the market; iii) wait and make a decision after the 
realization of the stochastic shock. If the firm has the possibility of delaying the 
decision, it faces a trade-off: waiting has the benefits mentioned above, but it also has 
the cost of foregoing the profits earned, if entry had occurred. 
Thus, uncertainty introduces an additional cost of entering (opportunity cost) 
that is the value of the option to wait.   
 In the case of uncertainty, the labor demand function (which corresponds to the 
supply function) of the individual firm becomes9: 
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Uncertainty in the future behavior of prices widens the hysteresis band (Dixit 
1992, p. 121; Göcke 1999, p. 275). Combining both triggers under uncertainty, the 
width of the band of inaction is: 
 
µµδ
δ
i
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i
iPPPP jjc jexitc jentryu jexitu jentry 21
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,,,, +
++
+
=
−
+−=−    (ii.16)
  
                                                 
8
 We introduce uncertainty by considering an expected future stochastic one-time shock, in line with 
Belke and Göcke (1999). 
9
 See Belke and Göcke (1999; 2005a) for more details. 
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where u j,entryP and u j,exitP  are the entry and the exit triggers under uncertainty 
respectively.  
From equation (ii.16), the expansion of the inaction band is linear and separable 
in the anticipated absolute size of the shock (see Figure ii.4). The width of the inaction 
band depends positively on the fixed cost of hiring and firing, and on the degree of 
uncertainty (see also Bertola 1992, p. 395)10.  
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Figure ii.4. Micro Hysteresis Loop 
 
   
II.3.3. THE EFFECT OF ADJUSTMENT THROUGH HOURS OF WORK 
 
To describe the dynamics of employment under a hysteretic model, we have 
neglected, until now, the margin of adjustment hours of work. Nonetheless, it is more 
realistic to recognize that a firm can respond to a demand shock by changing the 
number of employees, the number or hours per worker or both.  
Moreover, to the extent that there is some degree of substitutability between the 
adjustment of labor input through variation in hours per worker and through the 
variation in the number of workers, the existence of costs associated with the variation 
                                                 
10
 Concerning the effect of the interest rate, when 0→i  the band of inaction under certainty collapses 
towards zero while the band of inaction under uncertainty tends to µ2 . When ∞→i the band of inaction 
under uncertainty tends to jj FH + . Thus, the lower the interest, rate the higher the importance of 
uncertainty for the width of the band of inaction (Belke and Göcke 1999, p. 266).      
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in the number of hours of work could interact with the employment adjustment costs 
and reinforce or attenuate the existence of inertia in employment dynamics.  
In order to study the effect of the adjustment through the number of hours per 
worker in the analysis of labor input adjustment, we extended the previous model under 
certainty. 
We keep the same basic assumptions (see section II.3.1), but now we admit that 
the firms could vary the number of hours of work of the single worker, within certain 
limits, depending on the state of product demand. We assume that the standard hours of 
work are equal to one and that the actual number of hours could be fixed by the firm in 
the interval: [ ]udt h,hh ∈    with 10 << dh  and 21 << uh . Thus, the production 
function becomes: t,jt,jtj hny = .  
We assume that changing the number of hours per worker does not involve a 
fixed cost of adjustment implying that there is no hysteresis in this margin of 
adjustment. In fact, firms can change hours more rapidly and with fewer costs than 
hiring or firing employees, because varying the number of hours entails no long-run 
commitments and the decisions related to the number of hours are easier to reverse.11  
However, we assume that firms must pay a premium for overtime work that could be 
legally determined or established by collective bargaining agreements. 
Concerning the structure of the payment system, we assume that the wage is a 
function of the number of hours of work. Standard hours are fixed by law at the level of 
one. The decision of firms, concerning the number of effective hours of work, is 
influenced by the rigidity of the working time regulations. These regulations affect the 
upward and downward flexibility of hours, and together with employment adjustment 
costs determine the firms’ response to demand shocks.      
  Regarding upward hours flexibility, we assume that the overtime premium is 
increasing in hours of work beyond one, and the wage premium for working less than 
one is also increasing in )1( th− , which reflects the increase in the hourly wage to 
compensate the employee for working fewer than the standard number of hours. The 
structure of payment is summarized in equation (ii.17)12:   
                                                 
11
 This assumption is in line with Sargent (1978), who, using quarterly aggregate data from the United 
States in the period from the first quarter of 1947 to the fourth quarter of 1972, estimated straight-time 
adjustment costs larger than overtime adjustment costs. Shapiro (1986), using quarterly data for 
manufacturing from 1955 to 1980, also estimated small and insignificant adjustment costs in varying the 
number of hours of work of the existing workers. 
12
 We follow Nickel (1978). 
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  with uφ , [ ]10,d ∈φ  
 
Overtime hours that exceed one are paid at a constant rate, with uφ  being the 
overtime premium. In Equation ii.17, uφ  is a parameter that measures the tightness of 
overtime regulations concerning compensation. If the legislation is strict, uφ approaches 
one and the firm pays the maximum amount of overtime premium. Contrarily, if 
legislation is soft, uφ approaches zero, and each hour beyond one is paid at a standard 
hourly wage ( )jw . 
On the other hand, the wage payment for hours less than one 
is: ( )1−+ t,jhwdw jj φ , where dφ  measures downward hours flexibility. When the 
legislation concerning working less than standard hours is strict, dφ  leans closer to 
zero, and the firm must pay jw . When the legislation is soft, dφ approaches one, and the 
firm pays exactly the effective hours of work ( )t,jj hw . 
    
 Exit Decision (job destruction) 
 
Now consider the problem of calculating the exit trigger.  
A firm which has been active in the preceding period and that will continue its 
activity in the future will gain: 
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δ
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where j,tV  is the firm’s net present value if it continues to be active. 
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If, following a negative demand shock, the price falls to  jdt wP φ< , the firm 
has an incentive to reduce the number of hours of work to the minimum possible level 
( dh )13. 
The firm is indifferent between exiting in t  or remaining active if:  
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= δ
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               (ii.19)
  
Solving Equation ii.19 for tP  we obtain the trigger price that induces exit (fire 
the worker) when the firm has the possibility of reducing the number of hours of work: 
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From Equation ii.20 for dφ  close to one (high downward flexibility of hours) 
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1
. More precisely for ( )
j
d
w
F δφ −−> 11  
the firm will reach dh before exit and the existence of the margin of adjustment hours of 
work contributes to the increases in the width of the band of inertia. 
Moreover,  
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As a lower minimum level of hours of work ( dh ), and a lower penalty for reducing the 
number of hours of work ( dφ  closer to one) imply a more flexible adjustment through 
hours of work, the width of the hysteresis band is a positive function of the downward 
flexibility of hours adjustment.   
 
Job Creation Decision 
 
In order to analyze the impact of adjustment through hours after a positive 
demand shock, we introduce the following additional assumptions: 
i) After entering, which occurs when the price is c j,entryP , the firm has two 
options to adjust to a positive demand shock, i.e. to a further increase in its 
price level: a) the firm can increase the number of hours of work to a 
maximum of 2<uh , paying an overtime premium according to equation 
(ii.17); b) the firm can open another plant, which implies hiring another 
worker.  
ii) The production function of the second plant is the same as the first one, the 
firm pays the same wage jw  to the second worker, but opening another 
plant implies spending a fixed cost of activation of 'jH  with jj HH >' .  
iii) These alternatives are mutually exclusive, and the firm cannot change the 
number of hours of work in the second plant (which are necessarily equal to 
1). 
iv) The decision to increase the number of workers is reversible, meaning that if 
the circumstances turn out to be very favorable, the firm can reduce the 
number of hours of work in the first plant to one and open a second plant. 
 
Equation (ii.23) represents the profit of the firm if it decides to increase the 
number of hours of work: 
 
( ) ( )( )δ
φφφ
−
−+−
=
1
uuuujut
uu
h
t,j
hhwhP
,hV                   (ii.23) 
 
 47 
If ujt wP φ+> , firm j has an incentive to increase the number of hours of work to 
uh
14
.  
If the firm decides to open another plant it will earn:   
 
( )
( )
'jtplant
t,j H
wP
V
nd
−
−
−×
= δ1
22
                   (II.24) 
 
Thus, the firm will only open the second plant if the profit obtained from 
operating with two plants is higher than the profit obtained from the increase in the 
number of hours of work in the first plant. The firm will be indifferent between these 
alternatives for ( ) plantt,juuht,j
nd
V,hV 2=φ . Solving this equation for tP , we obtain the 
second plant activation trigger when the firm chooses between adjusting through the 
number of hours or through the number of workers: 
 
( ) ( )
( )u
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'
jhentry,j h
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+=
2
11
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φδ
                 (ii.25) 
 
For uφ < ( )δ−1'jH , ( ) ( )( ) ( )
'jentry,j
u
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'
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−+−
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2
11
22  
meaning that the introduction of upward adjustments of labor demand, through hours of 
work, contributes to the delay of the activation of a second plant and enlarges the 
employment hysteresis band.  
Moreover: 
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and as a higher maximum level of hours of work ( uh ) and a lower overtime premium 
( dφ  closer to zero) imply more flexible adjustment through hours of work, similarly, the 
width of the hysteresis band is a positive function of the upward flexibility of hours 
adjustment.   
Figures ii.5 presents the results of a numerical simulation of the effect of the 
interaction between non-convex costs of adjustment and the existence of uncertainty in 
the future path of prices on the width of the inaction band. 
We consider the model of employment demand with uncertainty presented in 
section II.3.2, and we set 1=jw , 1=jH , 1=jF ,  10.i =  and 50.=µ . Figure ii.5 a) 
shows that an increase in the fixed adjustment costs ( jj F,H ) from 1 to 1.59 with 
increments of 0.01 originates an increase of the inaction band. The simulation shows 
that the inaction band is a linear positive function of the fixed costs of hiring and firing 
(see also Equation ii.16). The effect of uncertainty is simulated in Figure ii.5 b). We 
verify that an increase of uncertainty, represented by an increase in the parameter µ  
from 0.5 to 0.795 with increments of 0.005, originates a linear increase in the band of 
inaction. Figure ii.5 c) illustrates the joint effect of the existence of fixed employment 
adjustment costs and uncertainty. The inaction band is particularly large for high values 
of the fixed adjustment costs and uncertainty.   
We also simulate the effect of the interaction between the presence of 
employment adjustment costs and the degree of flexibility in varying the number of 
hours per worker on the inaction band.  We analyze the effect of two aspects of the 
flexibility of the adjustment through the number of hours per employee: i) the maximum 
number of overtime hours of work ( uh ) and the minimum number of short time hours 
of work ( dh ); ii) the regulation concerning compensation for overtime and short time 
work, measured respectively by the parameters uφ  and dφ .    
We consider the model of labor demand without uncertainty presented in section 
II.3.3, and we set 1=jw , 1=jH , 1=jF ,  10.i = ,  850.hd = , 151.hu = , 1=dφ  and 
0=uφ . In Figure ii.6 we illustrate the effect on the inaction band of the downward 
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flexibility of adjustment through hours of work. The inaction band increases 
exponentially with the decrease in the minimum permitted number of hours of work 
from 85.0=dh  to 3485.0=dh  with increments of -0.0085 (Figure ii.6 b) and 
increases linearly with the increase in the parameter dφ  (see Figure ii.6), which is a 
measure of downward hours flexibility concerning the magnitude of the hourly wage 
premium mandated in the case of work time reduction (downward flexibility increases 
as dφ  approaches one). From Figures ii.6 d) and e) we verify that the inaction band is 
especially large for combinations of large employment fixed adjustment costs with a 
low minimum number of hours of work and with a low value of the parameter dφ . The 
amplification of the effects of the fixed costs of adjustment upon the inaction band, are, 
however, stronger for the case of the interaction with the minimum number of hours of 
work. Figure ii.6 f) also shows, that a larger inaction band emerges for combinations of 
soft legislation concerning the compensation of reduced time of work measured by the 
parameter dφ  with a low minimum number of hours of work.        
In Figure ii.7 we illustrate the effect on the inaction band of the upward 
flexibility of adjustment through hours of work15. As in the previous case, the inaction 
band increases exponentially with the maximum number of overtime hours of work 
permitted (Figure ii.7 b) and decreases linearly with the increase of the value of the 
parameter uφ , which implies a greater rigidity of the regulations on overtime work 
compensation (Figure ii.7 c). Again, the effect of the employment adjustment costs 
upon the inaction band is amplified by the degree of flexibility of upward adjustment of 
hours of work. The effect of the degree of upward flexibility of the adjustment of hours 
of work is captured by parameter uφ , which is an index of the rigidity of the legislation 
concerning the compensation of overtime work (Figure ii.7 e) and specially by the 
maximum number of overtime hours of work (Figure ii.7 d). Figure ii.7 f) shows that, as 
in the case of the downward adjustment, a large inaction band emerges for combinations 
of soft legislation concerning the compensation of overtime time work with a high 
maximum number of overtime hours of work.        
                                                 
15
 This case is more important than the previous one, as the upward adjustment in the number of hours of 
work is more common in practice as the way to adjust the labor factor. 
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Overall, the conclusion is that there is a positive association between the width 
of the inaction band and the magnitude of the fixed adjustment costs, the level of 
uncertainty and the degree of flexibility of adjustment through hours of work. 
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Figure. ii.5 
The effect of Employment Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty on the Inaction Band 
(Model with Uncertainty) 
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Figure. ii.6 
The effect of Employment Adjustment Costs and Downward Hours Flexibility on the Inaction 
Band (Model without Uncertainty) 
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Figure. ii.7 
The effect of Employment Adjustment Costs and Upward Hours Flexibility on the Inaction Band 
(Model without Uncertainty) 
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II.3.4. PROPERTIES OF WEAK HYSTERESIS  
 
An input-output system described by the Non-Ideal Relay Model, exhibits a 
weak form of hysteresis characterized by the following properties (see Amable et al. 
1995  and Mayergoyz 2003): 
i) The system exhibits path dependence. The history of the system matters 
because, for values of the input variable - )(tP  between u j,exitP  and u j,entryP , the system 
exhibits a bi-stability, in the sense that the output value associated with the same value 
of the input could be 0 or 1. In this case the position of the system (0 or 1) is dependent 
on the past trajectory of the system. More precisely, for a value of the input 
u jentryu jexit PtPP ,*, )( <<  the value of the output will be 1, if the value of the input 
started above u j,entryP , but it will be 0 if it started below u j,exitP  (see Figure ii.4). 
ii) The system exhibits remanence. If the input value is initially 
u jentryu jexit PtPP ,*, )( <<  and the equilibrium value of the output is 0, and if the input 
value increases transitorily to u jentryPtP ,1 )( ≥ , the equilibrium value of the output 
changes permanently to 1. Conversely, if the value of the input is initially 
u jentryu jexit PtPP ,*, )( <<  and the output equilibrium value of the output is 1, and if the 
input decreases transitorily to u jexitPtP ,2 )( ≤ , the equilibrium value of the output 
changes permanently to 0. 
iii) The remanence effect is independent of the magnitude of the change in the 
input once the values u j,exitP  and u j,entryP  are reached.     
 iv) The hysteresis operator is rate-independent, which means that the hysteretic 
behavior of the system is independent of how fast the input varies between two 
extremum points (as explained before). 
v) The non-ideal relay originates a hysteretic non-linearity with local memories, 
which means that the value of the output )( 0ty  at some moment of time 0t , and the 
values of the input )(* tP  at all subsequent instants of time 0tt ≥  uniquely 
predetermine the value of the output )(ty  for all 0tt > . In the example, branching 
occurs for any input extreme since the triggers u j,exitP  and u j,entryP  are reached. 
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II.4. STRONG HYSTERESIS MODELS OF EMPLOYMENT DEMAND 
  
II.4.1. THE PREISACH MODEL 
 
Among the several models of strong hysteresis that closely follow the original 
definition of the concept, and that could be used in economics, we describe the Preisach 
Model. 
The Preisach Model with the developments of Mayergoyz (2003), is one of the 
most powerful models of strong hysteresis, and is now widely recognized as a 
fundamental mathematical toolkit in describing a wide range of hysteretic phenomena in 
quite different areas (see Cross 1995 for an application to employment)16.  
The dynamics of aggregate employment )(N , in response to the time evolution 
of the aggregate price level (shock variable) can be described by the Preisach Model of 
Hysteresis. The Preisach Operator is an aggregation of elementary Non-Ideal Relays 
(
jj ,
R βα ) defined by the ( jj ,βα ) pairs of switching values of the aggregate price level 
that correspond, respectively, to the exit and entry triggers ( j,exitj P=α  
and j,entryj P=β ). The dynamics of aggregate employment is represented by the 
number of active firms in the Preisach Plan, which can be defined as: 
( ){ }αββα ≥ℜ∈= 2,P , and that is determined by the dynamics of the aggregate 
product demand. Each individual firm can be represented by a point in the ( βα , ) plan 
with αβ ≥ . Assuming a continuum in P  of heterogeneous hysteretic firms, each one 
with employment demand functions of the type of Equation ii.13, the Preisach Model of 
Hysteresis can be written as17: 
 
( ) ( )∫∫=
P
,
ddtPR,u)t(N βαβα βα                 (ii.28) 
 
                                                 
16
 The Preisach Model was originally introduced by the Hungarian Physicist Ferenc Preisach in 1935. The 
model was developed to represent hysteresis in ferromagnetic materials, and assumes that those 
substances are made of tiny magnetic particles (dipoles), which were represented by a simple hysteresis 
loop (see Figure ii.1).   
17
 See Mayergoyz (2003). 
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where )t(N  is the aggregate employment, ( )βα ,u  is the density function of the 
individual firms, also called the Preisach Function, 
jj ,
R βα are the individual relays that 
represent the relation between employment and aggregate demand at the firm level, and 
( )tP  is a proxy of product aggregate demand.   
Assuming ( ){ }n,...,,ttPmin 210 ==α   and ( ){ }n,...,,ttPmax 210 ==β ,  
a heterogeneous set of firm’s hysteretic relays can be considered on a limiting triangle 
T defined as: ( ){ }00 ββαααββα ≤∧≥∧≥= ,T  (see Figure 9). Moreover, the 
density ( )βα ,u  is defined inT , and it is equal to zero outside this triangle.   
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Figure ii.9. Preisach Memory Map 
 
Consider the time sequence of values of the aggregate price level represented in 
Figure ii.8. The dynamics of aggregate employment in response to the cyclical variation 
of the price is illustrated in Figure ii.9. An increase in aggregate price level is 
represented by an upward displacement of a horizontal (green) line, from the 
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position minαβ = , to the position corresponding to tP=β , switching relays from 0T  to 
1T  (see Figure ii.9 b), while a decrease in the price level is represented by a leftward 
displacement of a (red) vertical line, from the position maxβα =  to the position tP=α , 
switching relays from 1T  to 0T  (see Figure ii.9 c). At any time, triangle T  is divided 
into two time-varying regions: 1T  and 0T defined as: 
 
  
( ){ }
( ){ }0isatofoutput
1isatofoutput
0
1
tRT,)t(T
tRT,)t(T
,
,
βα
βα
βα
βα
∈=
∈=
              (ii.29)
  
so that t,T)t(T)t(T ∀=∪ 01 . 
The initial condition is that 0α<tP  implying that all the relays are switched off, 
meaning that all firms that are outside the market are employing zero workers, i.e., 
00 =,jn , j∀ , and the value of aggregate employment is zero ( =0T T and 01 =T ). In 
Figure ii.9 a) the dashed area shows the relays that are switched off (firms that stay 
outside the market). Subsequently, the price starts to increase monotonically, reaching a 
local maximum ( 1P ) at the time 1t . At that time, all relays with 1P≤β  switch on, 
meaning that firms with 1PPentry ≤  start to hire workers (grey area). The relays are now 
divided into two sets: 1T  represents the set of the relays that are switched on (grey area), 
corresponding to those firms that are currently entering the market hiring employees, 
and 0T  represents the set of the relays that are switched off (dashed area), 
corresponding to those firms that are currently firing employees or deciding to stay 
outside the market. When the aggregate price level decreases to a local minimum 2P , 
those relays for which 2P≥α  switch off, meaning that firms with 2PPexit ≥  start to 
dismiss. This dynamic serves to trace a staircase line ( )tL , which divides the grey area 
where the relays are on from the dashed area where the relays are off. The vertices of 
the staircase line have coordinates that correspond to the sequence of the past non-
dominated extremums of the input variable. Differently from what happens at the micro 
level, where the history of the system is summarized in 1−t,jn , history in this case is the 
sequence of non-dominated maximums and minimums of the aggregate price level.   
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II.4.2. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY AND ADJUSTMENT THROUGH HOURS OF WORK 
 
The Preisach Model is well suited to testing the existence of hysteresis in 
aggregate employment dynamics but it is not adequate to analyze the effect and the 
relative importance of the different sources of hysteresis (existence of non-convex costs 
of adjustment, uncertainty and adjustment through the number of hours of work). For 
this purpose we apply the Linear Play Model of Hysteresis (see Visitin 1994 and Göcke 
2001; 2002)18.  
The Linear Play Model of Hysteresis consists of a continuous operator rP  that 
can be described as a linear spring coupled in parallel with a friction element (Visitin 
1994, p. 15). From Figure ii.10, we notice that the Play Operator is characterized by 
horizontal reversible inner branches of the same length (the play segment) and 
increasing linear limiting branches uΓ  and lΓ  (called the spurt segments). It can also be 
observed that the loops are oriented counter-clockwise. As the slope of limiting 
branches is fixed, the operator is characterized by only one constant - its input threshold 
value or the magnitude of the play. Together with the initial value of the operator state: 
the pair ( ))(),( 00 tPtPr , determines the value of the output ( )tN  in dependence on the 
future values of the input ( )tP . 
Actually, the linear play dynamics, more typical at the firm level, could emerge 
at the macro level, especially when there is uncertainty concerning the future behavior 
of the product demand and/or input prices. Uncertainty originates a displacement of 
every ( )jj βα ,  combination characterizing firm j  to Northwest in the Preisach 
Triangle, as the entry/exit trigger increases/decreases by
i21+
µ
 (see section II.3.2). 
Consequently, the existence of uncertainty implies the emergence of a zone above and 
parallel to 45º - line without firms, introducing a zone of weak reaction (play interval) 
of aggregate employment (and possibly no reaction at all) with every reversal of the 
input variable (see Belke and Göcke 2005b, p. 199). The existence of play intervals 
originates flatter hysteresis loops. This happens because on the one hand, the play 
intervals have to be passed in order to originate a permanent employment impact, and 
                                                 
18
 The Linear Play Operator is a non-linear operator because ‘linear’ refers to the shape of the boundary 
of the hysteresis region, and not to the operator (Visitin 1994, p. 64).  
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on the other a small number of firms are affected by input changes (Belke and Göcke 
2005b, p. 199).         
 In order to illustrate the Play Hysteresis dynamics under uncertainty, we 
assume19:  
1. The Hysteresis loops are divided into linear partial functions with different 
slopes; 
2.  The slope of a linear section changes when a local extremum is reached; 
3.  Only two different slopes are considered: a small one, representing the 
relation between employment and the aggregate price level along a zone of 
relative inaction called the play, and a large one, representing the relation 
between employment and the aggregate price level along a zone of strong 
reaction called the spurt; 
4. The linear sections are continuously connected resulting in a joint point called 
‘knot’ of both adjacent sections for a local extremum;  
5. A constant width of the play area ( PLAY ) is assumed.  
 
Figure ii.10 helps to illustrate the linear play-dynamics.  
 
                                                           lΓ                              uΓ  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PLAY  
Figure ii.10. Linear Play Hysteresis-Dynamics 
 
 Suppose that starting from point A (with 0PPt = ) there is an increase in the 
aggregate price level to 1P . All the firms with 1P<β  will be hiring workers in this 
                                                 
19
 See Belke and Göcke (2001) and Göcke (2002). 
A
BCD
E F
2P 0P
N
P4P 3P 5P 1P
 61 
period originating an increase of aggregate employment along the upward spurt line uΓ  
(the system reaches pont B). From point B (with 1PP = ) in the upward spurt line, a 
decrease in the price level originates an entering into the play area, where a weak 
reaction results, until the entire play area is passed. When the aggregate price level 
reaches 3P  employment will start to fall along the downward spurt line dΓ  
until 4PPt =  (in point E). A further increase in the price level to 5P  will induce a 
vertical downward displacement of the play area and the system reaches point F.  
 
 
II.4.3. PROPERTIES OF STRONG HYSTERESIS 
 
Focusing on the Preisach Model, according to Visitin (1994), Amable et al. 
(1995, p. 159) and Mayergoyz (2003, p. 15-20), the nontrivial aggregation of 
heterogeneous individual relays originates a form of hysteresis with strong properties. 
Firstly, the value of the output variable depends in a more complex way on the 
history of the input, when compared to the weak form of hysteresis. History, in this 
case, is the sequence of non-dominated maximums and minimums of the input variable. 
The non-dominated local maxima are indicated by Mk and the non-dominated local 
minima by mk. The points (Mk,mk) are represented by the vertices of the staircase ( )tL  
(see Figure ii.9). The sequence M1,m1, … Mk,mk , is known as the reduced memory 
sequence of the Preisach Operator (Visitin 1994,p. 99). Strong Hysteresis is 
characterized by a memory wiping-out process. This means that the dominated values of 
the input are erased from the memory bank, when the input reaches a local non-
dominated extremum. The output variable retains a selective memory that is represented 
by the staircase (called the memory curve) formed in the Figures ii.9 a) to ii.9 d). When 
the input increases to 5x , the other dominated extremums are erased from the memory 
(we can see this situation in Figure ii.9 f), in which the new extremum 5x  erases the 
staircase that divides the areas 0T  and  1T ). Then, the past history is wiped out by price 
variations of sufficiently large magnitude (Visitin 1994, p.99). 
Secondly, contrasting with the weak form of hysteresis, where the temporary 
shocks of the input variable only cause remanence if the trigger values were reached, in 
the strong form of hysteresis every loading-unloading that implies an increase/decrease 
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of the value of the input over the last local maximum/minimum will originate 
remanence. This property emerges as we consider a continuum of relays on the T  
triangle. 
Thirdly, different to the weak hysteresis, the remanence effect depends on the 
magnitude of the temporary disturbance occurred on the input variable. Actually, a 
greater positive transitory shock to the input variable will induce more relays to switch 
on, originating a greater remanence effect. This could be illustrated in Figure ii.3. In this 
case the remanence effect of a transitory shock ( ) ( ) ( )010 xxx →→  is 1, while the 
remanence effect of a greater transitory shock ( ) ( ) ( )020 xxx →→  is 2. 
Fourthly, the Preisach Operator has the Congruency Property, which means that 
if the input varies between two extremums, regardless of what the prior history of the 
input is, the minor loops that are created by this cyclic behavior will be of the same 
shape. This means that, in spite of the position of the loops being different on the 
( )tY axis (see Figure i.1), the coincidence of the loops can be achieved by the 
appropriate translation of these loops along the ( )tY axis.   
Finally, the aggregation of individual relays that originates hysteresis behavior 
with local memories usually has a non local memory, which implies that future values 
of the output ( )tY  with 0tt >  depend not only on the current values of the output ( )0tY , 
but also on the past extreme values of the input ( )tx  (Mayergoyz 2003, p. xvii). 
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III.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
Previous empirical studies have shown that firms do not permanently adjust 
employment in order to accommodate demand shocks as they should under convex 
adjustment costs (see, for example, Varejão and Portugal 2007, for the case of 
Portugal). Hysteresis is based on the existence of non-convex costs of adjustment and 
implies inertia, irreversibility and occasional bursts of job creation and job destruction 
when the firms’ product demand falls (rises) below (above) a trigger level, as described 
by the Non-Ideal Relay Model. 
In this chapter, firstly, we offer preliminary evidence of the existence of 
hysteresis at the firm level by documenting the distribution of employment adjustment, 
in the line of Dunne (1998) and Varejão (2000). Our goal is not simply to show whether 
the adjustment of employment is discrete, but also to analyze how the distributions of 
employment adjustment vary by firm characteristics, such as the size of the firms and 
industry.  
Secondly, we study the frequency and the size of adjustment of the labor input 
along its two margins: the number of employees and hours of work per employee. To 
analyze the pattern of labor input adjustment we focus on; a) the empirical evidence on 
job reallocation; b) the empirical distribution of labor input adjustment; c) the serial 
correlation of employment adjustment; d) the interrelation between employment and 
hours adjustment.   
Thirdly, we implement a more direct test to the existence of hysteresis at the 
firm level based on the assumption that employment response to product demand 
shocks of the same magnitude is asymmetric, and that it depends on the difference 
between actual and desired level of employment, as in Parsley and Wei (1993).    
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III.2. DATA 
 
 The data used in this paper come from the “Inquérito Mensal à Indústria Volume 
de Negócios e Emprego” (IVNEI), which is a monthly survey run by the Instituto 
Nacional de Estatística (Portuguese Statistics Office). Data are collected by mail survey. 
Answering is mandatory. Its purpose is to measure the monthly evolution of four 
variables in manufacturing: turnover, employment, earnings and hours of work. The 
INVEI surveys a sample of manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees. Data are 
collected at the firm level and they are available for the number of employees in the 
firm (wage earners), the total number of man-hours (actually) worked, the total amount 
of earnings paid by the firms and total turnover (as measured by sales value). 
The IVNEI sample we use spans over 132 months from January 1995 to 
December 2005. On average, 2,616 firms responded each month, making a total of 
345,312 records ( monthsfirms × ) over the entire 11-year period (see summary 
characteristics of the data in Table A.1 in the appendix).  
The distribution of firms by number of employees and by activity sector in the 
starting period is reported respectively in Table iii.1 and iii.2.  
 
Table iii.1. 
Distribution of Firms by Size (1995:01) 
 Number of Firms Proportion of Firms 
1910 <≤ n  299 13.45% 
4920 <≤ n  528 23.75% 
9950 <≤ n  477 21.46% 
199100 <≤ n  410 18.44% 
500200 <≤ n  374 16.82% 
500≥n  135 6.07% 
Total 2223 100.00% 
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Table iii.2. 
Distribution of Firms by Activity Sector (1995:01) 
 
Number 
 of Firms 
Proportion  
of Firms 
Mining 91 4.09% 
Food, Tobacco and Beverages 290 13.05% 
Textile, Leather and Shoes 447 20.11% 
Furniture and Wood 310 13.95% 
Paper and Printing 151 6.79% 
Chemicals, Petroleum and Rubber  and Plastic Products 182 8.19% 
Non Metallic Mineral Products 184 8.28% 
Primary Metals 50 2.25% 
Machinery, Fabricated Metals, Motors and Cars and Other Transport Material 498 22.40% 
Electricity and Gas 20 0.90% 
Total 2223 1000% 
 
The data collected were converted into two data sets, which are referred to as the 
pooled data set and the longitudinal data set.  
The pooled data set simply pooled all the 132 monthly files. No major 
modifications were made to the original file, except for the records with non response or 
with a zero value for employment, sales and hours of work, which were deleted. This 
data set was used to analyze the micro pattern of labor adjustment.  
The longitudinal data set resulted from merging the 132 monthly files. All the 
records in every month have an identification code that is unique and does not change 
during the whole period the firm remains in the sample. This code number served as the 
key for merging the original files. This was used to generate a balanced panel of 947 
firms for which simultaneous information on employment, sales and total hours of work 
is available in each and every one of the 132 months surveyed. We use this data set to 
build the aggregate time series of employment, sales, hours of work and earnings, which 
were seasonally adjusted.   
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III.3. FIRM LEVEL LABOR ADJUSTMENT PATTERNS 
 
III.3.1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON JOB REALLOCATION 
 
This section presents preliminary indicators of employment dynamics. Table 
iii.3 and Figure iii.1 present the monthly average rates of job creation and destruction, 
net employment growth, job reallocation, excess job reallocation1 and the minimum 
reallocation required to its accommodation (lower bound). The monthly average rate of 
net job creation and job destruction are 0.9% and 1.1% respectively, implying that the 
manufacturing sector’s employment as a whole declined at a rate of 0.2% per month 
over the sample period. These findings are in line with the results of Varejão and 
Portugal (2007). Using quarterly manufacturing data from the period from the first 
quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2005, the authors reported a job creation and job 
destruction rates of respectively 2.3% and 3.1%, and a job reallocation rate of 5.4%, 
which are approximately equal to three times our calculation, but they imply less 
turnover than that referred to by Addison and Teixeira (2005), who, using quarterly 
manufacturing data from the period from the first quarter of 1977 to the fourth quarter 
of 1997, obtained job creation and job destruction rate estimates of respectively 3.3% 
and 5.2%, and a job reallocation rate equal to 8.5%. 
 
Table iii.3 
Job Flow Rates: Summary Statistics (1995:01-2005:12)2 
 
                                                 
1
 Excess job reallocation is an index of simultaneous job creation and destruction. 
2
 All the measures were computed according the standard Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) definitions. 
 
Job 
Creation 
  
Job 
Destruction 
  
Job 
Reallocation 
  
Net 
Employment 
Change   
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
  
Lower 
Bond 
  
Average  0.009 0.011 0.020 -0.002 0.023 0.008 
Standard Dev. 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.002 
Maximum 0.023 0.042 0.053 0.015 0.083 0.021 
Minimum 0.005 0.007 0.012 -0.030 0.014 0.005 
Correl (X,NET) 0.545 -0.700 -0.163  - -   -  
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Figure iii.1. Job Flow Rates 
 
We also computed the standard deviation of job creation and job destruction and 
the correlation between job reallocation and net employment changes (NET). The 
results we obtained indicate that job destruction is more volatile than job creation. 
Moreover, job creation is pro-cyclical whereas job destruction is strongly counter-
cyclical. As a result, job reallocation exhibits a small negative correlation with net 
employment change (-0.163), meaning that job turnover is virtually acyclical.  Table 
iii.4 further shows that job reallocation is a declining function of firm size as measured 
by the average number of employees (n)3.    
 
Table iii.4 
Average Job Flow Rates by Firm Size 
 
  
Job 
Creation 
  
Job 
Destruction 
  
Job 
Reallocation 
  
Net 
Employment 
Change   
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
  
Lower 
Bond 
  
1910 <≤ n  0.017 0.023 0.040 -0.006 0.046 0.017 
4920 <≤ n  0.014 0.017 0.031 -0.003 0.033 0.014 
9950 <≤ n  0.011 0.014 0.025 -0.002 0.028 0.011 
199100 <≤ n  0.010 0.012 0.023 -0.002 0.025 0.010 
500200 <≤ n  0.009 0.010 0.019 -0.002 0.021 0.009 
500≥n  0.007 0.009 0.016 -0.002 0.018 0.007 
 
Moreover, monthly average job reallocation rates show considerable cross-
industry variation ranging from 0.8% in the Electricity and Gas industry to 3% in the 
Food and Tobacco industry (see Table iii.5). 
                                                 
3
 The size classes considered are those previously defined in the data set. 
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 Table iii.5 
Average Job Flow Rates by Activity Sector 
 
  
Job 
Creation 
  
Job 
Destruction 
  
Job 
Reallocation 
  
Net 
Employment 
Change   
Excess Job 
Reallocation 
  
Lower 
Bond 
  
Mining 
 
0.011 0.013 0.024 -0.001 0.025 0.011 
Food, Tobacco and Beverages 
 
0.014 0.016 0.030 -0.002 0.032 0.014 
Textile, Leather and Shoes 
 
0.006 0.010 0.016 -0.004 0.020 0.006 
Furniture and Wood 
 
0.009 0.011 0.021 -0.002 0.022 0.009 
Paper and Printing 
 
0.007 0.008 0.015 -0.001 0.016 0.007 
Chemicals, Petroleum and Rubber  
and Plastic Products 
0.006 0.009 0.015 -0.003 0.017 0.006 
Non Metallic Mineral Products 
 
0.009 0.011 0.021 -0.002 0.023 0.009 
Primary Metals 
 
0.010 0.013 0.023 -0.002 0.026 0.010 
Machinery, Fabricated Metals, 
Motors and Cars and Other Transport 
Material 
0.010 0.013 0.023 -0.002 0.025 0.010 
Electricity and Gas 
 
0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.005 0.013 0.002 
 
  
  
III.3.2. THE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR INPUT ADJUSTMENT 
 
 
The model of employment adjustment described in section II.3.1, which 
incorporates non-convex costs of labor adjustment, generates inaction as an optimal 
response to demand fluctuation. This means that in the presence of small variations in 
output demand, firms should not change the number of workers. In such circumstances, 
a high frequency of zero net employment change episodes is expected. Besides, if 
irreversible costs and uncertainty are important characteristics of the adjustment 
technology, then firms should experience rare episodes of significant adjustment, 
followed by long periods of inaction, which translates into long fat tails of the empirical 
distribution of the net job change. 
In Figure iii.2 the empirical distribution of net employment change is plotted 
(see also Table A.2 in the Appendix)4. The distribution exhibits a large mass point 
around zero adjustment; zero employment variation accounting for 41% of the total 
number of observations. This is an unequivocal sign of lumpy adjustment5. There is, 
                                                 
4
 Interval width was set at 0.05. All intervals are identified by their mid points.   
5
 Our calculation of the frequency of inaction episodes is significantly less than the frequency of inaction 
calculated by Varejão and Portugal (2007) with quarterly data in the period 1991:01-2005:04 (73%). A 
possible reason is that the authors used a different data set that includes a greater percentage of small 
establishments in which more inaction is typically observed, although the frequency of their data is 
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also, some evidence of high frequency of small decreases in employment relative to 
small increases. However, the density function of monthly net employment changes 
does not exhibit significant fat tails, as expected for monthly data, and signs of smooth 
adjustment can be observed in the proportion of small adjustment episodes, i.e., below 
%5±  (excepting zero variation) which is approximately 44% for the whole sample. 
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Figure iii.2. Empirical Distribution of Employment Change 
 
 
Moreover, the frequency of no-adjustment episodes decreases markedly with the 
size of the firms. The frequency of inaction is approximately 68% for firms of 19 
workers or less, 52% for firms of 20-49 workers, 38% for firms of 50-99 workers, 28% 
for firms of 100-199, 21% for firms of 200-499 workers and 10% for firms larger than 
500 workers. The frequency of the existence of spikes6 also decreases with the size of 
the firm (see Figure iii.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
smaller.     
6
 We consider a spike episode a variation greater than 20% in absolute terms. 
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Figure iii.3.  Frequency of Inaction and Spikes by Firm Size 
 
 
 
We also observe that the differences in the incidence of inaction and the 
existence of spike episodes are more notorious across firms with different sizes than 
across sectors of activity (see Figure iii.4 and iii.5). As the observed differences across 
sectors are mainly determined by the sector’s average firm size, the subsequent analysis 
will focus on firm size heterogeneity only.   
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Figures iii.6 a) and b) show the empirical distribution of the monthly variation 
of earnings and sales for the entire sample of firms8. By simple visual inspection of 
these figures we can see that the shape of the two distributions differs markedly from 
the distribution of employment changes. In particular, monthly real sales exhibit a low 
frequency of episodes of zero change9 and a greater incidence of large variations. 
Moreover, and differently to what happens with employment, this pattern is 
homogeneous across firms’ size and across sector of activity (see Figure A.1 in the 
Appendix).  
 
 
a) Earnings Changes 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
<
-
0.
8
[-0
.
75
;-0
.
70
[
[-0
.
65
;-0
.
60
[
[-0
.
55
;-0
.
50
[
[-0
.
45
;-0
.
40
[
[-0
.
35
;-0
.
30
[
[-0
.
25
;-0
.
20
[
[-0
.
15
;-0
.
10
[
[-0
.
05
;-0
.
01
[
]0.
01
;0
.
05
]
]0.
10
;0
.
15
]
]0.
20
;0
.
25
]
]0.
30
;0
.
35
]
]0.
40
;0
.
45
]
]0.
50
;0
.
55
]
]0.
60
;0
.
65
]
]0.
70
;0
.
75
]
>
0.
8
 
 
  
 
b) Sales Changes 
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c) Hours per Worker Changes 
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Figure iii.6. Empirical Distribution of Labor Input, Earnings and Sales Variation   
 
In the presence of fixed employment adjustment costs it is expected that the 
empirical distribution of hours change exhibits high concentration in the range of small 
variation intervals, as firms used the number of hours per worker to respond to small 
variations of product demand. Figure iii.6 c) and d) show the empirical distribution of 
                                                 
8
 Both variables were deflated by Consumer Price Index (OECD Main-Economic Indicators); 2000=100.   
9
 In the case of the sales distribution we define the no-change state as corresponding to changes between  
-1% and +1%. 
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monthly hours per worker and total hours of work changes for the entire period and for 
the whole sample10. We verify that: a) there is considerable inaction in the adjustment 
of hours but much less when compared to the adjustment of employment; b) there is 
some incidence of large and small adjustments; c) the empirical distribution of 
adjustment of total hours of work is relatively similar to the distribution of sales growth 
but very different from the distribution of employment adjustment. These findings 
indicate that the existence of inaction in the level of employment at firm level is not 
caused by the inexistence of shocks but by the preference of firms for the adjustment 
through variations in the number of hours of work per employee as opposed to the 
variation of employment. The previous analysis reveals that firms leave employment 
essentially constant but adjust hours per worker more frequently, indicating that hours 
are subject to much fewer adjustment costs than employment is.   
 
 
III.3.3. SERIAL CORRELATION OF EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT 
 
 
Different structures of adjustment costs have different consequences in terms of 
both the serial correlation of adjustment and the dynamic interrelation between 
employment and hours’ adjustment. 
Concerning the serial correlation of the adjustment, convex adjustment costs 
imply that one period of small adjustment should be followed by another period of 
small adjustment, as firms try to spread the whole adjustment over several periods. On 
the contrary, non-convex adjustment costs imply that one period of adjustment should 
be followed by periods of inaction.   
To distinguish between these two types of adjustment costs, in each period firms 
were classified in one employment adjustment regime: inaction ( 0=∆ tn ); positive 
growth ( 0>∆ tn ); negative growth ( 0<∆ tn ). This information was then used to 
compute the probabilities of transition between regimes in two consecutive periods of 
time (probability transition matrix). The main focus of the analysis is on the second 
column and on the diagonal of the matrix (see Table iii.6)11.     
                                                 
10
 We also consider zero changes in hours when the absolute value of the variation is less than |1%|. This 
definition is particularly adequate because not all months have the same number of working days. 
11
 In order to verify if this transition pattern derives from the existence of non-convex costs of adjustment 
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High probabilities of transition from each regime to the inaction regime and the 
high probability of staying in the inaction regime, is a sign of the importance of non-
convex adjustment costs that lead to hysteresis. High values on the main diagonal reveal 
significant serial correlation between the adjustments and should be taken as signs of 
smooth adjustment (except the entries that correspond to the prevalence of inaction).    
Table iii.6 documents the existence of mixed signs of convex and non-convex 
adjustment costs. On the one hand, there is a great percentage of firms stuck in the 
inaction regime (the probability of a firm in the inaction regime remaining in the 
subsequent period is 58%) and a high probability of firms that are expanding or 
contracting the number of workers to move to the inaction regime in the next period. On 
the other hand, the main diagonal exhibits large serial correlation between positive and 
negative adjustments, which indicates that a large number of firms spread the 
adjustment over more than one period ahead.  
Table iii.6 also shows very different patterns of adjustment for the different 
variables considered. In particular, the probability of moving from an episode of 
adjustment to inaction is much greater for employment than it is for hours per worker 
and total hours. This is again evidence of the greater importance of non-convexities in 
the cost of adjusting employment than in the cost of adjusting the number of hours of 
work.      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
or instead from the time pattern of the shocks we also report identical transition probability matrix for 
sales and hours of work. 
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Table iii.6 
Probability Transition Matrices 
 
Employment 
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,24 0,07 0,10 
01 >∆ −tn  0,08 0,08 0,11 
01 <∆ −tn  0,10 0,11 0,11 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,58 0,17 0,25 
01 >∆ −tn  0,29 0,30 0,41 
01 <∆ −tn  0,29 0,33 0,38 
 
Hours per Worker 
 
% of the total observations 
 0=∆ th  0>∆ th  0<∆ th  
01 =∆ −th  0.05 0.01 0.01 
01 >∆ −th  0.01 0.15 0.30 
01 <∆ −th  0.01 0.30 0.16 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 0=∆ th  0>∆ th  0<∆ th  
01 =∆ −th  0,67 0,15 0,18 
01 >∆ −th  0,03 0,32 0,65 
01 <∆ −th  0,02 0,64 0,34 
 
 
Total Hours 
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tth  0>∆ tth  0<∆ tth  
01 =∆ −tth  0,04 0,01 0,02 
01 >∆ −tth  0,02 0,15 0,29 
01 <∆ −tth  0,02 0,29 0,16 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tth  0>∆ tth  0<∆ tth  
01 =∆ −tth  0,54 0,20 0,26 
01 >∆ −tth  0,04 0,32 0,64 
01 <∆ −tth  0,03 0,60 0,37 
 
 
Sales 
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ ts  0>∆ ts  0<∆ ts  
01 =∆ −ts  0,00 0,00 0,00 
01 >∆ −ts  0,00 0,19 0,32 
01 <∆ −ts  0,00 0,32 0,17 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ ts  0>∆ ts  0<∆ ts  
01 =∆ −ts  0,00 0,13 0,87 
01 >∆ −ts  0,00 0,38 0,62 
01 <∆ −ts  0,00 0,65 0,35 
 
 
 
 
 The analysis of the probability transition matrices by firm size (see Table iii.7), 
also reveals heterogeneity concerning the adjustment behavior of firms. For small firms, 
we observed not only a greater resilience of the inaction regime, but also the importance 
of this regime as the most likely destination of all firms that make a transition from one 
month to the next. Furthermore, while the resilience of the inaction regime decreases 
with firm size, the values of the main diagonal (with the exception of the first entry of 
the matrix) are low for small firms and increase with firm size. Thus, evidence of 
discrete adjustment is stronger for smaller firms than for larger ones.  
 
  
 
 79 
Table iii.7 
 Probability Transition Matrices by Firm Size 
 
2010 << n  
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,51 0,07 0,10 
01 >∆ −tn  0,08 0,02 0,04 
01 <∆ −tn  0,09 0,05 0,03 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
0=∆ tn  0,75 0,10 0,15 
0>∆ tn  0,57 0,15 0,28 
0<∆ tn  0,53 0,29 0,18 
 
4920 <≤ n  
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,32 0,08 0,11 
01 >∆ −tn  0,09 0,05 0,08 
01 <∆ −tn  0,11 0,09 0,07 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,63 0,15 0,22 
01 >∆ −tn  0,41 0,23 0,36 
01 <∆ −tn  0,41 0,34 0,25 
 
 
9950 <≤ n  
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,19 0,08 0,11 
01 >∆ −tn  0,09 0,08 0,11 
01 <∆ −tn  0,10 0,12 0,11 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,50 0,21 0,29 
01 >∆ −tn  0,30 0,29 0,40 
01 <∆ −tn  0,31 0,35 0,34 
 
 
199100 <≤ n  
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,12 0,07 0,10 
01 >∆ −tn  0,07 0,10 0,14 
01 <∆ −tn  0,09 0,14 0,17 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,41 0,23 0,36 
01 >∆ −tn  0,22 0,33 0,45 
01 <∆ −tn  0,23 0,35 0,42 
 
 
499200 <≤ n  
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,07 0,05 0,08 
01 >∆ −tn  0,05 0,13 0,15 
01 <∆ −tn  0,08 0,15 0,24 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,36 0,25 0,39 
01 >∆ −tn  0,16 0,38 0,46 
01 <∆ −tn  0,17 0,31 0,51 
 
500≥n  
 
% of the total observations 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,02 0,03 0,05 
01 >∆ −tn  0,03 0,16 0,16 
01 <∆ −tn  0,05 0,15 0,36 
 
Prob. Transition Matrix 
 
0=∆ tn  0>∆ tn  0<∆ tn  
01 =∆ −tn  0,36 0,25 0,39 
01 >∆ −tn  0,16 0,38 0,46 
01 <∆ −tn  0,17 0,31 0,51 
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III.4. INTERRELATION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS ADJUSTMENT 
 
 Movements in employment and hours jointly reflect adjustment costs and the 
shock process. A key moment is the relative variability of hours and employment 
growth.  Table iii.8 shows that the low variability of employment is caused mainly by 
the existence of costs of adjustment and not by the inexistence of shocks. In fact, the 
standard deviation of sales growth (0.224) is considerably greater than the standard 
deviation of employment variation (0.064), because firms react to shocks mainly 
through the variation in hours.  
If costs of adjustment are fixed, a negative correlation between hours growth and 
employment growth is expected because the firm may initially respond to relatively 
small profitability shocks, by changing working hours while maintaining the number of 
employees fixed. However, if profitability rises enough, the firm will change the 
number of workers and adjust average hours back to the initial level. Accordingly, this 
pattern of response produces a negative co-movement between hours and employment.  
Table iii.9 shows the simple contemporaneous correlations between employment 
variation, hours variation and sales growth. We found that employment variation and 
hours variation are weakly negative correlated with a coefficient of correlation of           
-0.048. This key moment indicates a potential substitutability between working hours 
and the number of employees. Moreover, the correlation between the variation in total 
hours of work and sales growth is stronger, and positive (0.266), than the one obtained 
between the variation in employment and sales, which that is equal to 0.062.   
 
 
Table iii.8 
Key Moments of Labor Input and Sales Growth* 
 Employment Growth 
Hours per Worker 
Growth 
Total Hours Growth Sales Growth 
 Average 0.062 0.249 0.261 0.463 
Stand. Dev. 0.064 0.157 0.156 0.224 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Maximum 0.849 0.931 0.935 1.575 
*The growth rates were calculated with the absolute value of the variation. 
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Table iii.9 
 
Contemporaneous Correlations between Margins of adjustment and Sales 
 
Employment Growth Hours Growth Total Hours Growth Sales Growth 
Employment Growth 
 
1.000 -0.048 0.266 0.062 
Hours per Worker 
Growth - 1.00 0.897 0.300 
Total Hours Growth 
 
- - 1.000 0.312 
Sales Growth 
 
- - - 1.000 
 
It is also important to analyze the correlation between employment and hours 
adjustment during employment inaction and during spike episodes. The question is 
whether inaction or spikes in one margin of adjustment increase the probability that 
firms adjust the other margin. Figure iii.7 shows that the empirical frequency of hours 
per worker variation is conditional on the existence of a positive (negative) spike 
episode, exhibits considerably less inaction relative to the unconditional frequency and 
is skewed to the left (right) reflecting the return of hours per worker to the pre-shock 
values when employment starts to adjust.   
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Frequency of Hours per Worker Change  
Conditional on Negative Employment Spike    
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Figure iii.7. Empirical Distribution of Monthly Hours per Employee Change and Employment Adjustment 
 
 
However, the empirical distribution of hours adjustment conditional on zero 
employment variation (see Figure iii.8) also indicates that almost 30% of firms keep the 
labor input stable (employment and hours per employee). It is this fact, and not the 
existence of convex costs of adjustment, that tends to reduce the negative correlation 
between employment variation and hours variation.     
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Figure iii.8. Frequency of Hours per Worker Change  
Conditional on Zero Employment Variation 
 
 
III.5. PATH DEPENDENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF LINEAR RESPONSE  
 
In the presence of fixed employment adjustment costs, establishments would not 
adjust continuously to the shocks they perceive, on the contrary, adjustment would be 
occasional and often large 
The current employment level chosen by the firm depends on the comparison 
between the fixed cost of adjustment in each period and the present value of the 
additional profit induced by the adjustment from the old to the new equilibrium. If the 
cost of the change from one static equilibrium to another is higher than additional profit 
induced by the adjustment, the firm does not adjust the level of employment, instead the 
firm will adjust to the new steady sate in an instantaneous jump. In this case, the 
demand for labor of the optimizing firm is discontinuous and could be represented by an 
(S,s) type model (Hamermesh 1989): 
 


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12
111
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µ
   (iii.1) 
 
Where t,j*n is the desired employment level, t,jn is the actual employment level, jk , is 
the percentage deviation of last period’s employment from the desired employment that 
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is necessary to overcome fixed adjustment costs, and 
tj ,1µ  and tj ,2µ are disturbances 
with ( ) 0,
,,
21 =
tjtj
E µµ . 
Figure iii.9 illustrates the relationship between employment and sales (used as a 
proxy of frictionless employment demand). Along the employment schedule, an 
increase in sales is associated with high employment. However, when hysteresis is 
present, employment will not change until a critical level of sales ( 1js ) is reached. 
Starting from point A, with js j β= , if sales start to increase, the firm j only adjusts its 
employment level to *jn , when jtjtj knn ≥− −1,,
*
, which happens in point B when 
1jj ss = . If the sales start to decrease, returning to the initial level, the actual 
employment level will stay at the previous level, and only decreases to the desired level 
when jt,jt,j* knn ≥− −1 .  
                
                 jn                     *ln                 
 
 
   D                 C   
        
              jk   
                                        
              entryn                                                     A        B 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               jα                    jβ           *s         1js                            js  
 
Figure iii.9.  (S,s) Adjustment Policy at the Firm Level  
 
 
Under hysteresis the cumulative changes in sales are important determinants of 
employment flows; i.e., the effect of sales changes on employment depends on the 
history of the past shocks as well as on the current sales variation. This implies that the 
same variation of the control variable could lead to different reactions of the state 
variable. Suppose an active firm, and consider that the control variable (sales) is far 
beyond the exit trigger. A small negative variation in sales will not cause any effect on 
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the state variable (employment demand). Now, consider cumulative negative shocks in 
sales of the same magnitude. When the control variable is close to the exit trigger the 
same negative variation in sales could lead to exit. Thus, the existence of sudden jumps 
in the dynamics of the state variable could not be accompanied by abrupt changes in the 
control variable; the discontinuous behavior of the state variable could be caused by 
continuous and smooth behavior of the input variable. 
We apply a test designed to study the existence of the hysteresis property of path 
dependence and divergence of the linear employment response hypothesis, in line with 
Parsley and Wei (1993), but applied to micro panel data.  
The test is constructed on the basis of three aspects of the hysteresis hypothesis. 
Firstly, the change in the shock variable should be large to induce structural shifts in the 
relationship between the input and the output. Secondly, the history of the input matters 
for the determination of the aggregate actual employment. Thirdly, there is an 
asymmetry in the reaction of the aggregate employment to the same (small) variation of 
the input variable, in the sense that it depends on whether the input variable is near or 
far from an entry or an exit trigger.  
To implement the test we assume, as in Parsley and Wei (1993), that the effect 
of an increase in the input value following a series of successive increases is different 
from the effect of an increase in the value of the input following a series of successive 
decreases. 
Thus, we define: 
 
∑
=
−−
−=
T
j
jititit ssV
0
1        (iii.2)
                
as the cumulative change in sales ( its ) over some period T. We also define a dummy 
variable itD  that indicates whether the actual change in sales is in the same, or opposite, 
direction for the change over the previous T periods: 
 


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To generate a hysteresis filtered variable of real sales we compute the measure of phase: 
 
ittitit VsiDs ∆=ψ                       (iii.4) 
            
   After computing the measure of phase with the sales variable ( itsψ ) and with the 
real wages variable ( itwψ ), we estimate an employment equation of the type: 
 
 itjit
n
j
jwjit
n
j
jsit wsseasonalsn εψβψβα ψψ ++++=∆ −
=
−
=
∑∑
0
,
0
,
       (iii.5)  
 
where itε  is a white noise disturbance term. 
The coefficients associated with the measures of phase are expected to have the 
same sign as in the case of the original variables (positive in the case of itsψ  and 
negative in the case of itwψ ). Suppose an increase in sales after a series of successive 
increases.  itV  and thus itsψ  will be positive and in the equation describing the behavior 
of employment the coefficient on  itsψ  will be positive. However, an increase in sales 
after a series of successive decreases should not have an impact on employment due to 
hysteresis effects. itV  will be negative its  positive and itsψ  will be equal to zero.  
Tables 10 and 11 present the fixed effects estimates of Equation iii.5 when the 
order of the lag polynomials is set to zero and to three. We choose T to be 12 in the 
calculus of itV , we assume that information about sales trends in the most recent year is 
sufficient to identify hysteresis effects. We compare the estimates of Equation iii.5 with 
the estimates of a similar employment equation with the original series of sales and real 
wages as independent variables.  
As the preliminary evidence about the existence of hysteresis, offered in the 
previous sections, indicates the existence of differences in the employment adjustment 
process between small and large firms, in order to verify the existence of differences in 
the importance of the hysteresis hypothesis by firm size, we estimated equation iii.5 for 
the whole sample, for firms with fewer than 20 workers, and for firms with more than 
500 workers. 
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Table iii.10 shows the point estimates of the coefficients associated with the 
independent variables. All the coefficients associated with the original dependent 
variables are significant and display the predicted sign. The estimated sales elasticity of 
employment is 0.0093 for the whole sample. We verify that, at the micro level, the 
employment of small firms is more responsive to sales than the employment of large 
firms (the estimated coefficients are respectively 0.0128 and 0.0060). 
Concerning the existence of hysteresis the estimation of Equation iii.5 reveals 
that the coefficients associated with the hysteresis transformed sales variable ( itsψ ) are 
significant and display the predicted positive sign. The coefficients associated with the 
hysteresis transformed real wages variable ( itwψ ) display the wrong (positive) sign in 
the case of the small firms. In the other cases the coefficient is negative but non-
significant. The goodness of fit of the employment equations increases when we include 
in the employment equation the hysteresis effects, in the case of the whole sample and 
for the sub sample of the small firms. We obtain opposite results in the case of large 
firms.       
 
Table iii.10 
Panel Data Employment Equation Estimates (with n=0) 
Dependent Variable: employment growth rate 
 Whole Sample   Firms with Fewer than 20 
Workers 
Firms with More than 500 
Workers  
 
Eq. with original 
independent 
variables: its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with original 
independent variables: 
its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with original 
independent variables: 
its and itw   
Eq. iii.5 
  
Cons   -0.0223* 
-25.73 
 
0.653* 
42.02 
 
-0.0403* 
-9.99 
 
-0.0158 
-4.09 
 
-0.0153* 
-7.59 
 
-0.0108* 
-5.81 
0,sβ  0.0093* 
30.98 
 
- 
0.0128* 
11.79 
 
- 
0.0060* 
7.92 
 
- 
0,wβ  -0.0226* 
-41.28 
 
- 
-0.0464* 
-18.67 
 
- 
-0.0066* 
-6.75 
 
- 
0,sψβ  
- 
0.0148* 
4.86 
 
- 
0.0045* 
10.89 - 
0.0010* 
3.17 
0,wψβ  - 
-0.0015 
-0.41 
 
- 
0.0055* 
4.49 - 
-0.0007 
-0.32 
2R  0.0058 0.012 0.0365 0.0595 0.4684 0.0004 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, and the t-statistic respectively.  
* Significant at 5% 
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Table 11 presents the sum of the estimated coefficients of the employment 
equation on the contemporaneous and first three lags of the independent variable. When 
we estimate the employment equation with the original variables, we verify that the 
cumulative effects of sales and real wages variations are higher after 3 months. In the 
case of the whole sample the coefficients associated with all the lags of the two 
independent variables are significant and display the expected sign. In the case of the 
sub sample of the small firms, only the second lag of the  real wages display a non-
expected positive sign, although, non-significant, and the sum of the estimated 
coefficients is negative.  For the large firms, the coefficients associated with the third 
lag of sales are non-significant (and negative, as well as all the coefficients associated 
with all the lags of real wages.  
Besides, only in the case of small firms, the inclusion of the transformed 
hysteresis variables itsψ  and itwψ ,  instead of the original variables, increases the value 
of R-square of the employment regression. Therefore, we only can conclude for the 
existence of signs of hysteresis in the relationship between employment and sales and in 
the case of the small firms. 
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Table iii.11 
 Panel Data Employment Equation Estimates (with n=3) 
Dependent Variable: employment growth rate  
 Whole Sample   Firms with Fewer than 20 
Workers 
Firms with More than 500 
Workers  
 
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw   
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Cons   -0.02037* 
-10.20 
-0.0111* 
-13.47 
-0.0426* 
-10.39 
-0.0156* 
-4.04 
-0.0149* 
-7.26 
-0.0109* 
-5.84 
0,sβ  0.01279* 37.49 - 0.0167* 13.47 - 0.0068* 7.73 - 
1,sβ  0.007973* 21.02 - 0.0089* 6.39 - 0.0019* 2.05 - 
2,sβ  0.00522* 13.79 - 0.0064* 4.55 - 0.0002 0.27 - 
3,sβ  0.00333* 9.9 - 0.0029* 2.36 - -0.0007 -0.36 - 
∑
n
sj
0
β  0.02924 - 0.0349 - 0.0082 - 
0,wβ  -0.0272* 
-43.67 - 
-0.0499* 
-18.15 - 
-0.0070* 
-6.08 - 
1,wβ  -0.0093* 
-13.72 - 
-0.0065* 
-2.24 - 
-0.0007 
-0.55 - 
2,wβ  -0.0055* 
-8.19 - 
0.0003 
0.13 - 
-0.0003 
-0.3 - 
3,wβ  -0.0031* 
-5.30 
 
- 
-0.0040 
-1.54 - 
-0.0007 
-0.64 - 
∑
n
wj
0
β  -0.0541 - -0.0601 - -0.0087 - 
0,sψβ  - 
 
0.0028* 
22.19 - 
0.0045* 
10.68 - 
0.00104* 
3.06 
1,sψβ  - 
 
0.0007* 
5.73 - 
-0.0006 
-1.38 - 
-0.0001 
-0.54 
2,sψβ   0.0006* 4.47 - 0.0003 0.79 - -0.0004 -1.15 
3,sψβ  - 
 
0.0001 
0.73 - 
-0.0004 
-0.96 - 
-0.0002 
-0.64 
∑
n
sj
0
ψβ  - 0.0042 - 0.0065 - 0.0003 
0,wψβ  - 
 
 
-0.0014* 
-4.89 - 
0.0059* 
4.76 - 
0.00036 
1.65 
1,wψβ  - 
 
0.0061* 
20.27 - 
0.0059* 
4.712 - 
0.00048 
0.22 
2,wψβ  - 
 
-0.0002 
-0.70 - 
0.0005 
0.43 - 
-0.00012 
-0.56 
3,wψβ  - 
 
-0.0005 
-1.69 - 
0.0004 
0.28 - 
-0.00002 
-0.11 
∑
n
wj
0
ψβ  - 0.0055 - 0.0127 - 0.0007 
2R  0.0129 0.0012 0.0513 0.1075 0.5051 0.0008 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively.  
* Significant at 5% 
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We also estimate Equation iii.5 with the growth rate of total hours of work as the 
dependent variable (see the results in Table iii.12 and iii.13). As expected, labor input 
( hoursemployment × ) is substantially more responsive to sales variation than 
employment. The employment sales elasticity increases from 0.0093 to 0.1424 when we 
use the whole sample, from 0.0128 to 0.1141 in the case of small firms, and from 
0.0060 to 0.1365, in the case of large firms (see Table iii.12).           
Concerning the hysteresis effects, the results are similar to those obtained for 
employment. In all the cases, the coefficients associated with the hysteresis transformed 
sales variable are positive and significant.  In the case of the hysteresis transformed real 
wage variables, the coefficients are significant but positive, when the whole sample and 
the sample of the small firms are used, and non-significant and positive when the 
sample of the large firms is used. Moreover, in the case on small firms the goodness of 
fit of the employment equations increases when the hysteresis effects are considered. 
The contrary happens when the whole sample and the sample of large firms are used.  
Table iii.13 indicates that hysteresis is not present in the dynamics of the labor 
input when the whole sample is used and in the case of large firms. Only in the case of 
the small firms, the inclusion of the hysteresis variables instead of the original ones 
increased the R-squared of the employment equation, which indicate the existence of 
hysteresis     
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Table iii.12 
 Panel Data Labor Input Equation Estimates (with n=0) 
Dependent Variable: labor input growth rate  
 Whole Sample   Firms with Fewer than 20 
Workers 
Firms with More than 500 
Workers  
 
Eq. with the original 
independent 
variables: its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw   
Eq. iii.5 
  
Cons   -0.085* 
-24.6 
 
-0.068* 
-26.58 
-0.0481* 
-4.61 
-0.0573* 
-5.68 
-0.0604* 
-4.07 
-0.1202 
-8.54 
0,sβ  0.1424* 
117.66 
 
- 
0.1141* 
40.08 - 
0.1365* 
23.91 - 
0,wβ  -0.0145* 
-6.61 
 
- 
0.0334* 
5.14 - 
0.0494* 
6.81 - 
0,sψβ  
- 
0.0255* 
48.29 
 
- 
0.0176* 
15.36 
 
- 
0.0138* 
5.12 
0,wψβ  - 
0.0134* 
10.96 
 
- 
0.0754* 
19.86 
 
- 
0.0003 
0.20 
2R  0.0372 0.0116 0.1204 0.1958 0.0962 0.0076 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, and the t-statistic respectively.  
* Significant at 5% 
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Table iii.13 
 Panel Data Labor Input Equation Estimates (with n=3) 
Dependent Variable: labor  input growth rate  
 Whole Sample   Firms with Fewer than 20 
Workers 
Firms with More than 500 
Workers  
 
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw   
Eq. iii.5 
  
Eq. with the original 
independent variables: 
its and itw  
Eq. iii.5 
  
Cons   -0.00674* 
-8.50 
-0.0897* 
-26.94 
0.01896* 
-8.59 
-0.0578* 
-5.72 
-0.0732* 
-4.84 
-0.1208* 
-8.58 
0,sβ  0.1385* 100.98 - 0.1142* 32.28 - 0.1305* 19.85 - 
1,sβ  -0.0106 
-6.99 - 
-0.0000 
-0.02 - 
-0.0177* 
-2.45 - 
2,sβ  0.0093* 6.16 - 0.0115* 3.15 - 0.0135 1.88 - 
3,sβ  0.0057* 4.31 - 0.0036 0.49 - 0.0110 1.74 - 
∑
n
sj
0
β  0.1429 - 0.1293 - 0.1373 - 
0,wβ  -0.0318* 
-12.77 - 
0.0224* 
3.11 - 
0.0313* 
3.67 - 
1,wβ  -0.0427* 
-15.71 - 
-0.0275* 
-3.61 - 
-0.0406* 
-4.22 - 
2,wβ  0.0107* 3.97 - 0.0218* 2.91 - -0.0058 -0.62 - 
3,wβ  0.0008 0.36 - 0.0059 0.87 - -0.0049 -0.61 - 
∑
n
wj
0
β  -0.0630 - 0.0226 - -0.0200 - 
0,sψβ  - 
 
0.0243* 
4567 - 
0.0168* 
14.37 - 
0.0124* 
4.54 
1,sψβ  - 
 
 -0.0138* 
-24.92 - 
-0.0077* 
-5.69 - 
-0.007* 
-2.80 
2,sψβ    0.0006 0.11 - -0.0004 -0.36 - -0.0030 -1.1 
3,sψβ  - 
 
-0.0008 
-1.48 - 
-0.0015 
-1.20 - 
-0.0024 
-0.89 
∑
n
sj
0
ψβ  - 0.0103 - 0.0072 - -0.0007 
0,wψβ  - 
 
 
0.0137* 
11.24 - 
0.0771* 
20.04 - 
0.0003 
0.19 
1,wψβ  - 
 
0.0071* 
5.67 - 
0.0092* 
2.42 - 
0.0004 
0.28 
2,wψβ  - 
 
0.0005 
0.38 - 
0.0032 
0.73 - 
-0.0009 
-0.56 
3,wψβ  - 
 
-0.0012 
-0.90 - 
-0.0030 
0.60 - 
0.0005 
0.32 
∑
n
wj
0
ψβ  - 0.0201 - 0.0865 - 
 
0.0003 
 
2R  0.0261 0.0167  0.1123 0.18.58 0.1037 0.0047 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively.  
* Significant at 5% 
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 III.4. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
In this part, we analyze the existence of hysteresis at the firm level, based on 
high frequency micro data for Portugal. We start by providing some descriptive 
statistics on employment adjustment to check for the existence of the necessary 
condition for the existence of hysteresis – the existence of non-convex costs of 
employment adjustment. Secondly, we analyze the joint dynamics of employment and 
hours of work. Finally, we estimate a model with the hysteresis property of path 
dependence and divergence of the linear employment response to shocks that offers 
more direct evidence of the existence of hysteresis at the micro level.  
The main conclusions are: 
 Firstly, the empirical distribution of net employment change exhibits clear signs 
of lumpy adjustment (large frequency of episodes of no adjustment and the existences 
of spike episodes). Moreover, the frequency of inaction and the frequency of spike 
episodes decrease markedly with the size of the firms. However, signs of smooth 
adjustment can also be observed in the proportion of small adjustment episodes.   
 Secondly, the shape of empirical distribution of real earnings and sales changes 
differs significantly from the empirical distribution of net employment changes, 
revealing much less inaction and greater incidence of large variations. The shape of the 
empirical distribution of sales is homogeneous across firms’ size and across activity 
sectors. 
 Thirdly, the empirical distribution of hours’ growth shows less inaction when 
compared with the empirical distribution of employment change and greater incidence 
of large adjustment episodes. Therefore, the empirical distribution of hours is more 
similar to the empirical distribution of sales changes than the empirical distribution of 
net employment changes. 
  Fourthly, sales growth is more volatile than total hours of work change. Hours 
per worker variability is significantly greater than employment variability, showing that 
firms react to shocks mainly through the variation in hours of work. We find a weak 
negative contemporaneous correlation between hours’ growth and employment growth 
which is a sign of the presence of non-convex employment adjustment costs. These 
results reveal a preference of the firms for the adjustment through variations in hours of 
work. The firms leave employment essentially constant but adjust hours per worker 
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more frequently, which indicate that hours are not subject to significant adjustment 
costs. 
 Finally, by estimating an employment equation that incorporates path 
dependence we find signs of hysteresis in the adjustment of employment, which are 
especially important in the case of small firms. We do not find clear signs of hysteresis 
in the employment adjustment of large firms. We also find that labor input is more 
responsive than employment to sales variation, due to the higher flexibility of 
adjustment through the number of hours per employee.   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
STRONG HYSTERESIS IN THE DYNAMICS OF LABOR DEMAND 
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IV.1. INTRODUCTION   
 
In this chapter, we address the macroeconomic consequences of discrete 
adjustment of employment, in the presence of non-convex costs of adjustment and 
uncertainty at the firm level. The key concern is the extent to which micro inertia is 
inherited at the macro level.   
While there is vast literature that stresses the lumpy nature of employment 
adjustment at the micro level, given the presence of both high hiring and firing costs1, at 
the aggregate level, employment series look smooth and appear to be well described by 
partial-adjustment like models reflecting convex adjustment costs at the firm level. This 
contradiction challenges the relevance of micro models of employment adjustment to 
explain the aggregate dynamics.  
 To study the macroeconomic implications of discontinuous adjustment at the firm 
level and reconcile the observed microeconomic behavior with aggregate evidence, it is 
necessary to allow for agent heterogeneity, and to consider the degree of coordination of 
individual firms at all points in time (Bertola and Caballero 1990, p. 253, Cross 1994, p. 
213). At one extreme, if all the individual firms are identical and coordinate their actions, 
the aggregate employment path should be similar to the individual paths. At the other 
extreme, if a large group of firms are uniformly spread in the state space and their actions 
are uncoordinated, the aggregate employment path can look very smooth.   
We apply a testing framework based on the Preisach Model of strong hysteresis, 
to study the dynamic behavior of employment at the aggregate level that results from the 
lumpy and intermittent pattern observed at the micro level2. This framework includes four 
methodological ingredients: i) a simple model of discontinuous behavior of employment 
demand at the micro level in the presence of non-convex (fixed or linear) costs of 
adjustment – Non-Ideal Relay Model of Hysteresis; ii) individual heterogeneity (each firm 
faces different fixed costs of adjusting employment; iii) an aggregation procedure of the 
                                                 
1
 See Hamermesh (1989; 1993), Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) and Caballero et al. (1997). 
2
 The Preisach Model is a mathematical tool that is designed and well suited to establishing the connection 
between micro and macro behavior, and can be very useful in the empirical investigation of the time series 
properties of aggregate variables. The outcome of the Preisach model, built from microeconomic units that 
adjust discontinuously the number of employees, is a continuous smooth series. This series exhibits strong 
hysteresis and cannot be described by a partial adjustment model.       
 
 96 
individual heterogeneous behavior - Preisach Model of Hysteresis; iv) an estimation and 
testing method consistent with i) and iii). 
Moreover, to study the relationship between the existence of hysteresis and 
uncertainty at the macro level, we apply a Linear Play Model of hysteresis and we 
estimate a time varying intercept employment demand equation, relating the frequency of 
structural break caused by hysteresis with the existence of uncertainty. 
Finally, we study the effects of adjustment through hours of work upon the band 
of inertia, at the aggregate level, by re-estimating the Linear Play Model with a variable 
play segment. 
In the empirical work, we used aggregate data from Portuguese manufacturing 
firms resulting from aggregating the series of firms that remained in our IVNEI data set 
from January 1995 to December 2005. Using this data set, we guarantee that the area of 
the potential active firms in the Preisach Triangle (see Figure ii.9) is constant, which 
implies that all the variation in the aggregate employment reflects the existence of 
shocks, and is not affected by effects related to the re-composition of the firms in the 
data set.  
  
 
IV.2. EMPIRICAL TESTS WITH SELECTIVE MEMORY MODELS OF HYSTERESIS 
 
IV.2.1. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
To test the existence of hysteresis we proceed as follows3: First, we estimate a 
hysteresis index variable, based on a hysteretic transformation ( tHS ) of the aggregate 
series of sales ( tS )4 according to the Preisach Model of Strong Hysteresis and to a Linear 
Play Algorithm. Second, the hysteresis index variable enters as an exogenous variable in 
a cointegration vector that explains the dynamics of the aggregate employment. The non-
                                                 
3
 This methodology follows Cross (1995), Piscitelli et al. (2000) and Belke and Göcke (2001). 
4
 We use aggregate sales as a proxy of the state of aggregate demand represented in the models of Chapter 
II by tP . Although real wages change could also be a source of hysteresis, we only test the existence of 
hysteresis caused by aggregate demand shocks. 
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linearity inherent to hysteresis is captured by the hysteresis index, while the rest of the 
model is kept linear. Third, we perform cointegration tests on the following regression:  
 
ttt TWHSN εββββ ++++= 3210             (iv.1)   
 
where the logarithm of the aggregate employment level is explained by a hysteresis 
transformation of the logarithm of real sales ( tHS ), by the real wage rate W , and by a 
time trend (T) to control for changes in employment not explained by output demand 
variation . 
The existence of hysteresis in the dynamics of employment is evaluated by 
considering: i) the significance of the hysteresis variable (hysteresis implies 01 ≠β ); ii) 
the increase of the goodness of fit of the hysteretic regression compared with the 
regression on the original independent variables (real sales and real wages), that is the 
specification of the standard labor demand function, assuming cost minimization firms 
that take output demand and input prices as given; iii) the existence of a cointegrated 
vector between employment and the hysteresis transformation of sales. 
 As the preliminary evidence on the existence of hysteresis, offered in Chapter III, 
indicates the existence of differences in the employment adjustment process between 
small and large firms, we also analyze the presence of hysteresis in these two sub 
samples.    
 
 
IV.2.2.EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF STRONG HYSTERESIS MODELS 
 
IV.2.2.1. PREISACH MODEL   
  
In this section, we describe a procedure based on the Preisach Model of Strong 
Hysteresis that allows us to test, empirically, the existence of hysteresis in the aggregate 
path of employment.   
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The Preisach Model of Strong Hysteresis operates a transformation on an input 
variable tS  in accordance with equation ii.28 that traces the dynamics of employment 
given by the area of the active firms ( 1T ) in Figure ii.9.  
This procedure was implemented by writing a MATLAB program that generates 
the hysteresis transformation of the aggregate series of sales, used as a proxy of labor 
demand, following the algorithm provided in Piscitelli et al. (2000). We made some 
numerical improvements in the code such as preallocation for better memory use and 1-
dim data arrays to memorize the non-dominated extremes instead of the proposed 2-dim 
data arrays (see Program 1 in the Appendix). 
The computation of the transformed variables involves four steps:  
 Step 1, made at the beginning of the program, specifies 0α  and 0β - the vertex of 
the Preisach Triangle. Given that we do not have information on 0α  and 0β , we assume, 
as in Cross (1995), that ( ){ }n,....,,ttSmin 210 ==α  and ( ){ }n,....,,ttSmax 210 ==β , 
where ( )tS  is the logarithm of real sales.  
 Step 2, requires the selection of non-dominated extreme values from the time 
series of the input variable ( )tS . The maximum is given by ( ) )j(Smaxt,kM = , 
−
−
= t,...ktj 1 , such that ( ) ( )+= ktSt,kM  and the minimum is given by ( ) ( )jSmint,km = , 
+
−
= t,...ktj 1 , such that ( ) ( )−= ktSt,km . 
 Step 3, involves computing the area 1T  at t , n,...,t 1= , updating 
( ) ( )( )t,kmt,kM)t(T)t(T 1
2
1
11 −−+=  to add the area of the triangle with vertex 
( ) ( )( )t,km,t,kM 1−  and ( ) ( )( )t,kmt,kM)t(T)t(T 1
2
1
11 −−−=  and to subtract the area of 
the triangle with vertex in ( ) ( )( )t,km,t,kM . 
Finally, Step 4 implies the specification of the Preisach Function - ( )βα ,u  that 
specifies how much each ( jj ,βα ) switching combination contributes to the aggregate 
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output. In the absence of cross-section information on the distribution of ( jj ,βα ) along 
the Preisach Triangle, we assume a uniform weight function5.  
 
 
IV.2.2.2. LINEAR PLAY MODEL 
   
The dynamics induced by the Preisach Model can also be approximated by a 
Linear Play Hysteresis Operator (see Visitin 1994, Belke and Göcke 2001 and Göcke 
2002 for an application to the dynamics of employment).   
Based on the Play Model of hysteresis, we estimate a linear switching 
employment equation, with an unknown splitting factor (called the play), to capture the 
non-linear play hysteresis effects6. We assume that for small changes of sales there is a 
weak reaction of employment along a play segment, and for large changes of sales there 
is a strong reaction of the employment along a spurt segment. The location of the play 
segment is shifted vertically by movements on the spurt line in the direction of the change 
in employment. Thus, the realization of the aggregate employment can be expressed as a 
shift in the cumulate vertical displacement of the play segment, induced by past spurts, 
and by the change of the current state of product demand (see Figure ii.10). 
   
The Algorithm to Compute the Play  
 
We consider that the change in the independent variable tS  (the variable that 
causes hysteresis) may occur inside the play area ( PLAY ), in which case it is referred to 
as a∆ , or on the spurt line, in which case it is referred to as SPURT∆ 7: 
                                                 
5
 In fact, the results are not very sensitive to the specification of the Preisach Function, a property that is 
usually referred to as the statistical stability of the Preisach Model.     
6
 The implementation of the Linear Play Model of Hysteresis follows Belke and Göcke (2001). 
7
 The calculation of tSPURT∆  is based on the assumption that in every period that the firm faces the 
decision to change the level of employment it must incur fixed costs of adjustment. This would happen 
even if the firm has located in the right spurt line and 0>∆ tP  or if the firm is located in the left spurt line 
and 0<∆ tP .   
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ttt SPURTaS ∆+∆=∆ , with 
( ) ( ) ( )



 >−∆⇐−∆∆
=∆
otherwise
PLAYSPLAYSSsign
SPURT
ttt
t 0
0*
 
              (iv.2) 
 
The change in the logarithm of aggregate employment induced by a change in the 
logarithm of sales ( tS ), is divided in a weak reaction in the play area and in a strong 
reaction described by the spurt line when tS  changes sufficiently: 
 
  ( ) ttt SPURTaN ∆++∆=∆ 211 βββ , with 211 βββ +<       (iv.3) 
 
The location of the play line is shifted vertically by movements on the spurt line 
in the direction of the change in employment. The cumulate vertical displacement of the 
play line, induced by all previous movements on both spurt lines, is expressed as: 
 
 ( )∑
−
=
−
∆+=
1
0
211
t
t
tt SPURTV ββ                     (iv.4) 
 
Thus the realization of the dependent variable can be expressed as a shift in V 
induced by past spurts and the current change in the independent variable ( tS∆ ): 
 
( ) ( ) tt
t
t
tttt SPURTaSPURTCNVCN ∆++∆+∆++=∆++= ∑
−
=
− 211
1
0
211 βββββ      (iv.5) 
 
 and rearranging we have: 
 
( ) t
t
t
tt SSPURTCN 1
0
21 βββ +∆++= ∑
=
                   (iv.6) 
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Summing and subtracting ∑
−
=
∆−
1
0
1
t
t
tSβ and making ∑
−
=
∆−=
1
0
10
t
t
tSC ββ , we have: 
 
( ) ttt SPURTSN 2110 ββββ +++= ,      (iv.7) 
with ( ) ( )∑
=
∆+=+
t
t
tt SPURTSPURT
0
2121 ββββ         
 
 The linear equation (iv.7) captures the non-linear play dynamics with the 
inclusion of an artificial variable tSPURT  that summarizes all preceding and present 
movements on the spurt lines, originating a shift in the current relation between 
employment and input variables.    
We wrote a MATLAB program (see Program 2 in the appendix) to generate the 
spurt variable ( tSPURT ) following the algorithm described in Belke and Göcke (2001). 
The algorithm requires the estimation of the width of the play ( )PLAY , which is assumed 
constant over time. The estimation of the play is executed via a grid search procedure 
over the values of the play ( )PLAY 8: i) given the value of the PLAY , the algorithm 
computes the spurt variable ( tSPURT ); ii) given the tSPURT , the R-square of the 
estimated employment equation is calculated for every play grid points; iii) the value of 
the play leading to the maximum value of the goodness of fit of Equation iv.7 is selected. 
The calculus of the R-square requires the estimation of the β coefficients: 
 
( ) Y'XX'X 1−=β)            (iv.8) 
 
As matrix inversion is a computationally expensive procedure and also a numerically 
unstable one, we made some improvements in the code to avoid this problem. The 
solution was to use a QRX =   factorization, where Q  is orthogonal and R  is triangular: 
 
                                                 
8
 We use a grid between 0.000 and 0.200 with increments of 0.02, and tSPURT  is calculated using real 
sales as a proxy of employment demand. 
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( ) ( ) YQRY'Q'RQR'Q'RY'XX'X 1111 −−−− ===β)         (iv.9) 
 
The implementation of this procedure to calculate the R-square was done in an auxiliary 
program (see Program 3 in the Appendix) 
 
 
IV.2.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  
 
The test of strong hysteresis consists of checking the ability of the selected 
hysteresis transformed input variable, to explain the observed aggregate employment 
dynamics. Following the referred methodology, we estimate by OLS a cointegrated 
regression between employment, real sales and the hysteresis transformation of sales, 
according to the Preisach Model and to the Linear Play Model9. 
  A first test to the existence of hysteresis consists in verifying the significance of 
the transformed sales variable, either when it enters alone or with the original series in the 
cointegrated regression10. We started by applying formal unit root tests to all the variables 
– employment ( tN ), real sales ( tS ), the real wage ( tW ) and the hysteresis transformed 
sales variable ( tHS ) – see Table A.9 in the Appendix. The null hypothesis is that the 
series are integrated of order one. In none of the cases the tADF-statistic exceeds in 
absolute value the critical value, meaning that we did not reject the null hypothesis. In 
order to check the existence of cointegration between the variables we adopt the Engle-
Granger Cointegration Test and the Johansen Test Procedure (see Johansen 1988)11. We also 
                                                 
9
 We adopt the OLS estimators of the cointegrated vector, which according to Granger (1991, p. 71): 
“…should give an excellent estimate of the true coefficient …”, since the OLS estimator is super-consistent 
when there is cointegration. 
10
 When we conclude for cointegration between the variables, the estimated coefficient of an integrated 
regressor can be estimated in an unusually precise way, as the estimate converges for its true value at a rate 
T-1 rather than the usual T-1/2. The estimators are superconsistent. However, the standard Gaussian 
asymptotic theory does not apply when there are integrated regressors meaning that the t-statistics do not 
follow the standard t–student distribution (Stock and Watson 1988). For that reason, we do not perform 
formal tests on the significance of the variables and proceed only with a broad assessment of the main 
performance. 
11
 The Engle-Granger test is an Augment Dickey-Fuller unit-root test of the residuals of the cointegrating 
regression. If the series are not cointegrated then there must be a unit root in the residuals (null hypothesis 
of no cointegration). On the contrary, if the residuals are stationary the series are cointegrated, and the 
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perform a test on the increase in the goodness of fit of the original regression, when we 
add the hysteresis transformed variable12.  
 
 
IV.2.3.1 RESULTS OF THE PREISACH MODEL 
 
 
We start by estimating by OLS an equation relating the logarithm of aggregate 
employment to the logarithm of real sales and a time trend (see Table iv.1, p. 109)13: 
 
ttt TSN εβββ +++= 210                    (iv.10) 
 
The estimated sales elasticity of employment is 0.25414 and the estimated 
coefficient associated with the time trend shows that the employment of the 
manufacturing sector decreased every month at 0.2 percent. Both the logarithm of sales 
and the time trend are significant15. We also estimated equation iv.10 for firms with fewer 
than 20 workers, and for firms with more than 500 workers (see Table iv.1 - columns 5 
and 8)16. We verify that the estimated coefficient associated with real sales is positive and 
significant for both sub samples and that aggregate employment of small firms is more 
responsive to sales than aggregate employment of large firms (the estimated coefficients 
are respectively 0.364 and 0.182).    
                                                                                                                                                  
critical values tabulated by MacKinnon (1991) should be used. We also use the Johansen Maximum 
Likelihood procedure (Trace Test), to test for cointegration. The test was performed with four lags in the 
VAR representation and with an intercept and time trend in the cointegration equation. We report the 
results of testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration ( 0=r ) against the alternative of the existence of 
at least one cointegrated vector ( 1≥r ) . 
12
 The F-Statistic does not follow exactly the F-distribution. However, a large magnitude of the F-Statistic 
relative to the standard critical value of 4.79 (for a 1% significance level) indicates that the unrestricted 
model is more adequate.    
13
 We do not include information on earnings in the employment equation since the data set we use does not 
contain information on the market wage rate, but only on the unitary value of earnings paid by firms, which 
are already a consequence employment demand decisions. Actually, the estimated coefficient associated 
with the real earnings variable is non-significant and displays a positive sign, which indicates potential 
simultaneity problems. 
14
 Not very different from 0.29, the estimate obtained by Varejão (2000) with quarterly data for the period 
1991 to 1995. 
15
 Note that, even considering that the t-values are not student-t distributed the t-statistics are three times 
greater than 1.96 (the 5% critical value in the case of the standard t-student distribution). 
16
 The data set contains 65 firms with fewer 20 workers and 60 firms with more than 500 workers. 
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To test the existence of hysteresis, we replace the original series of sales ( tS ) in 
Equation iv.10 with its hysteresis transformation ( tHS ) and we estimate Equation iv.11: 
 
ttt THSN εβββ +++= 210                              (iv.11) 
 
Figure iv.1 plots the Preisach hysteresis index variable tHS  under the assumption 
that the Preisach Function is uniform. The Preisach hysteresis index variable computed 
by the previous program looks smoother than the original series of sales as it is the output 
of a non-linear transformation of the original variable, that retains in the memory bank 
only the non-dominated extremes, and combines them in a non-linear way.   
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Figure iv.1. Hysteresis Transformed Real Sales Series (Preisach Model of Hysteresis) 
 
Figure iv.2 (the plot of the hysteresis transformation of the logarithm of sales, at 
constant prices, against the original variable - hysteresis loop) shows the predicted 
dynamics of employment under hysteresis. If the Preisach Model of hysteresis offers a 
good description of the data, the dynamic behavior of employment at the macro level 
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could be approximated by the hysteresis transformation of the aggregate sales series. 
Figure iv.2 shows that when sales vary back and forth, the response of the hysteresis 
transformed variable is non-linear. Moreover, we have several values of the transformed 
series associated with the same value of sales, which indicates that in order to know the 
current value of the transformed series variable it is not enough to know the current value 
of the sales. In other words, the historical path of the input matters. In this figure, the 
number of the loops is determined by the number of inflexions (the change in the sign of 
the first differences of the series) of the original sales variable, while the vertical distance 
between the increasing and the decreasing paths is determined by the magnitude of the 
inflexions of the original series of sales in the presence of fixed employment adjustment 
costs.  
Figure iv.2 also shows that hysteresis properties in the relationship between 
aggregate employment and sales, if they are present, should be more important for the 
sub sample of the small firms. Actually, the relationship between the predicted dynamics 
captured by the hysteresis transformed variable and the original series of sales exhibits 
more non-linearity in the case of the small firms.  
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Figure iv.2. Aggregate Hysteresis Loops (Preisach Model of Hysteresis) 
 
 
The results of the estimation of Equation iv.11 show an increase in the t-statistic 
associated with the estimated coefficient of sales from 6.832 to 8.616, and an increase in 
the goodness of fit of the regression from 84.4% to 86.5%. Nevertheless, based on 
cointegration tests, we fail to reject the null of no-cointegration in both regressions.  
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In order to obtain results that can be comparable with the results of the Linear 
Play Model we also estimate an equation that includes both the original variable and the 
transformed variable: 
 
tttt THSSN εββββ ++++= 3210      (iv.12) 
 
 The estimation of equation iv.12 reveals that the coefficient associated with the 
original series of sales becomes non-significant (at 5% level) implying that the influence 
of the transformed variable seems to substitute the effects of the original series of sales. 
Concerning the goodness of fit of the employment equation, the inclusion of the 
hysteresis transformation of sales significantly increases the R-square from 84.4% to 
86.9%17. Based on the Trace Test, we conclude (at 5% level of significance) for the 
existence of a cointegrated vector relating aggregate employment, real sales and their 
hysteresis transformation, which is also a sign of hysteresis.   
 For firms with fewer than 20 workers, the goodness of fit of Equation iv.11, 
which relates aggregate employment to sales increased from 69.8% to 80% when we used 
the transformed sales variable instead of the original series. Our estimation indicates an 
increase of the t-statistics, associated with the coefficient of the transformed variable. 
Regarding the goodness of fit of the employment equation, the inclusion of the hysteresis 
transformation of the input variable significantly improved the R-square from 69.8% 
(Equation iv.10) to 81.0% (Equation iv.12)18. We also verify that in the case of small 
firms, when we estimated Equation iv.12, the coefficient associated with the original 
sales series turned to negative and non-significant. This means that transformed variable 
is more adequate to explain aggregate employment.  Finally, note that based on the Trace 
Test we conclude for the existence of one cointegrated vector relating the variables in all 
equations. 
                                                 
17The F-statistic of the test on the increase of goodness of fit is 24.3.  
18The F-statistic of the test on the increase of goodness of fit is 73, exceeding by far the 1% critical level 
(4.79) for the rejection of the hypothesis that the inclusion of the transformed variable does not 
significantly improve the R-square of the regression.   
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 The results for large firms contrast sharply with the results for small firms. For 
firms with more than 500 workers the inclusion in the equation of the hysteresis variable 
instead of the original variable (Equation iv.11) does not originate an increase in the R-
square and when we add the transformed variable to the equation relating employment 
with the original series of sales (Equation iv.12), the transformed variable appears non-
significant and the increase in the goodness of fit is also not significant19. However, based 
on the Trace Test we can conclude for the existence of a cointegrated vector relating 
employment with both the original and the transformed series of sales20. 
In order to compare the dynamics of the labor factor with the dynamics of 
employment, we re-estimate Equations iv.10 to iv.11 with the logarithm of total hours of 
work (labor factor) as the dependent variable (see Table A.10 in the Appendix).  
For the whole sample, the estimated sales elasticity of employment increases to 
0.295 and the estimated coefficient associated with the time trend is again -0.002. This 
means that the labor factor is more responsive to sales than employment.  
 Concerning the hysteresis effects, for the sub sample of the small firms, we 
conclude that the inclusion of the hysteresis transformed variable instead of the original 
series of sales increases the goodness of fit of the adjustment from 0.791 (Equation iv.10) 
to 0.807 (Equation iv.11). Consequently, in spite of not being so evident (as in the case of 
aggregate employment) hysteresis is still present in the dynamics of the labor factor.  
When we estimate equation iv.11 for the whole sample and for the sub sample of large 
firms, we conclude that the explanatory power of the transformed sales variable 
decreases. This indicates that hysteresis do not characterize the dynamics of the labor 
factor adjustment of large firms.  
 
  
                                                 
19
 The F-statistic of the test on the increase of goodness of fit is 1.60.   
20According to the Engle-Granger Cointegration test, we verify that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no-cointegration, in all the samples. However, for the whole sample and for the sample of small firms the 
absolute value of the test statistics increases, when we run the regressions with the transformed hysteresis 
variable, meaning that we are closer to accepting the existence of cointegration.  
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Table iv.1 
 Results of the Preisach Model 
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Aggregate Employment ( )tN - Sample: 1995:01-2005:12 
Aggregate series for the whole sample Aggregate series for firms with fewer than  
20 workers 
Aggregate series for firms with more than  
500 workers  
Dependent 
Variables 
Equation iv.10 Equation iv.11 Equation iv.12 Equation iv.10 Equation iv.11 Equation iv.12 Equation iv.10 Equation iv.11 Equation iv.12 
Cons   6.682 
8.397 
(0.000) 
 
12.11 
3588 
(0.000) 
 
10.17 
9.987 
(0.000) 
 
1.399 
2.437 
(0.016) 
 
6.983 
775.2 
(0.000) 
 
9.299 
9.000 
(0.000) 
 
7.340 
8.899 
(0.000) 
 
11.13 
2555 
(0.000) 
 
8.215 
7.652 
(0.000) 
 
tS  0.254 6.832 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
 
0.091 
1.910 
(0.058) 
 
0.364 
9.904 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
 
-0.150 
-2.242 
(0.027) 
 
0.182 
4.600 
(0.000) 
 
 
- 
 
0.140 
2.723 
(0.007) 
 
tHS  
- 
 
0.100 
8.616 
(0.000) 
 
0.079 
4.929 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.185 
14.63 
(0.000) 
 
0.242 
8.544 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.055 
3.837 
(0.000) 
 
0.023 
1.268 
(0.207) 
 
T  -0.002 
-22.05 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-20.56 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-20.43 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
-12.05 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
-18.45 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-17.30 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-16.12 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-13.49 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-14.09 
(0.000) 
 
2R  0.844 0.865 
 
0.869 
 
0.698 0.800 0.810 0.826 0.819 0.829 
DW  0.326 0.107 
0.199 
 
 
0.783 0.536 0.432 0.157 0.049 0.128 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration Test 
Statistic 
-1.404 -2.388 -1.834 -1.87 -2.268 -2.103 -2.079 -1.834 -2.194 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Value -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 
Trace Test Statistic 22.97* 20.74 
 
44.87* 
 
30.89* 30.06* 54.72* 21.05 18.53 57.49* 
5% Critical Value 25.87 25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 25.87 42.91 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively.  
* Significant at 5% 
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IV.2.3.2. RESULTS OF THE LINEAR PLAY MODEL 
 
 
To check whether the Play Model is relevant, as the model predicts a weaker play 
reaction and a stronger spurt reaction, we tested the hypothesis H0: 211 βββ +=  against 
H1: 211 βββ +<  (see Equation iv.7). We estimated equation iv.7 with sales as an 
independent variable; a time trend is also included: 
 
( ) tttt TSPURTSN εβββββ +++++= 32110     (iv.13) 
 
 Through a process of grid search described in section IV.2.2.2, the values 
obtained for the play are: 0.106 for the whole sample; 0.170 for firms with fewer than 20 
workers; 0.074 for firms with more than 500 workers. This means that the band of 
inaction is greater for small firms (see Figure iv.3). 
 
 
Whole Sample Firms with Fewer 
 Than 20 Workers 
Firms with More  
than 500 Workers 
 
Figure iv.3. Estimation of the Constant Play Width 
(Values of the R-square of Equation iv.13estimated for each grid play value)   
 
 The series of the spurt variable calculated for the estimated play values are 
plotted in Figure iv.4 and the linear hysteresis loops are displayed in Figure iv.5. The 
spurt variable is a kind of filtered input, since the input variations inside the play interval 
are eliminated (Belke and Göcke 2001, p. 189). As the estimated play width is greater for 
the sub sample of the small firms, the linear play algorithm originates a transformed 
series, which is smoother than in the case of the large firms.   
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Figure iv.4. Hysteresis Transformed Real Sales Series (Linear Play Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure iv.5. Aggregate Hysteresis Loops (Linear Play Model of hysteresis) 
 
Table iv.2 shows that, in all cases, when we estimate Equation iv.13, which 
includes both the spurt and the play, the coefficient associated with the play variable is 
not significant while the coefficient associated with the spurt variable is significant. The 
t-statistics to test H0: 211 βββ +=  against H1: 211 βββ +<  are respectively 6.072 for 
the whole sample and 6.107 for the sample of the small firms, which implies that H0 is 
clearly rejected. For these two samples, we conclude that the reaction along the play is 
weaker than the reaction along the spurt and that the influence of the hysteresis 
transformation of sales seems to substitute the effects of the original variable (see Table 
iv.2 and iv.3). In the case of large firms the t-statistic is 0.9866, which implies that we 
cannot reject H0. Consequently, we did not find evidence of play hysteresis in the 
dynamics of aggregate employment of large firms.  
Concerning the increase of the goodness of fit of the regression due to inclusion 
of the transformed variable, we verify that the R-square increases significantly from 
84.44% (Equation iv.10) to 89.1% (Equation iv.13) for the entire sample, and from 69.8% 
to 78.6% for the sub-sample of small firms21. For large firms, the F-statistic of the test of 
the increase of goodness of fit is low (3.84), meaning that the inclusion of the spurt 
variable did not significantly increase the goodness of fit.  
 In addition, the Trace Test shows that, in all cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of the existence of a cointegrated vector between aggregate employment, the original 
sales series and the spurt series.   
                                                 
21The F-statistic of the test on the increase of goodness of fit is respectively 45.94 and 47.69. 
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 In order to allow a more direct comparability of the tests (based on the Preisach 
and on the Linear Play Models of Hysteresis) we also estimated the model with only the 
spurt variable: 
 
ttt TSPURTN µβββ +++= 320       (iv.14) 
 
 Consequently, we assume that 01 =β  in equation iv.13 meaning that the play segment 
in Figure ii.10 is a horizontal line. Table iv.3 shows that compared with equation iv.10, 
the t-statistics of the coefficients associated with the hysteresis transformed sales variable 
increase for all sub samples. The results also reveal, for every class of firm size, an 
increase of R-square when the transformed variable substitutes the original one22.  
 Finally, to offer more robust results on labor factor dynamics we re-estimate 
Equations iv.13 and iv.14 with the logarithm of total hours of work as the dependent 
variable (see Table A.11 in the Appendix). We do not reject H0, when we use the whole 
sample and the sample for large firms, and we conclude that in the case of small firms, 
the difference of the reaction along the play and along the spurt is not as large as in the 
case of employment. These results indicate that contrary to what happens with 
employment, hysteresis is not so important to describe the dynamics of the labor input.   
  
Table iv.2 
Estimated Play Width and Employment Elasticities 
( )γ=tPLAY  
 
 Whole Sample Small Firms   Large Firms 
Width of the play ( sp_PLAY ) 0.106 
 
0.170 
 
0.074 
 
Reaction along the play ( 1β ) 0.038 (0.829) 
 
0.058 
(1.109) 
 
0.080 
(1.116) 
 
Reaction along the spurt ( 21 ββ + ) 0.364* (6.779) 
 
0.504* 
(6.906) 
 
0.161 
(1.961) 
 
 * Significant at 5% (t-statistics greater than three times the standard critical value to the rejection of non-significance) 
t-Statistics in brackets  
 
                                                 
22
 Nonetheless, according to the Trace Test, we only conclude for the existence of cointegration for the case 
of small firms. 
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Table iv.3 
Results of the Linear Play Model (Constant Play) 
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Aggregate Employment ( )tN - Sample: 1995:01-2005:12 
Aggregate series for the whole sample Aggregate series for firms with fewer than  
20 workers 
Aggregate series for firms with more than  
500 workers  
Dependent 
Variables 
Equation iv.10  Equation iv.13 Equation iv.14 Equation iv.10  Equation iv.13 Equation iv.14 Equation iv.10  Equation iv.13 Equation iv.14 
Cons   
6.682 
8.397 
(0.000) 
11.349 
11.64 
(0.000) 
12.16 
2594 
(0.000) 
1.399 
2.437 
(0.016) 
 6.124 
7.488 
(0.000) 
7.031 
935.7 
(0.000) 
 
7.340 
8.899 
(0.000) 
9.484 
6.284 
(0.000) 
11.16 
1568 
(0.000) 
tS  
0.254 
6.832 
(0.000) 
 
0.038 
0.829 
(0.408) 
 
- 
0.364 
9.904 
(0.000) 
0.058 
1.109 
(0.270) 
 
- 
0.182 
4.600 
(0.000) 
0.080 
1.116 
(0.266) 
 
- 
tSPURT  
 
- 
0.364 
6.779 
(0.000) 
0.396 
10.682 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.504 
6.906 
(0.000) 
 
0.569 
12.68 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.161 
1.961 
(0.052) 
0.238 
5.476 
(0.000) 
T  
-0.002 
-22.05 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-26.56 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-26.73 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-12.05 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-15.01 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-15.52 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.12 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.19 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.16 
(0.000) 
2R  
 
0.844 
 
 
0.891 
 
0.890 
 
0.698 
 
0.786 
 
0.784 
 
0.826 
 
0.844 
 
0.842 
DW  
 
0.326 
 
 
0.135 
 
0.114 
 
0.783 
 
0.470 
 
0.429 
 
0.157 
 
0.113 
 
0.082 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration Test 
Statistic 
 
-1.404 
 
-2.354 
 
-2.488 
 
-1.870 
 
-2.888 
 
-2.257 
 
-2.079 
 
-2.437 
 
-2.312 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Value -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 
Trace Test Statistic 
 
22.97* 
 
 
51.99* 
 
21.19 
 
30.89* 
 
57.24* 
 
30.67* 
 
21.05 
 
45.09* 
 
15.33 
5% Critical Value 
 
25.87 
 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
 
25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
 
25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively.  
* Significant at 5%
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IV.3. HYSTERESIS, UNCERTAINTY AND ADJUSTMENT THROUGH HOURS OF WORK   
 
 
Models of weak hysteresis predict that the band of inaction is a positive function of 
uncertainty and of the degree of flexibility of working time regulations.  
In this section, we use two methods to check the effect of uncertainty upon the 
existence of hysteresis in the dynamics of employment at the aggregate level. One 
method is based on the continuous change in the relation between employment and sales, 
and it is implemented using Kalman Filter techniques, to estimate a time varying 
intercept employment equation. The other method checks for the existence of discrete 
changes in the relation between employment and sales and it is implemented by 
estimating a switching regression with a variable splitting factor (the play) that is a 
function of a proxy of uncertainty.   
The later approach is also used to test the influence of the adjustment through hours 
per worker upon the existence of aggregate employment hysteresis.   
 
 
IV.3.1. STRONG HYSTERESIS MODELS WITH UNCERTAINTY 
 
IV.3.1.1. TIME VARYING INTERCEPT EMPLOYMENT MODEL 
 
To analyze the importance of uncertainty in determining hysteretic behavior, we 
implement an empirical test based on the fact that the frequency of structural break 
hysteresis in the relationship between employment and its fundamentals is a negative 
function of uncertainty and the existence of fixed employment adjustment costs. This 
prediction emerges from Figure ii.10. The greater the play width, the less frequently 
changes in tP  lead to a reaction along the spurt, with back and forth movements in tP  
originating a weak reaction along the play area without any structural break.   
          To implement this test, we estimate a stochastic time varying intercept version of 
the employment demand equation: 
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ttt,t TSN εβββ +++= 210         (iv.15) 
 
where tN , tS  and tT  are respectively the aggregate employment, real sales and a time 
trend.  
The shifts in the intercept represent major shifts in the relation between 
employment and its fundamentals, while the coefficient associated with tS  represents the 
weak reaction along the play. 
If uncertainty related to input variation determines hysteresis, the change in the 
time varying intercept ( )t,0β  should be inversely related to some measure of uncertainty 
(see Parsley and Wei 1993): 
 
tSt, t
ˆ ωσααβ ++=∆ 100         (iv.16) 
 
where t,0ˆβ  is a time series of the estimated time varying intercept in Equation iv.15 and 
tSσ  is a proxy for the variability of the real sales. 
 
Estimation of the Time Varying Intercept Version of Employment Equation 
 
We assume a random walk structure for the time varying intercept and a 
maximum likelihood estimation method based upon the Kalman Filter. The specification 
of the model is the following: 
 




+=
+++=
− tt,t,
ttt,t TSN
2100
1210
εββ
εβββ
       (iv.17) 
 
The Kalman Filter is a recursive procedure to calculate the optimal linear 
estimator of the state vector in each period t , with Tt ,...1= , based on the available 
information  in t , given the matrices of the system and some acceptable priors for the 
initial state vector and covariance matrices (see Harvey 2001). 
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In order to apply the Kalman Filter Algorithm the model has to be stated in the 
state-space form. The state-space form of the system is given by a measurement equation 
that establishes the relationship between the observables (N, S, and T) and the non-
observable variable ( )t,0β 23 and by a transition equation that specifies the stochastic 
processes for the non-observable time varying intercept. It represents the relation between 
the sate vector tα  and its lagged values through the transition matrix T (see Harvey 
2001). Measurement  
  
)equationtransition(
)equationtmeasuremen(
1
ααα
α
ttt
Y
ttt
ΣT
ΣZY
+=
+=
−
                (iv.18) 
 
With: 
 
=×1)(1tY  [ ]tN  
=× 3)(1tZ  [ ]TSt1  

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


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
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2
1
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4)(1α  

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






=×
100
010
001
33 )(T  
 
The stochastic specification of the model is completed with the inclusion of the 
disturbance vector YtΣ and 
α
tΣ , each with mean equal to zero and covariance matrices 
equal to tH  and tQ , respectively: 
 
                                                 
23
 The time varying intercept is estimated as an unobservable variable. 
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Y
εσ=×1)(1tH  
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The program used to estimate (iv.17) was written in GAUSS (see Program 4 in 
the Appendix). 
 
 Results  
 
Table iv.4 shows the results of the estimation of the time varying intercept version 
of employment equation. The time varying intercept is significant for the whole sample 
and for the sub samples of the small and large firms, and the sales variable remain 
significant. The time varying intercept estimates required to estimate Equation iv.16 are 
shown in Figure A.3 in the Appendix.     
 
Table iv.4 
Estimates of Time Varying Intercept Version of Employment Equation 
(Dependent variable tnp ) 
Country tβ 24 tsp  
  
T   
 
Whole Sample  
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
0.350* 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
(1.00) 
 
Small Firms   
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
0.154* 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
(0.962) 
 
Large Firms  
 
 
(0.000)* 
 
0.311* 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
(0.999) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 See Appendix 6 for time varying intercept estimates 
*significant at 5% 
p-values  in brackets 
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We estimate Equation iv.16, firstly, for the whole sample, and then for firms with 
fewer than 20 workers and for firms with more than 500 (see Table iv.5). We use two 
forward-looking measures of uncertainty based on ex-post variability of real sales25: 
 
( )∑  −
−
=
+
+=
nt
ti
iS SS
nt 1
2
1
1
σ                    (iv.19) 
  with 6=n  and 12=n   
 
and two backward-looking measures:  
 
( )∑  −
−
=
−
−=
1 2
1
1 t
nti
iS SS
nt
σ                    (iv.20) 
  with 6=n  and 12=n   
 
  The estimates are in general non-significant, and when they are, they do not 
display the predicted negative sign. Based on this test, we do not find evidence on the 
effect of uncertainty upon the hysteresis band. 
 
Table iv.5 
Uncertainty Coefficient Estimates 
(Dependent Variable t,ˆ 0β∆ ) 
Forward Looking Measures Backward Looking Measures 
 )6( =n
ts
σ  )12( =n
ts
σ   )6( =n
ts
σ  )12( =n
ts
σ  
Whole Sample  
 
0.019 
(0.202) 
 
0.013 
(0.501) 
0.001 
(0.921) 
-0.015 
(0.394) 
Small Firms   
 
0.015 
(0.298) 
 
0.023 
(0.308) 
0.037* 
(0.007) 
0.060** 
(0.004) 
Large Firms  
 
-0.002 
(0.886) 
 
-0.010 
(0.643) 
0.023 
(0.153) 
0.009 
(0.654) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
p-values  in brackets 
 
                                                 
25
 We follow Parsley and Wei (1993) 
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 IV.3.1.2. LINEAR PLAY MODEL WITH UNCERTAINTY 
 
We test the effect of uncertainty, at the aggregate level, by re-estimating the 
Linear Play Model of hysteresis allowing for a variable play width ( )tPLAY  that is a 
positive function of the standard deviation of the series of sales (
tSσ ), used as an 
uncertainty proxy variable: 
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Figure iv.6 plots the R-square of the employment equation (Equation iv.21) for 
each combination of grid values of γ  and δ  that were used to calculate the play 
variable26. As in the case of constant play, the estimated band of inertia is larger for firms 
with fewer than 20 workers than for firms with more than 500 (see also Figure iv.7 and 
Table iv.6). 
We re-estimate the employment equation with the original sales variable and the 
spurt variables calculated on the basis of the play values (Equation 21). As in previous 
estimations, we also present the results on the assumption that 01 =β : 
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26
 We keep the same grid and increment as for the case of constant play for each parameter. 
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 The results for the whole sample and for the sub-samples of the small and large 
firms are in Table iv.6 and iv.7. Concerning the magnitude of the estimates, we find, in 
all cases, an increase in the value of coefficients associated with the spurt variable and a 
decrease in the value of the coefficients associated with the play variable. These results 
indicate a clearer distinction between the employment reaction along the play and the 
reaction along the spurt, which gives even more reason for the Linear Play Model. As is 
the case of the estimation assuming a constant play value, the coefficient associated with 
the spurt variable is significant when the whole sample is used and in the case of the 
small firms (all the other coefficients are not significant). Moreover, the t-statistics of the 
coefficient associated with the spurt variable increase when we compare with the model 
with a constant play value.    
In order to assess the impact of uncertainty on the presence of hysteresis, we also 
test the hypothesis H0: 0=δ against H0: 0>δ  by comparing the goodness of fit of the 
employment equation estimated with a constant (restricted model) and with a variable 
play (unrestricted model). The F-Statistic (for 6=K parameter and 1=m  restriction) for 
a comparison of the unrestricted ( 0>δ ) and the restricted case with 0=δ  is 1.17 for the 
whole sample, 19.75 for small firms and 3.32 for large firms27. Consequently, we 
conclude that only in the case of small firms does uncertainty contribute to explaining the 
dynamics of aggregate employment through hysteresis mechanisms.     
Finally, the Trace Test indicates that the variables in the Linear Play Model 
(Equation iv.21) are cointegrated for a 5% significance level. The existence of 
cointegration is verified for the case of the whole sample and also for the sub sample of 
the small and large firms, indicating that the previous results are not spurious.   
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Figure iv.6. Estimation of the Variable Play Width ( )
tspt
PLAY δσγ +=  
Values of the R-square of Equation iv.21 estimated for each combination of play parameters ),( δγ  
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Figure iv.7 Variable Play Width ( )
tspt
PLAY δσγ +=  
  
Table iv.6 
Estimated Play Width and Employment Elasticities  ( )tStPLAY δσγ +=  
 
 Whole Sample Small Firms   Large Firms 
Estimated Play Parameters 20
1020
.
.
=
=
δ
γ
 
 
20
1760
.
.
=
=
δ
γ
 
 
1940
050
.
.
=
=
δ
γ
 
 
Average Play Width 0.108 
 
0.187 
 
0.056 
 
Reaction along the play ( 1β ) 
0.035 
(0.779) 
 
0.049 
(1.081) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.012) 
Reaction along the spurt ( 21 ββ + ) 
0.366* 
(6.952) 
 
0.632* 
(8.628) 
 
0.246 
(2.728) 
 
* Significant at 5% (t-statistics greater than three times the standard critical value to the rejection of non-significance) 
t-Statistics in brackets  
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Table iv.7 
Results of the Linear Play Model (Variable Play: 
tspt
PLAY δσγ += ) 
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Aggregate Employment ( )tN - Sample: 1995:01-2005:12 
Aggregate series for the whole  sample Aggregate series for firms with fewer than  
20 workers 
Aggregate series for firms with more than  
500 workers  
Dependent 
Variables 
Equation iv.10 Equation iv.21 Equation iv.22 Equation iv.10 Equation iv.21 Equation iv.22 Equation iv.10 Equation iv.21 Equation iv.21 
Cons   
6.682 
8.397 
(0.000) 
11.405 
11.825 
(0.000) 
12..15 
2631 
(0.000) 
1.399 
2.437 
(0.016) 
 6.274 
8.853 
(0.000) 
7.039 
1075 
(0.000) 
 
7.340 
8.899 
(0.000) 
11.186 
6.431 
(0.000) 
11.16 
1763 
(0.000) 
tS  
0.254 
6.832 
(0.000) 
 
0.035 
0.779 
(0.437) 
 
- 
0.364 
9.904 
(0.000) 
0.049 
1.081 
(0.280) 
 
- 
0.182 
4.600 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-0.012 
(0.999) 
 
- 
tSPURT  
 
- 
0.366 
6.952 
(0.000) 
0.396 
10.84 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.632 
8.628 
(0.000) 
 
0.692 
14.63 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.246 
2.728 
(0.008) 
0.245 
5.987 
(0.000) 
T  
-0.002 
-22.05 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-26.64 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-26.77 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-12.05 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-17.38 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-15.52 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.12 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.61 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.73 
(0.000) 
2R  
 
0.844 
 
 
0.892 
 
0.892 
 
0.698 
 
0.815 
 
0.813 
 
0.826 
 
0.848 
 
0.848 
DW  
 
0.326 
 
 
0.130 
 
0.112 
 
0.783 
 
0.494 
 
0.463 
 
0.157 
 
0.100 
 
0.100 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration Test 
Statistic 
 
-1.404 
 
-2.527 
 
-2.485 
 
-1.870 
 
-2.715 
 
-2.765 
 
-2.079 
 
-2.371 
 
-2.372 
MacKinnon 
5%Critical Values -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 
Trace Test Statistic 
 
22.97* 
 
 
52.405* 
 
17.60 
 
30.89* 
 
58.81* 
 
32.91* 
 
21.05 
 
48.166* 
 
15.03 
5% Critical Value 
 
25.87 
 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
 
25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
 
25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively. 
 * Significant at 5%. 
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IV.3.2. LINEAR PLAY MODEL WITH ADJUSTMENT THROUGH HOURS OF WORK 
 
We test the hypothesis of influence of the adjustment through hours of work upon 
the band of inertia, at the macro level, by estimating the Linear Play Model of Hysteresis 
allowing for a variable play width that is a positive function of a proxy of the flexibility of 
the adjustment through hours of work: 
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As a proxy for the flexibility of the adjustment through variation in hours per 
worker, we use the ratio between the standard deviation of hours per worker and the 
standard deviation of sales ( tHI ). The idea behind this proxy is that when it is high, the 
working time regulations are not binding meaning that firms leave the number of workers 
relatively constant and adjust the number of hours per worker. When the ratio is low, the 
working time regulations are binding, implying that the adjustment should occur through 
variation in the number of workers. Therefore, the play width should be positively related 
to tHI .  
   Figure iv.8 plots the R-square of the employment equation for each combination of 
grid values of γ  and δ  that are used to calculate the play variable. Once again, our results 
indicate that the estimated band of inertia is larger for small firms (see also Figure iv.9 and 
Table iv.8). 
We re-estimate the employment equation with the original sales variable and the 
spurt variables calculated on the basis of the variable play values (Equation iv.23). We also 
present the results on the assumption that 01 =β : 
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The results for the whole sample and for the sub samples of the small and large firms 
are in Tables iv.8 and iv.9. Concerning the magnitude of the estimates, once again, in all 
cases, we find an increase in the value of coefficients associated with the spurt variable and 
a decrease in the value of the coefficients associated with the play variable, relative to the 
model estimated with a constant play. These results are more robust than in the case of the 
estimation on the basis of variable play dependent on uncertainty, and indicate a clear 
distinction between the employment reaction along the play and the reaction along the spurt 
when we include the effect of the adjustment through hours of work. As the previous cases 
(estimation with a constant play and with a variable play dependent on uncertainty), the 
coefficient associated with the spurt variable is significant when the whole sample is used 
and in the case of the small firms, while all the other coefficients are not significant. 
Moreover, once again, the t-statistics of the coefficient associated with the spurt variable 
increases, again, when we compare with the model with a constant play value.    
In order to assess the impact of the effect of the adjustment through the number of 
hours of work on the presence of hysteresis, we repeat the test on the hypothesis                
H0: 0=δ against H0: 0>δ  by comparing the goodness of fit of the employment equation 
estimated with a constant (restricted model) and with a variable play (unrestricted model). 
The F-statistics in all cases are very high (138.12 for the whole sample, 183.93 for small 
firms and 105.24 for larger firms), indicating that the introduction of the hours of work 
margin interacts with the fixed employment adjustment costs (whose effect is captured by 
parameter γ ) and reinforces the hysteresis mechanisms. 
   However, based on the Trace Test, only for the case of small firms is it possible to 
conclude for the existence of a cointegrated vector between the variables. Consequently, 
only in the case of small firms can we conclude that the possibility of adjusting the labor 
 127 
input by varying the number of hours of work contributes to the existence of hysteresis 
effects in the dynamics of aggregate employment.   
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Figure iv.8. Estimation of the Play Width ( )tt HIPLAY δγ +=  
Values of the R-square of Equation 23 estimated for each combination of play parameters ),( δγ  
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Figure iv.9 Variable Play Width ( )tt HIPLAY δγ +=  
 
 
 
 
Table iv.8 
Estimated Play Width and Employment Elasticities  
( )tt HIPLAY δγ +=  
 
 Whole Sample Small Firms   Large Firms 
Estimated Play Parameters 1080
0100
.
.
=
=
δ
γ
 
 
1160
1900
.
.
=
=
δ
γ
 
 
0701
0460
.
.
=
=
δ
γ
 
 
Average Play Width 0.089 
 
0.324 
 
0.096 
 
Reaction along the play ( 1β ) -0.098 (-3.119) 
 
0.021 
(0.750) 
 
-0.175 
(-3.873) 
 
Reaction along the spurt ( 21 ββ + ) 0.354* (15.45) 
 
0.790* 
(17.33) 
 
0.395* 
(10.615) 
 
* Significant at 5% (t-statistics greater than three times the standard critical value to the rejection of non-significance) 
t-Statistics in brackets  
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Table iv.9 
Results of the Linear Play Model (Variable Play: tt HIPLAY δγ += ) 
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Aggregate Employment ( )tN - Sample: 1995:01-2005:12 
Aggregate series for the whole sample Aggregate series for firms with fewer than  
20 workers 
Aggregate series for firms with more than  
500 workers  
Dependent 
Variables 
Equation iv.10 Equation iv.18 Equation iv.19 Equation iv.10 Equation iv.18 Equation iv.19 Equation iv.10 Equation iv.18 Equation iv.19 
Cons   
6.68 
8.397 
(0.000) 
14.243 
20.996 
(0.000) 
12..127 
5413 
(0.000) 
1.399 
2.437 
(0.016) 
 6.739 
15.59 
(0.000) 
7.064 
1790 
(0.000) 
 
7.340 
8.899 
(0.000) 
14.815 
15.685 
(0.000) 
11.15 
3116 
(0.000) 
tS  
0.254 
6.832 
(0.000) 
 
-0.098 
-3.119 
(0.002) 
 
- 
0.364 
9.904 
(0.000) 
0.021 
0.750 
(0.454) 
 
- 
0.182 
4.600 
(0.000) 
-0.175 
-3.873 
(0.000) 
 
- 
tSPURT  
 
- 
0.354 
15.45 
(0.000) 
12..127 
5413 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.790 
17.33 
(0.000) 
 
0.813 
24.52 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.395 
10.615 
(0.000) 
0.283 
11.548 
(0.000) 
T  
-0.002 
-22.05 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-40.55 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-39.34 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-12.05 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-17.33 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-33.10 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-16.12 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-34.26 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-27.80 
(0.000) 
2R  
 
0.844 
 
 
0.948 
 
0.944 
 
0.698 
 
0.913 
 
0.912 
 
0.826 
 
0.915 
 
0.904 
DW  
 
0.326 
 
 
0.285 
 
0.227 
 
0.783 
 
0.733 
 
0.726 
 
0.157 
 
0.290 
 
0.156 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration Test 
Statistic 
 
-1.404 
 
-3.485 
 
-3.05 
 
-1.870 
 
-3.970 
 
-4.06* 
 
-2.079 
 
-3.712 
 
-2.89 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Values -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 
Trace Test Statistic 
 
22.97* 
 
 
35.71 
 
24.64 
 
30.89* 
 
51.97* 
 
32.891* 
 
21.05 
 
38.77 
 
15.22 
5% Critical Value 
 
25.87 
 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
 
25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
 
25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively.  
*Significant at 5%. 
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IV.4. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter, we analyzed the existence of hysteresis at the macro level and we 
studied the influence of uncertainty and the adjustment through hours of work upon the 
hysteresis band. The main conclusions are stated below. 
 
Existence of Hysteresis 
 
The results of the Preisach Model reveal that the hysteresis transformation of sales 
offers a better explanation of the aggregate employment dynamics than the original variable. 
However, the results are distinct concerning the size of the firms. While the inclusion of the 
hysteresis variable significantly increases the goodness of fit of the employment equations 
in the case of small firms, for large ones the original series of sales offers a better 
explanation of employment dynamics, meaning that hysteresis is not important in this case. 
 Results of the Linear Model of Strong Hysteresis indicate the existence of large 
periods of inaction implying that a large play width is necessary to achieve the maximum 
goodness to fit of the employment equations. Overall, the non-linear model, which includes 
the hysteresis transformation of the variables, performs better than the standard linear 
model. Furthermore, the estimated play interval is larger for small firms than for large ones 
(the estimated play for the whole sample lies in the middle of these values). While for small 
firms the results indicate the existence of a zone of weak employment reaction (the play) 
and a zone of strong employment reaction (the spurt), for large firms the difference between 
these zones of different reaction of employment is not so clear.  
  
 The Effect of Uncertainty  
 
 
We find weak evidence regarding the effect of uncertainty upon hysteresis at the 
aggregate level. The test, based on the estimation of a time varying intercept version of the 
employment equation, does not reveal signs of the influence of uncertainty. 
 132 
By estimating the Linear Play Model of Hysteresis with a variable play, we verify 
that, except for small firms, uncertainty does not significantly affect the dynamics of 
employment at the macro level through hysteresis mechanisms.   
 
 The Effect of Adjustment through Hours of Work 
 
By estimating the Linear Play Model of Hysteresis with a variable play, we conclude 
that, for the whole sample and also for the sub samples of small and large firms, introducing 
into the model the adjustment of labor factor through the number of hours of work 
significantly increases R-square of the employment equations. However, after carrying out 
cointegration tests, only in the case of small firms can we conclude clearly for the existence 
of an effect of the adjustment by varying the number of hours of work upon the hysteresis 
band. 
Finally we also find that the impact of the degree of flexibility of adjusting the 
number of hours of work upon the hysteresis band of the small firms, at the aggregate level, 
is greater than the impact of uncertainty.  
 
Distinction between Small Firms and Large Firms  
 
We find clear differences in the adjustment of employment between small and large 
firms at the aggregate level. We find that, in general, hysteresis is a property of the 
employment dynamics of small firms. The heterogeneity concerning the existence of 
hysteresis by firm size can be justified by four reasons. Firstly, the fact that non-convex 
costs of adjusting employment represents a higher proportion of the total costs for a small 
firm makes it more difficult to adjusting continuously the number of employees in response 
to product demand shocks. Secondly, for small firms there may also be the factor of 
indivisibility, which means that firms cannot change the number of employees for every 
small labor demand shock. Thirdly, large firms have at their disposal collective dismissals as 
an instrument for adjusting employment downwards, which contributes to a decrease in the 
inaction band. In fact, in Portugal, the threshold for collective dismissals is set at 2 workers 
for firms with fewer than 50 employees and 5 workers for firms with more than 50 
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employees. This rule implies that the larger the firm is, the smaller the proportion of the 
threshold in the total labor force, making it easier for these firms to dismiss using this 
mechanism. Fourthly, in Portugal it is easier for small firms to increase the number of hours 
of work than for large ones. At present, the maximum number of overtime hours allowed per 
year is 175 hours for micro and small firms and 150 hours for medium or large firms and 
according to the theoretical prediction of section II.3.3 and the results of section IV.3.2, the 
higher the flexibility of the adjustment through the number of hours of work the greater the 
hysteresis effects.      
 
 
  
 
 
 
  CHAPTER V 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS 
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V.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this part, an overview of the presence of hysteresis in different countries is 
presented, and its significance is discussed in relationship to labor market institutions, 
such as employment protection legislation and working time regulations.  
In order to study the relative importance of hysteresis in the aggregate dynamics 
of Portuguese employment we apply the Preisach Model and the Linear Play Model of 
Hysteresis, already estimated for the case of Portugal, to monthly seasonally adjusted 
data from the manufacturing sector covering the period from January 1995 to July 2005 
for nineteen OECD countries. To analyze the effect of uncertainty, we also repeat the test 
based on the estimation of a time varying intercept employment equation on this data set. 
We use the real product as the proxy for output demand. Data sources are the 
EUROSTAT General Statistics – Industry Commerce and Services, for employment 
(number of persons employed) for the real product and for gross wages, and the 
EUROSTAT – Economy and Finance – Consumer prices indexes for the wage deflator.  
For the output (Y), we use a production index adjusted by the number of working days, 
for employment (N) we use the index of the number of employees, and for real wages 
(W), we deflate the index of gross wages by the general index of consumer prices. For the 
US, Japan and Canada we use data from OECD – Main Economic Indicators.  
 
V.2. RESULTS OF THE PREISACH MODEL 
 
We start by estimating by OLS an equation relating the logarithm of aggregate 
employment to the logarithm of real product, the logarithm of real wages1 and a time 
trend: 
 
tttt TWYN εββββ ++++= 3110                        (v.1) 
  
                                                 
1
 Since we don’t expect the real wages series published by EUROSTAT to have the same problems as the 
micro series, we include real wages in the employment equation.   
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Table v.1 reports the results of the estimation of Equation v.1.2 We found that the 
coefficient of the logarithm of the real product is significant in the majority of the 
countries (with the exception of Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and Poland) and has 
the expected positive sign (with the exception of Denmark and Luxembourg). The 
coefficient of the logarithm of the real wages is also significant in the great majority of 
the countries, with the exception of Canada and Slovenia, but has the predicted negative 
sign only for Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Japan, Slovenia, and the United 
Sates3. The time trend is in general significant and has a negative sign.  Table v.2 shows 
the employment-output elasticity for the countries where we have data on real wages. The 
estimated employment-output elasticity in Portugal is equal to 0.115, which is low when 
compared with the other countries.   
Following the empirical methodology applied in Section IV.2.1 we computed the 
Preisach hysteresis transformed variable based on the original series of the output.  Figure 
v.1 plots the Preisach hysteresis index variable for 19 OECD countries.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 In spite of not having data on wages for Belgium, Spain and the UK, we also analyze the presence of 
hysteresis in these countries. This option is justified by the importance of the countries (especial the last 
two) in the European context. We do not include Italy in the study due to the lack of data. 
3
 Note that, even considering that the t-values are not t-student distributed, in the great majority of the cases 
concerning both hysteresis transformation of real product and real wages, the t-statistics are three times 
greater than 1.96 (the 5% critical value in the case of the standard t-student distribution). 
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Table v.1. 
 Results of the Preisach Model  
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Aggregate Employment ( )tN  
Austria 
1996:01-2005:06 
114 obs. 
Belgium 
1995:01-2005:07 
 126 obs. 
Canada 
1995:04-2005:07 
127 obs. 
Czech Republic 
2001:01-2005:07 
 55 obs. 
Denmark 
1996:01-2005:06 
 108 obs. 
Finland 
1995:1-2005:07 
114 obs. 
France 
1996:01-2005:06 
 111 obs.  
Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq.v.1 Eq.v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq.v.1 Eq.v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq.v.1 Eq.v.2 Eq.v.3 
cons  
5.273 
18.252 
(0.000) 
5.879 
24.326 
(0.000) 
5.896 
24.09 
(0.000) 
1.951 
5.651 
(0.000) 
4.658 
1170 
(0.000) 
3.139 
8.028 
(0.000) 
3.504 
3.752 
(0.000) 
3.763 
3.289 
(0.001) 
3.205 
3.354 
(0.001) 
4.310 
13.569 
(0.000) 
5.856 
15.44 
(0.000) 
4.011 
11.79 
(0.000) 
-0.224 
-0.353 
(0.724) 
-0.178 
-0.256 
(0.798) 
2.177 
2.261 
(0.026) 
0.961 
2.668 
(0.009) 
0.993 
2.955 
(0.004) 
1.129 
3.315 
(0.001) 
1.893 
12.918 
(0.000) 
-3.724 
29.29 
(0.000) 
3.878 
26.71 
(0.000) 
tY  
0.067 
3.448 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.009 
-0.520 
(0.604) 
0.605 
7.371 
(0.000) 
- 
0.340 
3.882 
(0.000) 
0.513 
12.061 
(0.000) 
- 
0.454 
7.448 
(0.000) 
0.307 
7.932 
(0.000) 
- 
0.353 
8.086 
(0.000) 
-0.107 
-1.038 
(0.167) 
- 
-0.382 
-3.378 
(0.001) 
0.291 
5.050 
(0.000) 
- 
0.125 
1.849 
(0.067) 
0.1152 
3.826 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.039 
-2.087 
(0.039) 
tW  
-0.208 
-3.095 
(0.003) 
-0.277 
-5.185 
(0.000) 
-0.271 
-4.975 
(0.000) 
- - - 
-0.269 
-1.402 
(0.163) 
0.187 
0.633 
(0.528) 
-0.148 
-0.697 
(0.486) 
-0.224 
-3.563 
(0.001) 
-0.281 
-3.076 
(0.003) 
-0.206 
-3.349 
(0.002) 
1.188 
8.726 
(0.000) 
1.071 
6.919 
(0.000) 
0.927 
0.608 
(0.00) 
0.540 
4.691 
(0.000) 
0.818 
10.64 
(0.000) 
0.665 
5.926 
(0.000) 
0.477 
12.160 
(0.000) 
0.195 
7.132 
(0.000) 
0.199 
7.389 
(0.000) 
tHY  
 
- 
 
0.072 
8.995 
(0.000) 
0.074 
7.884 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.125 
8.652 
(0.000) 
0.091 
5.562 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.138 
8.026 
(0.000) 
0.028 
1.374 
(0.172) 
- 
0.000 
1.161 
(0.113) 
-0.028 
-2.069 
(0.044) 
 
- 
 
0.024 
0.952 
(0.344) 
0.117 
3.210 
(0.002) 
 
- 
 
0.122 
6.455 
(0.000) 
0.096 
4.123 
(0.000) 
- 
0.098 
17.33 
(0.000) 
0.105 
16.21 
(0.000) 
T  
0.000 
-5.267 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-10.65 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-9.840 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-13.47 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-15.03 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-15.98 
(0.000) 
0.000 
-1.876 
(0.063) 
-0.000 
-0.895 
(0.373) 
-0.000 
-2.324 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
-5.034 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
0.178 
(0.859) 
-0.001 
-4.931 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-6.327 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-5.726 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-6.638 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-11.15 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-12.28 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-12.07 
(0.000) 
0.000 
-21.40 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-35.13 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-35.56 
(0.000) 
2R  0.551 0.713 0.714 0.785 0.807 0.827 0.854 0.792 0.857 0.802 0.579 0.818 0.706 0.703 0.733 0.652 0.687 0.696 0.842 0.954 0.956 
DW  0.187 0.368 0.363 0.190 0.1345 0.228 0.127 0.056 0.116 1.436 0.609 1.617 0.304 0.319 0.417 0.270 0.305 0.297 0.188 0.628 0.566 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration 
Test Statistic 
-2.95 -3.316 -3.25 -2.451 -2.036 -2.11 -1.79 -1.43 -1.84 -5.322 -2.54 -5.97 -3.340 -2.88 -5.96 -3.254 -3.52 -3.58 -2.525 -4.32 -4.11 
MacKinnon 
5% Critical 
Values 
-4.22 -4.225 -4.55 -3.856 -3.856 -4.216 -4.21 -4.214 -4.54 -3.342 -3.342 -4.70 -4.231 -4.231 -4.70 -4.217 -4.217 -4.56 -4.009 -4.009 -4.56 
Trace Test 
Statistic 47.38 25.25 61.45 23.166 9.851 36.860 44.07 37.03 69.44 33.683 37.58 78.05 48.490 45.00 64.90 38.482 38.39 66.88 45.310 40.06 71.41 
5% Critical 
Value 42.91 42.91 63.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively
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 Germany 
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs 
 Hungary 
1998:01-2005:06 
90 obs. 
Japan 
1995:01-2005:06 
126 obs. 
Luxembourg  
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs. 
Netherlands 
1995:01-2004:12 
120 obs. 
Poland 
1999:05-2005:06  
77 obs.  
Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. 
v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 
cons  
1.478 
7.112 
(0.000) 
2.413 
11.65 
(0.000) 
3.262 
12.59 
(0.000) 
2.364 
14.615 
(0.000) 
2.444 
13.69 
(0.000) 
2.357 
14.051 
(0.000) 
5.600 
14.831 
(0.000) 
6.729 
22.91 
(0.000) 
7.394 
36.026 
(0.000) 
2.411 
14.246 
(0.000) 
2.486 
15.14 
(0.000) 
2.588 
14.02 
(0.000) 
0.990 
4.988 
(0.000) 
2.545 
13.69 
(0.000) 
2.588 
10.91 
(0.000) 
1.167 
5.474 
(0.000) 
1.454 
5.767 
(0.000) 
2.007 
7.195 
(0.000) 
tY  
0.021 
0.690 
(0.500) 
- 
-0.149 
-4.834 
(0.000 
0.122 
5.453 
(0.000) 
- 
0.128 
3.556 
(0.000) 
0.134 
3.499 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.401 
-12.20 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
-0.195 
(0.846) 
- 
-0.033 
-1.203 
(0.231 
0.428 
10.238 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.017 
-0.294 
(0.769) 
-0.062 
-1.171 
(0.245) 
- 
-0.223 
-3.627 
(0.001) 
tW  
0.676 
15.508 
(0.000) 
0.493 
10.900 
(0.000) 
0.454 
10.712 
(0.000) 
0.457 
9.317 
(0.000) 
0.573 
12.652 
(0.000) 
0.453 
8.356 
(0.000) 
-0.326 
-3.337 
(0.001) 
-0.443 
-6.869 
(0.000) 
-0.192 
-3.999 
(0.000) 
0.484 
12.056 
(0.000) 
0.463 
12.68 
(0.000) 
0.473 
12.655 
(0.000) 
0.374 
5.980 
(0.000) 
0.454 
11.066 
(0.000) 
0.462 
9.381 
(0.000 
0.903 
13.95 
(0.000) 
0.781 
13.672 
(0.000) 
0.875 
14.84 
(0.000) 
tHY  
 
- 
0.064 
6.857 
(0.000) 
0.097 
8.846 
(0.000) 
- 
0.057 
3.804 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
-0.201 
(0.841 
 
- 
0.041 
11.609 
(0.000) 
0.082 
19.858 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.026 
1.878 
(0.063) 
0.034 
2.225 
(2.225) 
- 
0.080 
15.999 
(0.000) 
0.083 
8.824 
(0.000) 
- 
0.185 
6.718 
(0.000) 
0.128 
4.167 
(0.000) 
T  
-0.001 
-13.22 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-16.22 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-17.66 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-21.76 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-16.32 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-15.00 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-24.23 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-34.44 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-51.84 
(0.000) 
0.000 
1.897 
0.0601 
-0.000 
-0.581 
(0.563) 
-0.000 
-0.294 
(0.769) 
-0.001 
-9.511 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-15.62 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-15.10 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-2.41 
(0.000) 
-0.06 
-2.247 
(0.028) 
-0.001 
-3.906 
(0.000) 
2R  0.947 0.962 0.968 0.915 0.901 0.916 0.969 0.984 0.993 0.822 0.827 0.829 0.870 0.921 0.921 0.964 0.965 0.971 
DW  0.935 0.733 0.836 1.402 1.430 1.399 0.111 0.369 0.554 1.164 1.169 1.157 0.584 0.480 0.469 0.637 0.509 0.721 
 Engle Granger 
Cointegration 
Test Statistic 
-3.27 -3.01 -3.27 -6.72 -6.81 -6.64 -1.58 -3.33 -2.96 -2.01 -2.58 -2.55 -2.625 -3.76 -3.71 -3.878 -3.73 -4.72 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Values -4.21 -4.21 -4.55 -4.25 -4.25 -4.59 -4.21 -4.214 -4.55 -4.215 -4.215 -4.55 -4.220 -4.220 -4.55 -4.27 -4.28 -4.62 
Trace Test 
Statistic 41.64 28.00 57.64 63.52 60.18 91.94 44.34 49.19 69.4 41.16 34.82 62.02 23.577 30.17 58.31 49.63 55.33 66.08 
5% Critical 
Value 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively 
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Portugal 
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs. 
Slovak Republic 
1998:01-2005:06 
 90 obs. 
Slovenia 
1998:01-2005:06 
 90 obs. 
Spain 
1995:01-2004:12 
 120 obs. 
UK 
1995:01-2005:06 
126 obs. 
USA 
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs.  
Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.2 Eq.v.3 
cons  
4.258 
30.64 
(0.000) 
3.667 
26.83 
(0.000) 
3.507 
15.255 
(0.000) 
4.255 
36.114 
(0.000) 
4.578 
273 
(0.000) 
4.733 
31.84 
(0.000) 
4.684 
14.737 
(0.000) 
5.343 
22.37 
(0.000) 
5.778 
20.123 
(0.000) 
1.210 
4.312 
(0.000) 
4.424 
1290.5 
(0.000) 
4.119 
10.516 
(0.000) 
-1.290 
-2.254 
0.0259 
4.702 
878.8 
(0.000) 
-0.792 
0.795 
(0.427) 
11.45 
16.03 
(0.000) 
15.75 
10.09 
(0.000) 
11.75 
18.68 
(0.000) 
tY  
0.115 
3.794 
(0.000) 
 
0.039 
0.867 
(0.387 
0.0582 
2.0704 
(0.041) 
- 
-0.034 
-1.048 
(0.298) 
0.143 
4.819 
(0.000) 
- 
-0.102 
-2.557 
(0.012) 
0.723 
11.422 
(0.000) 
- 
0.067 
0.7067 
(0.444) 
1.320 
10.506 
(0.000) 
- 
0.859 
3.895 
(0.000) 
0.750 
42.22 
(0.000) 
- 
0.636 
26.139 
(0.000) 
tW  
0.263 
9.164 
(0.000) 
0.240 
7.961 
(0.000) 
0.237 
7.775 
(0.000 
0.418 
17.882 
(0.000) 
0.325 
11.277 
(0.000) 
0.318 
10.728 
(0.000) 
-0.163 
-2.288 
(0.025) 
-0.161 
-2.818 
(0.006) 
-0.154 
-2.767 
(0.007) 
- - - 
 
- 
 
- - 
-1.074 
-7.054 
(0.000) 
-1.297 
-3.801 
(0.000) 
-1.029 
-7.694 
(0.000) 
tHY  - 
0.035 
4.394 
(0.000 
0.027 
2.267 
(0.025 
- 
0.001 
5.053 
(0.000) 
0.087 
4.630 
(0.001) 
- 
0.076 
9.112 
(0.000) 
0.106 
7.527 
(0.000) 
- 
0.227 
17.267 
(0.000) 
0.208 
8.921 
(0.000) 
- 
0.105 
9.763 
(0.000) 
0.046 
2.513 
(0.013) 
- 
0.243 
15.960 
(0.000) 
0.057 
6.133 
(0.000) 
T  
-0.002 
-41.88 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-29.18 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-28.10 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-3.624 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
6.357 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-5.949 
(0.000) 
0.000 
-2.609 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
-6.539 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-7.213 
(0.000) 
0.001 
6.533 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
-0.034 
(0.972) 
0.000 
0.125 
(0.906) 
-0.003 
-37.99 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-36.31 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-38.46 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-32.01 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-13.94 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-35.46 
(0.000) 
2R  0.993 0.993 0.993 0.828 0.858 0.860 0.702 0.807 0.821 0.921 0.953 0.953 0.923 0.917 0.926 0.987 0.932 0.990 
DW  0.786 0.30 0.634 1.299 1.175 1.109 0.345 0.491 0.536 0.247 0.16 0.174 0.257 0.105 0.217 0.263 0.058 0.319 
 Engle Granger 
Cointegration 
Test Statistic 
-3.28 -2.714 -3.10 -2.84 -6.11 -5.96 -2.69 -3.41 -3.63 -1.83 -2.22 -2.31 -2.11 -2.60 -2.49 -3.13 -2.75 -3.89 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Values -4.21 -4.21 -4.55 -4.22 -4.22 -4.59 -4.25 -4.25 -4.59 -3.86 -3.86 -4.11 -3.85 -3.85 -4.21 -4.21 -4.21 -4.55 
Trace Test 
Statistic 42.00 31.66 65.10 36. 43 35.23 62.62 30.72 32.87 49.36 10.67 12.70 39.95 20.53 19.07 58.29 40.41 51.81 73.48 
5% Critical Value 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively 
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Table v.2 
Employment–Output Elasticities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*significant at 5% (t-statistics greater than three times the standard critical 
value to the rejection of non-significance) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Elasticity t-statistic 
USA  0.75* 42.22 
Canada  0.513* 12.06 
Netherlands  0.428* 10.23 
Czech Republic  0.307* 7.93 
Finland  0.291* 5.05 
Slovenia  0.143 4.81 
Japan  0.134 3.49 
Hungary  0.122 5.45 
France  0.115 3.82 
Portugal  0.115 3.79 
Austria  0.067 3.44 
Slovak Republic  0.058 2.07 
Germany  0.021 0.69 
Luxembourg -0.005 -0.19 
Poland  -0.062 -1.17 
Denmark  -0.107 -1.10 
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Figure v.1 Hysteresis Transformed Real Product Series (Preisach Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure v.1 Hysteresis Transformed Real Product Series (Preisach Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure v.1 Hysteresis Transformed Real Product Series (Preisach Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure v.1 Hysteresis Transformation of Real Product (Preisach Model of Hysteresis) 
 
  
To test the existence of hysteresis, we replace the original series of aggregate 
output ( tY ) in equation v.1 with its hysteresis transformation ( tHY ) and we estimate 
equation v.2: 
 
tttt TWHYN εββββ ++++= 3210                     (v.2) 
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Concerning the significance of the coefficient associated with the transformed 
variable, we conclude, on the basis of the high value of the t-statistics, that it is in general 
significant. Exceptions are the Czech Republic, Denmark and Luxembourg.   
Concerning the goodness of fit of the employment equations, and after carrying 
out cointegration tests, we conclude that in the majority of the countries the non-linear 
relation between employment and the real product captured by the inclusion of the 
transformed variable instead of the original one (Equation v.2), performs better than the 
model with the original variable (see Table v.3). The exceptions are Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, the UK and the USA where the R-Square of the hysteretic 
equation is lower than the R-Square of the equation with the original sales variable.  
 
Table v.3 
Test on the Increase in Goodness of Fit (Preisach Model) 
 
R2 
  
Country 
Equation v.1 Equation v.2  Equation v.3  
R2 (Eq. v.2) - R2 (Eq. v.1)   R2 (Eq. v.3) - R2 (Eq. v.1)   F-Stat* 
Austria 0.551 0.713 0.714 0.162 0.163 62.15 
Belgium 0.785 0.807 0.827 0.022 0.042 30.93 
Canada 0.854 0.792 0.857 -0.062 0.003 1.880 
Czech Republic 0.802 0.579 0.818 -0.223 0.016 4.280 
Denmark 0.706 0.703 0.733 -0.003 0.027 10.30 
Finland 0.652 0.687 0.696 0.035 0.044 16.99 
France 0.842 0.954 0.956 0.112 0.114 262.9 
Germany 0.947 0.962 0.968 0.015 0.021 78.26 
Hungary 0.915 0.901 0.916 -0.014 0.001 0.040 
Japan 0.969 0.984 0.993 0.015 0.024 394.0 
Luxembourg 0.822 0.827 0.829 0.005 0.007 4.948 
Netherlands 0.870 0.921 0.921 0.051 0.051 77.86 
Poland 0.964 0.965 0.971 0.001 0.007 17.36 
Portugal 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.000 0.000 5.130 
Slovak Republic 0.828 0.858 0.860 0.03 0.032 21.44 
Slovenia 0.702 0.807 0.821 0.105 0.119 26.66 
Spain 0.921 0.953 0.953 0.032 0.032 79.59 
UK 0.923 0.917 0.926 -0.006 0.003 6.310 
USA 0.987 0.932 0.990 -0.055 0.003 37.61 
5
1
1
2
3._
2
1._
2
3._
*
−
−
−
=−
n
R
RR
StatF
vEquation
vEquationvEquation
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We also estimate an equation that includes both the original variable and the 
transformed variable: 
 
ttttt TWYHYN εβββββ +++++= 43210         (v.3) 
 
When we estimate a regression that includes the original variables and the 
hysteresis transformation of the real product according to the Preisach Model, the 
coefficient associated with the original series becomes not significant or changes sign 
from positive to negative in fourteen of the nineteen considered countries. We conclude, 
in general, that the influence of the transformed variable seems to substitute the effects of 
the original series of the real product. Exceptions are again Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, the UK and the USA where the explicative power of the original sales series is 
greater than the explicative power of the transformed variable.      
   We also performed a test on the increase in the goodness of fit of the original 
regression when we include in the equation both the original and the hysteresis 
transformed series of the aggregate output (Equation v.3). We found that in general the R-
square increases significantly in the majority of the countries with the exceptions of 
Canada, Czech Republic and Hungary (see Table v.3).      
Table iv.1 shows the results of the Engle-Granger cointegration test4. When we 
estimate employment against real product, real wage and a time trend, we fail in general 
to reject the hypothesis of no-cointegration for the majority of countries (exceptions are 
the Czech Republic and Hungary). When we apply the Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
to the models that include the transformed variables, either isolated or with the original 
variables, we identify the existence of a cointegrated vector in four more countries 
(Denmark, France, Poland and the Slovak Republic). Moreover, we observed in eight of 
the remaining thirteen countries an increase in the absolute value of the test statistic, 
meaning that the minimum significance level for accepting cointegration decreases.  
 These results are reinforced when we apply the Johansen cointegration test 
methodology. Actually, the Trace Test indicates that when we estimate the model with 
                                                 
4
 Firstly, we studied the stationary of the series carrying the Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test (see 
Table A.12 in the Appendix). 
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only the original variables, we find the existence of at least one cointegrated vector in 
seven countries, but adding to the model the Preisach transformations of the input 
variables (Equation v.3), we conclude for the rejection of the null of no-cointegration in 
13 of the nineteen considered countries.   
The tests based on the Preisach Model of hysteresis indicate that we do not find 
hysteresis in the dynamics of the aggregate employment in Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hungary, the UK and the USA. On the contrary, hysteresis is present in the 
path of employment in France, Finland, Spain, the Slovak Republic, Belgium, Japan and 
Poland. In the cases of Austria, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg, in 
spite of the increase in of the goodness of fit of the employment equation when we 
replace the series of sales with its hysteretic transformation, we do not reject the 
inexistence of cointegration between the variables. In the case of Portugal based on the 
Preisach Model and with this data set, we do not find clear signs of hysteresis. The t-
statistics of the coefficient associated with the transformed variable is higher than the t-
statistics of the coefficient associated with the original sales variable (Equation v.3) 
meaning that the transformed variable has more explanatory power. However, the R-
square does not increase significantly when we replace the series of sales with the 
hysteresis transformed variable.  
 
  
IV.3 RESULTS OF THE LINEAR PLAY MODEL 
 
 
Table v.4 (column 2) shows the estimated play using the real product in the 
manufacturing  sector calculated as explained in section IV.2.2.2 (see also Figure A.4 in 
the appendix), and Figure v.2 plots the hysteresis transformed variable (the spurt 
variable). 
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Table v.4 
Estimated Play and Employment Elasticities 
Country 
 Play 
Width 
  
Reaction along the 
play 
( 1β ) 
Reaction along 
the spurt 
( 21 ββ + )  
t-Statistic for testing 
H0: 211 βββ +=  against 
H1: 211 βββ +<  
Austria 0.102 -0.026 (-1.265) 
0.238* 
(7.723) 8.57 
Belgium 0.062 0.127 (1.492) 
0.746* 
(8.770) 7.28 
Canada 0.020 0.232 (0.925) 
0.302 
(1.144) 0.26 
Czech Republic 0.032 0.159 (1.532) 
0.166 
(1.496) 0.11 
Denmark 0.186 -0.193 (-2.986) 
0.712* 
(7.368) 9.36 
Finland 0.096 0.119 (1.325) 
0.346 
(2.995) 1.96 
France 0.074 -0.021 (-1.297) 
0.702* 
(17.84) 19.81 
Germany 0.074 -0.072 (-3.128) 
0.306* 
(9.782) 12.12 
Hungary 0.054 0.048 (-1.115) 
0.201 
(4.404) 2.85 
Japan 0.068 0.044 (1.235) 
0.266* 
(6.625) 5.75 
Luxembourg 0.122 -0.073 (-3.161) 
0.232* 
(7.327) 9.65 
Netherlands 0.000 0.437* (10.23) - - 
Poland 0.032 -0.342 (-2.350) 
0.310 
(2.059) 4.33 
Portugal 0.044 -0.030 (-0.719) 
0.231 
(4.832) 5.46 
Slovak Republic 0.168 -0.028 (-0.945) 
0.330 
(4.916) 13.98 
Slovenia 0.070 -0.044 (-1.378) 
0.357* 
(8.069) 9.11 
Spain 0.072 0.084 (1.066) 
1.108* 
(10.167) 9.39 
UK 0.024 -0.178 (-0.126) 
1.106* 
(7.43) 9.04 
USA 0.024 0.024 (0.034) 
0.756* 
(10.368) 10.17 
t-statistics in brackets  
*significant at 5% (t-statistics greater than three times the standard critical value to the rejection of non-
significance) 
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Figure v.2 Hysteresis Transformed Real Product Series (Linear Play Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure v.2 Hysteresis Transformed Real Product Series (Linear Play Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure v.2 Hysteresis Transformed Real Product Series (Linear Play Model of Hysteresis) 
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Figure v.2 Hysteresis Transformation of Real Product (Linear Play Model of Hysteresis) 
 
 
 
To test the existence of hysteresis we start by estimating an equation that includes 
both the spurt and the play (see Table v.5, p. 152): 
 
( ) tttt TWSPURTSN εββββββ ++++++= 432110            (v.4) 
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To test the existence of two zones of different employment reaction that 
characterizes hysteresis according to the Linear Play Model, we tested the hypothesis 
H0: 211 βββ +=  against H1: 211 βββ +< . Table v.4 (column 4) reports the 
employment elasticities along the spurt segment. The coefficient associated with the spurt 
variable is significant in the great majority of the countries. Exceptions are Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Netherlands5. Table v.4 (column 5) also shows the            
t-statistics for testing the hypothesis H0. The null hypothesis is in general rejected with 
the exceptions of Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and the Netherlands. 
We conclude that in the other fourteen countries, the reaction along the play is weaker 
(and in most cases non-significant) than the reaction along the spurt, and this is a sign of 
the existence of hysteresis.  
 The estimated play values reflect large periods of inaction meaning that in many 
cases a large play width is necessary to achieve the maximum goodness of fit of the 
employment equations. The larger the width of the play is, the larger the increase in the 
R-square of the employment regressions. Table v.5 shows the F-Statistic for testing the 
increase of the goodness of fit of the model that includes both the spurt and the play 
(Equation v.4). For most countries the estimated statistic exceeds by far the 1% critical 
level (4.79) for the rejection of the hypothesis that the inclusion of the transformed 
variable (the spurt) does not significantly increases the R-square of the regression. 
Exceptions are Canada, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland.  
We also repeat the cointegration tests applied in the previous section now using 
the hysteresis transformation of input variable, in accordance with the Linear Play Model. 
Table v.5 shows the results of the Engle-Granger test. The probability of the existence of 
cointegration in the employment regression increases when we estimate the regression 
with the hysteresis transformation of the independent variables according to the Linear 
Play Model. When we study the complete model (Equation v.4), we reject the null of no 
cointegration in five of the nineteen analyzed countries6, and even when we do not reject 
the null of no cointegration, there is an increase in the absolute value of the observed t-
                                                 
5
 Due to the low value of the t-statistic, the empirical evidence is not clear in the case of Finland, Portugal, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic.     
6
 We reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Poland and for the 
Slovak Republic 
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statistic of the Engle-Granger test in eight more countries, meaning that variables are 
closer to being cointegrated for a 10% significance level. These results are confirmed 
when we use the Johansen cointegration test procedure. Using the Trace Test, we 
conclude that for a 5% significance level, we only reject the null of no-cointegration in 
six of the nineteen countries, in regression with only the original independent variables 
(Equation v.1). When we include the hysteresis transformation of the variables (Equation 
v.4), we reject the null of no-cointegration in eleven countries7.   
Due to the fact that, with the exception of the Netherlands, all the coefficients 
associated with the play variable are not significant, we also estimated Equation v.4 
assuming that the 01 =β (see Table v.5):  
 
ttt TWSPURTN µββββ ++++= 4320              (v.5) 
 
 We found that the coefficient associated with the spurt variable is significant in 
all the countries with the exception of Poland, and that the estimation of the employment 
equation with the inclusion of the spurt variable ( tSPURT ) instead of the original 
variable ( tY ) originates an increase in the goodness of fit in all the countries except in 
Poland. We also found a positive correlation of 0.6 (and a 5% significant rank correlation 
of 0.53) between the increase of the goodness of fit of the employment equation when the 
output is transformed according the Preisach Model and when it is transformed according 
to the Linear Play Model.  
Overall, considering the results of the cointegration tests and the increase in the 
goodness of fit of the regressions, the non-linear model that includes the hysteresis 
transformation of the variables displays a better performance than the standard linear 
model. Exceptions are Canada, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland, and for 
that reason, we do not find traces of hysteresis in these countries. The Linear Play Model 
identifies clear signs of hysteresis in Austria, France, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and even in the USA. In the cases of 
                                                 
7
 We reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and the USA. 
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Finland, Belgium, Slovenia and Spain, although there is an increase in of the goodness of 
fit of the employment equation when we replace the series of sales with its hysteretic 
transformation, we do not reject the inexistence of cointegration between the variables. 
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Table v.5 
 Results of the Linear Play Model  
Dependent variable: Logarithm of Aggregate Employment ( )tN  
Austria 
1996:01-2005:06 
114 obs. 
Belgium 
1995:01-2005:07 
 126 obs. 
Canada 
1995:04-2005:07 
127 obs. 
Czech Republic 
2001:01-2005:07 
 55 obs. 
Denmark 
1996:01-2005:06 
 108 obs. 
Finland 
1995:1-2005:07 
114 obs.  
Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 
cons  
5.273 
18.252 
(0.000) 
6.322 
23.70 
(0.000) 
6.194 
25.02 
(0.000) 
1.951 
5.651 
(0.000) 
4.108 
10.78 
(0.000) 
4.676 
1138 
(0.000) 
3.504 
3.752 
(0.000) 
4.669 
4.263 
(0.000) 
5.308 
6.249 
(0.000) 
4.310 
13.569 
(0.000) 
4.879 
9.506 
(0.000) 
5.564 
21.794 
(0.000) 
-0.224 
-0.353 
(0.724) 
3.503 
4.858 
(0.000) 
2.739 
3.915 
(0.000) 
0.961 
2.668 
(0.009) 
3.506 
4.214 
(0.000) 
4.155 
6.162 
(0.000) 
tY  
0.067 
3.448 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
-1.265 
(0.209) 
 
0.605 
7.371 
(0.000) 
0.127 
1.492 
(0.138) 
- 
0.513 
12.061 
(0.000) 
0.232 
0.925 
(0.356) 
- 
0.307 
7.932 
(0.000) 
0.159 
1.532 
(0.132) 
- 
-0.107 
-1.038 
(0.167) 
-0.193 
-2.986 
(0.003) 
 
0.291 
5.050 
(0.000) 
0.119 
1.325 
(0.187) 
- 
tW  
-0.208 
-3.095 
(0.003) 
-0.349 
-6.405 
(0.000) 
-0.346 
-6.405 
(0.000) 
- - - 
-0.269 
-1.402 
(0.163) 
-0.257 
-1.263 
(0.209) 
-0.177 
-0.962 
(0.338) 
-0.224 
-3.563 
(0.001) 
-0.194 
-3.130 
(0.003) 
-0.181 
-2.912 
(0.005) 
1.188 
8.726 
(0.000) 
0.457 
0.3.07 
(0.003) 
0.434 
2.816 
(0.006) 
0.540 
4.691 
(0.000) 
0.120 
0.767 
(0.445) 
0.085 
0.549 
(0.584) 
tSPURT  
 
- 
 
0.238 
7.723 
(0.000) 
0.212 
9.376 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.746 
8.770 
(0.000) 
0.827 
12.64 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.302 
1.144 
(0.255) 
0.543 
12.94 
(0.000) 
- 
0.165 
1.496 
(0.141) 
0.323 
7.692 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.712 
7.368 
(0.000) 
0.657 
6.67 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.346 
2.995 
(0.001) 
0.465 
6.380 
(0.00) 
T  
0.000 
-5.267 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-10.81 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-10.70 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-13.47 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-19.02 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-20.36 
(0.000) 
0.000 
-1.876 
(0.063) 
-0.000 
-2.699 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
-2.949 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
-5.034 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-5.699 
(0.00)0 
-0.002 
-5.663 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-6.327 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
--8.248 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-18.66 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-11.15 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-5.186 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-6.064 
(0.000) 
2R  0.551 0.710 0.701 0.785 0.864 0.86 0.854 0.861 0.860 0.802 0.832 0.824 0.706 0.809 0.792 0.652 0.666 0.661 
DW  0.187 0.562 0.542 0.190 0.239 0.211 0.127 0.116 0.101 1.436 1.166 0.984 0.304 0.516 0.481 0.270 0.181 0.150 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration 
Test Statistic 
-2.95 -4.17 -4.11 -2.451 -2.855 -2.71 -1.79 -1.50 -1.467 -5.322 -4.496 -4.14 -3.340 -7.61 -4.74 -3.254 -3.32 -3.67 
MacKinnon 
5% Critical 
Values 
-4.22 -4.56 -4.22 -3.856 -4.22 -3.85 -4.21 -4.54 -4.214 -3.342 -4.70 -3.342 -4.231 -4.57 -4.231 -4.217 -4.56 -4.217 
Trace Test 
Statistic 47.38 74.57 40.84 23.166 40.71 12.54 44.07 66.48 39.81 33.683 60.16 38.46 48.490 86.628 72.07 38.482 54.16 35.54 
5% Critical 
Value 42.91 63.87 42.91 25.87 42.91 25.87 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively
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France 
1996:01-2005:06 
 111 obs. 
Germany 
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs 
Hungary 
1998:01-2005:06 
90 obs. 
Japan 
1995:01-2005:06 
126 obs. 
Luxembourg  
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs.  
Poland 
1999:05-2005:06  
77 obs.  
Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 
cons  
1.893 
12.918 
(0.000) 
4.391 
27.82 
(0.000) 
4.294 
30.80 
(0.000) 
1.478 
7.112 
(0.000) 
2.572 
14.351 
(0.000) 
2.279 
14.40 
(0.000) 
2.364 
14.615 
(0.000) 
3.306 
12.806 
(0.000) 
3.099 
17.23 
(0.000) 
5.600 
14.831 
(0.000) 
5.471 
16.881 
(0.000) 
5.390 
16.94 
(0.000) 
2.411 
14.246 
(0.000) 
3.343 
17.486 
(0.000) 
3.053 
17.55 
(0.000) 
1.167 
5.474 
(0.000) 
2.317 
3.888 
(0.000) 
1.061 
3.907 
(0.000) 
tY  
0.1152 
3.826 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
-1.297 
(0.197 
- 
0.021 
0.690 
(0.500) 
-0.072 
-3.128 
(0.002) 
- 
0.122 
5.453 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
-1.115 
(0.268) 
- 
0.134 
3.499 
(0.001) 
0.044 
1.235 
(0.219) 
 
-0.005 
-0.195 
(0.846) 
-0.073 
-3.161 
(0.002) 
 
-0.062 
-1.171 
(0.245) 
-0.342 
-2.350 
(0.022) 
 
tW  
0.477 
12.160 
(0.000) 
0.076 
2.547 
(0.012 
0.076 
2.530 
(0.000 
0.676 
15.508 
(0.000) 
0.531 
15.919 
(0.000) 
0.525 
15..21 
(0.000) 
0.457 
9.317 
(0.000) 
0.407 
8.969 
(0.000) 
0.406 
8.937 
(0.000) 
-0.326 
-3.337 
(0.001) 
-0.209 
-2.441 
(0.000) 
0.274 
7.633 
(0.000) 
0.484 
12.056 
(0.000) 
0.347 
9.332 
(0.000) 
0.339 
8.839 
(0.000) 
0.903 
13.95 
(0.000) 
0.907 
14.310 
(0.000) 
0.868 
13.77 
(0.000) 
tSPURT  - 
0.702 
17.84 
(0.000) 
0.679 
19.32 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.306 
9.782 
(0.000) 
0.268 
8.974 
(0.000) 
- 
0.201 
4.404 
(0.000) 
0.156 
7.424 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.256 
6.625 
(0.000) 
0.256 
6.625 
(0.000) 
 
- 
0.232 
7.327 
(0.000) 
0.193 
6.383 
(0.000) 
- 
0.310 
2.059 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
-0.377 
(0.707) 
T  
0.000 
-21.40 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-46.60 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-40.34 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-13.22 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-19.98 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-21.45 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-21.76 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-22.29 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-24.81 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-24.23 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-29.23 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-29.23 
(0.000) 
0.000 
1.897 
0.0601 
-0.000 
-2.81 
(0.473) 
-0.000 
-4.349 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-2.41 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-2.824 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
-3.090 
(0.003) 
2R  0.842 0.962 0.961 0.947 0.974 0.972 0.915 0.934 0.932 0.969 0.977 0.978 0.822 0.874 0.864 0.964 0.966 0.963 
DW  0.188 0.500 0.515 0.935 1.255 1.1145 1.402 1.269 1.275 0.111 0.084 0.084 1.164 0.903 0.945 0.637 0.711 0.592 
 Engle Granger 
Cointegration 
Test Statistic 
-2.525 -3.854 -3.902 -3.27 -4.74 -4.302 -6.72 -6.533 -6.534 -1.58 -0.47 0.11 -2.01 -4.213 -6.36 -3.878 -4.96 3.86 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Values -4.009 -4.56 -4.009 -4.21 -4.55 -4.215 -4.25 -4.59 -4.25 -4.21 -4.55 -4.21 -4.215 -4.55 -4.215 -4.27 -4.62 -4.27 
Trace Test 
Statistic 45.310 73.2 42.74 41.64 71.33 41.51 63.52 85.3 62.36 44.34 100.70 45.59 41.16 63.26 38.16 49.63 80.20 54.39 
5% Critical 
Value 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively 
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Portugal 
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs.  
Slovak Republic 
1998:01-2005:06 
 90 obs. 
Slovenia 
1998:01-2005:06 
 90 obs. 
Spain 
1995:01-2004:12 
 120 obs. 
UK 
1995:01-2005:06 
126 obs. 
USA 
1995:01-2005:06 
 126 obs.  
Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 Eq. v.1 Eq. v.4 Eq.v.5 
cons  
4.258 
30.64 
(0.000) 
4.908 
25.91 
(0.000) 
4.744 
1979.8 
(0.000) 
4.255 
36.114 
(0.000) 
4.692 
35.51 
(0.000) 
4.568 
320.07 
(0.000) 
4.684 
14.737 
(0.000) 
5.379 
21.067 
(0.000) 
5.215 
22.97 
(0.000) 
1.210 
4.312 
(0.000) 
4.098 
11.683 
(0.000) 
4.472 
18.593 
(0.000) 
-1.290 
-2.254 
0.0259 
5.550 
7.703 
(0.000) 
4.739 
1082 
(0.000) 
11.45 
16.03 
(0.000) 
13.642 
24.30 
(0.000) 
13.724 
27.09 
(0.000) 
tY  
0.115 
3.794 
(0.000) 
-0.030 
-0.719 
(0.473) 
- 
0.0582 
2.0704 
(0.041) 
-0.028 
-0.945 
(0.347) 
- 
0.143 
4.819 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
-1.378 
(0.172 
- 
0.723 
11.422 
(0.000) 
0.084 
1.066 
(0.288) 
- 
1.320 
10.506 
(0.000) 
-0.178 
-1.126 
(0.263 
- 
0.750 
42.22 
(0.000) 
0.024 
0.0345 
(0.731) 
- 
tW  
0.263 
9.164 
(0.000) 
0.202 
6.800 
(0.000) 
0.200 
6.777 
(0.000) 
0.418 
17.882 
(0.000) 
0.301 
10.062 
(0.000) 
0.307 
10.415 
(0.000) 
-0.163 
-2.288 
(0.025) 
-0.120 
-2.203 
(0.000) 
-0.129 
-2.371 
(0.020) 
- - - 
 
- 
 
- - 
-1.074 
-7.054 
(0.000) 
-0.864 
-7.710 
(0.000) 
-0.859 
-7.762 
(0.000) 
tSPURT  - 
0.232 
4.832 
(0.000 
0.206 
6.322 
(0.000 
- 
0.330 
4.916 
(0.000) 
0.119 
5.142 
(0.000) 
- 
0.357 
8.069 
(0.000) 
0.314 
10.05 
(0.000) 
- 
1.108 
10.167 
(0.000) 
1.202 
18.593 
(0.000) 
- 
1.106 
7.43 
(0.000) 
0.969 
12.847 
(0.000 
- 
0.756 
10.368 
(0.000) 
0.780 
58.83 
(0.000 
T  
-0.002 
-41.88 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-39.62 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-39.80 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-3.624 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
-2.623 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-7.267 
(0.000) 
0.000 
-2.609 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
-6.097 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
-5.989 
(0.000) 
0.001 
6.533 
(0.000) 
0.000 
2.177 
(0.032) 
0.000 
2.1098 
(0.029) 
-0.003 
-37.99 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
-33.21 
(0.000 
-0.003 
-47.10 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
-32.01 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
-45.37 
(0.000 
-0.003 
-46.04 
(0.003) 
2R  0.993 0.994 0.994 0.828 0.857 0.856 0.702 0.823 0.819 0.921 0.958 0.957 0.923 0.973 0.973 0.987 0.993 0.993 
DW  0.786 0.540 0.565 1.299 1.072 1.123 0.345 0.457 0.450 0.247 0.173 0.163 0.257 0.144 0.173 0.263 0.280 0.278 
 Engle Granger 
Cointegration 
Test Statistic 
-3.28 -3.142 -3.15 -2.84 -5.642 -5.766 -2.69 -3.32 -3.22 -1.83 -2.47 -2.472 -2.11 -3.204 -3.21 -3.13 -4.13 -4.17 
MacKinnon 5% 
Critical Values -4.21 -4.55 -4.21 -4.22 -4.59 -4.215 -4.25 -4.59 -4.25 -3.86 -4.22 -4.21 -3.85 -4.22 -4.21 -4.21 -4.22 -4.275 
Trace Test 
Statistic 42.00 69.30 33.44 36. 43 78.43 35.91 30.72 54.46 35.33 10.67 39.47 14.95 20.53 29.45 18.64 40.41 84.06 55.4 
5% Critical 
Value 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 42.91 63.87 42.91 25.87 42.91 25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 42.91 63.87 42.91 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively 
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Table v.6 
Test on the Increase of Goodness of Fit (Linear Play Model) 
R2 F-Stat* R2 Country 
Equation v.1 Equation v.4 
R2 (Eq. v.4) - R2 (Eq. v.1)   
 Equation v.5 
R2 (Eq. v.5) - R2 (Eq. v.1) 
Austria 0.551 0.710 0.159 8.315 0.701 0.150 
Belgium 0.785 0.864 0.079 76.910 0.860 0.075 
Canada 0.854 0.861 0.007 0.132 0.860 0.006 
Czech Republic 0.802 0.832 0.030 2.238 0.824 0.022 
Denmark 0.706 0.809 0.103 54.287 0.792 0.086 
Finland 0.652 0.666 0.014 8.970 0.661 0.009 
France 0.842 0.962 0.120 318.330 0.961 0.119 
Germany 0.947 0.974 0.027 95.680 0.972 0.025 
Hungary 0.915 0.934 0.019 19.401 0.932 0.017 
Japan+ 0.969 0.977 0.008 43.893 0.978 0.009 
Luxembourg 0.822 0.874 0.052 53.681 0.864 0.042 
Netherlands 0.870 0.870 0.000 - 0.870 0.000 
Poland 0.964 0.966 0.002 4.240 0.963 -0.001 
Portugal 0.993 0.994 0.001 23.344 0.994 0.001 
Slovak Republic 0.828 0.857 0.029 86.992 0.856 0.028 
Slovenia 0.702 0.823 0.121 65.120 0.819 0.117 
Spain 0.921 0.958 0.037 103.363 0.957 0.036 
UK 0.923 0.973 0.050 59.952 0.973 0.050 
USA 0.987 0.993 0.006 107.580 0.993 0.006 
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V.4. RESULTS OF THE TIME VARYING INTERCEPT EMPLOYMENT MODEL 
 
 
To analyze the effect of uncertainty on the existence hysteresis in the dynamics of 
aggregate employment, we also implement on this data set the test on the existence of 
structural break hysteresis in the relationship between employment and its fundamentals. 
Firstly, we estimate a time varying intercept employment equation:  
 




+=
++++=
− tt,t,
ttt,t TWYN
2100
13210
εββ
εββββ
                    (v.6) 
 
Table v.7 shows the results of the estimation of Equation v.6. The time varying 
intercept is significant in all countries. Contrasting with the original estimates of the 
employment demand equation, the coefficient associated with real output is only 
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significant in the countries where the hysteresis effect is weak (Canada, Belgium, the UK 
and the USA).  
For the other countries, these results, interpreted under the hysteresis hypothesis, 
postulate that the major employment reaction occurs via structural changes in the 
dynamics (reaction along the spurts), captured in Equation v.6 by the time varying 
intercept t,0β , while the reaction along the play (captured by 1β ) is close to zero, which 
makes the coefficient associated with real output to be non-significant.    
Secondly, if uncertainty associated with the future input values determines 
hysteresis, the change in the time varying intercept ( )t,0β  should be inversely related to a 
measure of uncertainty: 
 
tYt, t
ˆ ωσααβ ++=∆ 100         (iv.7)  
 
where t,0ˆβ  is a time series of the estimated time varying intercept in Equation v.6 and 
tYσ  is a proxy for the variability of the real output. The test on the uncertainty hypothesis 
is a test to H0: 01 <α against H1: 01 =α . 
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Table v.7 
Estimates of Time Varying Intercept Version of Employment Equation 
Country tβ 8 ty  tw  
  
T    
 
Austria   
(0.000) 
0.0162 
(0.152) 
-0.0731 
(0.985) 
-0.001 
(0.936) 
Belgium   
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.003) 
 
- 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
Canada   
(0.000) 
0.068** 
(0.018) 
0.037 
(0.275 
0.001* 
(0.064) 
Czech Republic   
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.265) 
0.029 
(0.170) 
-0.0004 
(0.746) 
Denmark   
(0.000) 
-0.072 
(0.966) 
0.153* 
(0.074) 
-0.001 
(0.792) 
Finland   
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.687) 
0.021 
(0.345) 
0.001 
(0.998) 
France  
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.161) 
0.024 
(0.082)* 
-0.001* 
(0.011) 
Germany   
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.161) 
0.025** 
(0.047) 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
Hungary   
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.171) 
0.059** 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.822) 
Japan   
(0.000) 
0.115 
(0.171) 
-0.017 
(0.897) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
Luxembourg  
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.843) 
0.018** 
(0.039) 
0.000* 
(0.065) 
Netherlands   
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.246) 
0.199*** 
(0.001 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
Poland   
(0.000) 
0.043** 
(0.038) 
0.025** 
(0.046) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
Portugal   
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.630) 
0.025** 
(0.046) 
-0.003 
(0.682) 
Slovak Republic   
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.362) 
0.028 
(0.165) 
0.0003 
(0.682) 
Slovenia   
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.121) 
-0.019 
(0.826) 
-0.001*** 
(0.001) 
Spain   
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.896) 
- 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
UK   
(0.000) 
0.0315*** 
(0.001) 
- 
-0.002 
(0.000)*** 
USA   
(0.000) 
0.369*** 
(0.000) 
0.250*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.999) 
* significant at 10%   
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 2% 
p-value in brackets 
  
To analyze the effects of uncertainty, firstly, we estimate Equation v.5 from 
country to country (see Table v.8) and, secondly, we estimate a random effects model 
(see Table v.9). We use the two forward-looking and two backward-looking measures of 
                                                 
8
 See Figure A.10 in the Appendix for time varying intercept estimates 
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uncertainty, based on ex-post variability of real output (in line with Equations iv.19 and 
iv.20): 
When we estimate Equation v.6 country by country, we find, in the majority of 
the cases, the negative predicted value for 1α , although in general these estimates are 
non-significant.   
 When we estimate 1α  with a fixed effects specification, we obtain a negative 
significant estimate when the forward-looking measures of uncertainty are used, and 
mixed results, when we use the backward-looking measures of hysteresis9. 
  Based on this test, we conclude for the existence of weak evidence concerning the 
effects of uncertainty upon the hysteresis band. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The inclusion in the panel specification of a proxy of the magnitude of the costs of adjusting employment 
does not change the results concerning uncertainty. Moreover, we find a negative coefficient associated 
with the fixed adjustment costs proxy, which is in line with the theory. However, possibly due to lack of 
variability of this variable, the estimates are not significant.     
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Table v.8 
Uncertainty Coefficient Estimates – Country Estimates 
(Dependent Variable
j,t
ˆ
0β∆ ) 
Country 
tyσ (n=6) tyσ (n=12) tyσ (n=6) tyσ (n=1) 
Austria  -0.015 
(0.034) 
 
 -0.016 
(0.028) 
-0.003 
(0.034) 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
Belgium  -0.016 
(0.046) 
 
-0.020 
(0.047) 
-0.026 
(0.051) 
-0.047 
(0.053) 
Canada  -0.144** 
(0.056) 
 
-0.124*** 
(0.036) 
-0.055 
(0.056) 
-0.082** 
(0.038) 
Czech Republic  0.024 
(0.041) 
 
-0.097*** 
(0.037) 
-0.005 
(0.053) 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
Denmark  -0.048 
(0.088) 
 
0.187 
(0.127) 
-0.048 
(0.086) 
-0.070 
(0.109) 
Finland  -0.018 
(0.050) 
 
-0.060 
(0.049)  
-0.073 
(0.051) 
-0.030 
(0.053) 
France -0.035** 
(0.015) 
 
-0.013 
(0.027)  
0.017 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
Germany  0.001 
(0.036) 
 
0.043 
(0.030) 
-0.043 
(0.036)  
-0.025 
(0.03) 
Hungary  -0.019 
(0.053) 
 
-0.018 
(0.036) 
-0.046 
(0.052) 
0.007 
(0.036) 
Japan  0.023 
(0.023) 
 
0.044** 
(0.165)  
0.021 
(0.023) 
-0.013 
(0.016)  
Luxembourg -0.008 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
Netherlands  -0.013 
(0.016) 
 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.020) 
Poland  0.022 
(0.047 
 
0.050 
(0.034) 
0.041 
(0.050) 
0.034 
(0.037)  
Portugal  -0.046 
(0.035) 
 
0.035 
(0.026) 
-0.017 
(0.030) 
-0.041 
(0.041)  
Slovak Republic  0.042 
(0.059) 
 
-0.022 
(0.045) 
-0.012 
(0.057) 
-0.015 
(0.052) 
Slovenia  -0.017 
(0.047) 
 
-0.034 
(0.047) 
0.053 
(0.047) 
-0.025 
(0.046) 
Spain  -0.003 
(0.053) 
 
0.077 
(0.049) 
-0.068 
(0.051) 
-0.068 
(0.049)  
UK  -0.092 
(0.0650) 
 
-0.082 
(0.053) 
-0.139** 
(0.068) 
-0.204** 
(0.077) 
USA  -0.013 
(0.059) 
 
-0.007 
(0.038) 
0.029 
(0.063) 
-0.068* 
(0.034) 
* significant at 10%  
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 2% 
p-values in brackets 
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Table v.9 
Uncertainty Coefficient Estimates – Panel Estimates 
(Dependent Variable
j,t
ˆ
0β∆ ) 
 
 
EPL 
tyσ (n=6) tyσ (n=12) tyσ (n=6) tyσ (n=1) 
Eq.1 
 
-0.004 
(0.009)    
Eq.2 -0.0004 (0.0005) 
-0.001 
(0.001)    
Eq.3 
  
0.025** 
(0.010)   
Eq.4 -0.001 (0.001)  
0.027** 
(0.011)   
Eq.5 
   
-0.040*** 
(0.010)  
Eq.6 -0.0003 (0.001)   
-0.045*** 
(0.011)  
Eq.7 
    
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
Eq.8 -0.0003 (0.001)    
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
** significant at 5% 
***significant at 2% 
Standard Errors in Brackets  
 
 
 V.5. PATTERN OF HYSTERESIS AND LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
 
After computing the transformed variables according to the Preisach Model and to 
the Linear Play Model of Strong Hysteresis, we evaluated the existence of hysteresis by 
looking into three indicators: i) the substitution effect of the significance of the 
transformed variable; ii) the increase in the goodness of fit of the regressions; iii) the 
increase inhe absolute value of the statistics of the cointegration tests. 
 Tables v.10 and v.11 summarize the results of the tests. We verify that the 
inclusion of the hysteresis transformed variables increases, in most cases, the quality of 
the employment equations.   
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Table v.10 
Summary of the Results of the Preisach Model 
Increase in Cointegration 
Tests Statistics 
Number of 
Cases 
Substitution 
Effect 
(original variable 
non-significant 
and hysteresis 
variable 
significant) 
Increase in the 
R-Square 
(regression with 
the transformed  
variable relative 
to  regression 
with the original 
variable) 
 (F-Test) 
(Increase in the 
R-Square with the 
inclusion of the 
Transformed 
Variable)  
Engle Granger 
Test 
Trace 
test 
In Favor of 
Hysteresis 11 15 12 14 14 
Against 
Hysteresis 2 4 5 5 5 
Difficult 
Conclusion 6 0 2 0 0 
Note: 19 countries analyzed (for real wages we only have data for 16 countries) 
 
 
Table iv.11 
Summary of the Results of the Linear Play Model 
Increase In Cointegration 
Tests Statistics 
Number of 
Cases 
Substitution 
Effect 
(original variable 
non-significant 
and hysteresis 
variable 
significant) 
Increase in the 
R-Square 
(regression with 
the transformed  
variable relative 
to regression 
with the original 
variable) 
 (F-Test) 
(Increase in the 
R-Square with the 
inclusion of the 
Transformed 
Variable)  
Engle Granger 
Test 
Trace 
test 
In Favor of 
Hysteresis 12 18 15 13 14 
Against 
Hysteresis 0 1 4 6 5 
Difficult 
Conclusion 7 0 0 0 0 
Note: 19 countries analyzed  
 
We also provide two indicators of the importance of hysteresis (see Table v.12). 
The Preisach indicator is simply the rank position of the country concerning the increase 
in the goodness of fit of the cointegrated regression. The play indicator is the rank 
position of the country concerning the width of the play estimated with the series of real 
product (see also Figure v.3)10. Overall, considering the information in Table v.12 and the 
results of the cointegration tests, the two indicators agree in identifying important signs of 
                                                 
10
 The comparison of the results on the existence of hysteresis in the dynamics of employment implies the 
existence of similar economic cycles in the considered countries, otherwise the inexistence of shocks or 
inflections of sales of sufficient magnitude could erroneously indicate the inexistence of hysteresis. The 
length of the sample is, however, sufficient to rule out this possibility.  
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hysteresis in the dynamics of employment in France, Finland, the Slovak Republic and 
Japan. Traces of hysteresis are also found in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. However, in these countries we only found the existence of 
cointegration between the variables in one test we. We found that hysteresis is not 
relevant in Canada, the Czech Republic, the UK or in the USA.  
Concerning the case of Portugal, from Table v.12 and Figure v.3, we conclude 
that in spite of its reputation as a country with high employment protection, it does not 
rank between the countries where macro employment inertia is high11.      
  
Table v.12 
Hysteresis Indicators 
Preisach Indicator 
R2 (Eq. v.2) - R2 (Eq. v.1) 
Linear Play Indicator 
(Play Width) 
Austria  0.162 Denmark  0.186 
France  0.112 Slovak Republic  0.168 
Slovenia  0.105 Luxembourg 0.122 
Netherlands  0.051 Austria  0.102 
Finland  0.035 Finland  0.096 
Spain  0.032 France  0.074 
Slovak Republic  0.030 Germany  0.074 
Belgium  0.022 Spain  0.072 
Germany  0.015 Slovenia  0.07 
Japan  0.015 Japan  0.068 
Luxembourg 0.005 Belgium  0.062 
Poland  0.001 Hungary  0.054 
Portugal  0.000 Portugal  0.044 
Denmark  -0.003 Czech Republic  0.032 
UK  -0.006 Poland  0.032 
Hungary  -0.014 UK  0.024 
USA  -0.055 USA  0.024 
Canada  -0.062 Canada  0.02 
Czech Republic  -0.223 Netherlands  0.00 
* Increase in the R-square when we estimate the model with 
the transformed series of real output instead of the original 
series.   
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The fact that the outcome of the labor market adjustment does not totally reflect the very rigid 
employment protection legislation in Portugal is stated in Addison and Teixeira (2003, 2005). Actually, 
Addison and Teixeira (2005) compared the speed of the adjustment of Portuguese and the German 
aggregate employment, to its long run value, in the period from the first quarter of 1977 to the fourth 
quarter of 1997, and they concluded that it is higher in Portugal than in Germany, in spite of Portugal being 
a country with a more rigid labor market reputation.   
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a. Preisach Indicator  
R2 (Eq. v.2) - R2 (Eq. v.1) 
 
b. Linear Play Indicator 
Play Width 
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 Figure v.3. Hysteresis Indicators 
 
The theoretical models of hysteresis postulate that the band of inaction is a 
positive function of the magnitude of the fixed costs of adjusting employment and 
uncertainty, and a negative function of the magnitude of the cost of adjusting the number 
of hours per worker (see section II.3). Benefiting from our empirical results, we finally 
verify the empirical association between hysteresis and its main causes.  
Table v.13 reports the rank correlations between indicators of hysteresis and 
proxies of employment adjustment costs, costs of adjusting hours of work and 
uncertainty. 
In line with the predictions of the hysteresis models, we find: i) a positive and 
significant correlation between the hysteresis indicators and the strictness of employment 
protection legislation; ii) mixed and non-significant results concerning the correlation 
between hysteresis indicators and the proxy of strictness of working time regulations; iii) 
a positive and significant correlation (for the indicator calculated from the Linear Play 
Model) between the hysteresis indicator and the proxy of uncertainty. 
These results indicate that labor market institutions and especially employment 
protection legislation affect the aggregate dynamic of employment through hysteresis 
mechanisms.  
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Table v.13 
Spearman's Rank Correlation between  
 Labor Market Institutions Indicators and Hysteresis Indicators 
Employment Adjustment Costs 
Working 
Time 
Regulations 
Proxy of 
Uncertainty Hysteresis  
Indicator 
sLATE_EPL 90 1 2003_EPL 2 LMID_EPL 3 EPI 4 WTR 5 
tyσ (n=6) 
( )PLAY  
 
0.48* 
(2.14) 
 
0.57* 
(2.80) 
 
0.29 
(0.99) 
 
0.19 
(0.63) 
 
-0.08 
(0.27) 
 
0.63** 
(3.36) 
 ( )2R∆  
(Preisach 
Model) 
0.67** 
(3.53) 
0.75** 
(4.48) 
0.55* 
(2.18) 
0.45 
(1.65) 
0.35 
(1.25) 
0.18 
(0.77) 
* Significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
t-statistics in brackets 
 
1 Employment Protection Indicator from OECD – Employment Outlook 2004 (Table 2.A.2.4). 
2  Employment Protection Indicator from OECD – Employment Outlook 2004 (Table 2.A.2.4).   
3  Employment Protection Indicator from Labor Market Institutions Database, version 2.00, 2001, by Stephen Nickel  
4  Employment Protection Indicator [0.20] from Nunziata (2002) (Table 1, p. 38). 
5  Working Time Regulation Index from Nunziata (2003), (Table 1, p. 38). 
 
 
 
 
 
V.6. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
This part was dedicated to an international comparison of the importance of 
hysteresis in shaping the dynamics of employment at the macro level. By applying the 
models of strong hysteresis to aggregate data from EUROSTAT and OECD we conclude: 
Firstly, in general the non-linear model that allows for hysteresis performs better 
than the linear model with the original variables. 
Secondly, by estimating a time varying intercept employment equation, we find 
only weak evidence regarding the effect of uncertainty upon the hysteresis band at the 
macro level. 
Thirdly, we find a significant correlation between the rigidity of some labor 
market regulations and the importance of hysteresis, meaning that labor market 
institutions affect the dynamics of employment through hysteresis mechanisms. 
Finally, the position of Portugal in the ranking of the importance of hysteresis 
does not totally reflect its rigid employment protection legislation.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
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VI.1. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to analyze the existence of hysteresis in the 
adjustment of employment at the micro level and to study its aggregate implications. 
At the firm level, the adjustment pattern of the labor input for Portuguese 
manufacturing firms in the period from January 1995 to December 2005 reveals 
unequivocal signs of lumpy adjustment, although smooth adjustment is also important. 
Lumpy adjustment is more important for small firms than for large ones. From the joint 
dynamics of employment, hours of work and sales, we verify that while there are some 
signs of the existence of non-convex costs of adjusting employment, reflected in the 
existence of a negative correlation between hours and employment adjustment, there is 
no significant cost in changing the number of hours per worker. This implies that the 
response of the labor input to variations in sales, is primarily implemented through the 
variation in the number of hours of work.  
A more formal test for the existence of hysteresis was conducted, at the firm 
level, based on the assumption that employment response to product demand shocks of 
the same magnitude is asymmetric, and it depends on the differences between the actual 
and desired level of employment. We found that the signs of the existence of hysteresis 
at the micro level are stronger in the case of smaller firms. 
The results of the Preisach Model reveal that the hysteresis transformation of 
sales offers a better explanation of the aggregate employment dynamics than the 
original variable. However, the results are different concerning the size of firms. While 
the inclusion of the hysteresis variable significantly increases the goodness of fit of the 
employment equations in the case of small firms, for large ones the original series of 
sales offers a better explanation of employment dynamics, meaning that hysteresis is not 
important in this case. 
 Results of the Linear Model of Strong Hysteresis indicate significant periods of 
inaction, implying that a large play width is necessary to achieve the maximum 
goodness of fit of employment regressions. Overall, the non-linear model, which 
includes the hysteresis transformation of the variables, performs better than the standard 
linear model. Furthermore, the estimated play interval is larger for small firms than for 
large ones (the estimated play for the whole sample lies in the middle of these values). 
While for small firms the results indicate the existence of a zone of weak employment 
reaction (the play) and a zone of strong employment reaction (the spurt), for large firms 
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the differences between these zones of different reactions of employment are not as 
clear.   
 Concerning the effect of uncertainty, based on the estimation of a time varying 
intercept version of the employment equation, we did not find evidence regarding its 
influence on hysteresis at the macro level. Nonetheless, we conclude, based on the 
Linear Model of Hysteresis with a variable play, that uncertainty has a positive effect 
over the inaction band, at the macro level, for firms with fewer than 20 workers.  
 We found strong evidence of the existence of a relationship between the 
adjustment through hours of work and the existence of hysteresis at the macro level.  
The goodness of fit of the employment equation increased significantly, when we 
estimated the hysteresis variable on the basis of a variable play. 
 Therefore, in the case of Portugal, at the micro level, the empirical evidence 
indicates the existence of significant non-convex adjustment costs that originates 
hysteresis. The evidence is stronger for small firms than for large ones. At the aggregate 
level signs of hysteresis do not completely vanish. Strong hysteresis models show that, 
while the aggregate path of employment of firms with fewer than 20 workers is 
characterized by hysteresis, the hysteresis properties are not as distinguishable in the 
aggregate path of employment of firms with more than 500 workers. 
 An international comparison of the results of strong hysteresis models indicates 
that hysteresis in the dynamics of employment is particularly noticeable in countries 
such as France, Finland, the Slovak Republic and Japan. Traces of hysteresis are also 
found in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. On 
the contrary, hysteresis is not noticeable at all in Canada, the Czech Republic, the UK or 
the USA. These results reveal a positive and significant correlation between the 
rankings of rigidities of labor market institutions and the estimated rankings of the 
importance of hysteresis. Thus, labor market institutions affect the dynamics of 
employment through hysteresis mechanisms. 
 In spite of being in the top rankings of the rigidity of employment protection 
legislation, this study places Portugal in the middle of the said extreme groups with 
regard the importance of hysteresis. A possible explanation for this fact could be the 
interaction of rigid employment protection legislation with medium rigidity concerning 
overtime regulations. Another explanation could be the fact that employment protection 
legislation indexes that are based on an interpretation of the legislation do not totally 
reflect the behavior of the labor market.  
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VI.2. BASIS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Naturally, several issues related to the subject in this thesis remain open.  
Due to lack of available data, we only analyzed the dynamics of employment 
adjustment on the intensive margins (adjustment of firms that are already operating in 
the market). However, it is also important to analyze the dynamics of employment 
adjustment on the extensive margin (firms’ entry and exit). This could be studied in the 
framework of the Preisach Model of Strong Hysteresis or with the application of a 
dynamic discrete choice model of a firm’s participation decision.  
Moreover, we ignore the influences of the investment decisions on the level of 
employment. Since labor and capital are interrelated and recognizing that decisions 
regarding physical capital adjustment are also affected by non-convex costs of 
adjustment, it would be important to analyze the relationship between hysteresis in the 
dynamics of the stock of capital and hysteresis in the dynamics of employment.   
Some improvements in the programs to calculate hysteresis variables could also 
be implemented. In particular it would be interesting to examine the sensitivities of the 
results to different specifications for the Preisach Function. By applying the least square 
method, we should be able to estimate the density function over the Preisach Triangle 
that originates the higher R-square of the employment equation. We expect that in 
countries with more rigid employment protection legislation, a great proportion of the 
firms should be located in the Norwest region of the Preisach Triangle.   
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Figure A.3 
Time Varying Intercept Estimates of Labor Demand Equation with Kalman Filter 
(with micro data from Portuguese industrial firms) 
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Figure A.4 
Estimation of the Play Width 
(with manufacturing aggregate data from EUROSTAT and OECD – dependent variable: real product) 
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Figure A.5 
Time Varying Intercept Estimates of Labor Demand Equation with Kalman Filter 
(with aggregate data from EUROSTAT and OECD) 
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Table A.1. 
Summary Characteristics of the Data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Employment 148.016 307.32 1 8075.00 
Total Hours of Work 22346.48 46958.38 0 7707874.20 
Sales 1176.26 10056.12 0 615 250. 96 
Real Wages 2414.61 94266.47 0 477218282.93 
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Table A.2 
Monthly Net Employment Changes 
 
* Employment growth rates as percentage of the period’s employment average. Extreme values (-2,2) were 
excluded as they do not necessarily represent shutdowns or start ups. Interval width was set at 0,05 – all 
intervals are identified by their mid points.  
** An observation is defined as the adjustment of the firm j in month t. 
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<-0.8 344 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,003  
[-0.80;-0.75[ 42 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000  
[-0.75;-0.70[ 42 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000  
[-0.70;-0.65[ 94 0,000 0,002 0,001 0,001  
[-0.65;-0.60[ 64 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,001  
[-0.60;-0.55[ 70 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,001  
[-0.55;-0.50[ 99 0,000 0,002 0,001 0,001  
[-0.50;-0.45[ 130 0,000 0,003 0,001 0,001  
[-0.45;-0.40[ 131 0,000 0,003 0,001 0,001  
[-0.40;-0.35[ 305 0,001 0,004 0,002 0,003  
[-0.35;-0.30[ 328 0,001 0,005 0,002 0,003  
[-0.30;-0.25[ 525 0,002 0,007 0,003 0,005  
[-0.25;-0.20[ 883 0,003 0,010 0,005 0,008  
[-0.20;-0.15[ 1888 0,006 0,016 0,010 0,018  
[-0.15;-0.10[ 4127 0,013 0,029 0,022 0,039  
[-0.10;-0.05[ 15236 0,049 0,077 0,082 0,146  
[-0.05;0.00[ 80262 0,256 0,333 0,431 0,768  
[0.00;0.00[ 128058 0,408 0,741     
]0.00;0.05] 60468 0,193 0,933 0,325  0,742 
]0.05;0.10] 13465 0,043 0,976 0,072  0,165 
]0.10;0.15] 3686 0,012 0,988 0,020  0,045 
]0.15;0.20] 1596 0,005 0,993 0,009  0,020 
]0.20;0.25] 739 0,002 0,995 0,004  0,009 
]0.25;0.30] 414 0,001 0,996 0,002  0,005 
]0.30;0.35] 232 0,001 0,997 0,001  0,003 
]0.35;0.40] 196 0,001 0,998 0,001  0,002 
]0.40;0.45] 79 0,000 0,998 0,000  0,001 
]0.45;0.50] 117 0,000 0,998 0,001  0,001 
]0.50;0.55] 67 0,000 0,999 0,000  0,001 
]0.55;0.60] 49 0,000 0,999 0,000  0,001 
]0.60;0.65] 41 0,000 0,999 0,000  0,001 
]0.65;0.70] 53 0,000 0,999 0,000  0,001 
]0.70;0.75] 26 0,000 0,999 0,000  0,000 
]0.75;0.80] 32 0,000 0,999 0,000  0,000 
>0.8 231 0,001 1,000 0,001  0,003 
 #Obs: 314 119**     
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Table A.3 
Monthly Net Employment Changes by Firm Size 
20<n  4920 <≤ n  9950 <≤ n  199100 <≤ n  499200 <≤ n  500≥n  
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2
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Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
<-0.8 125 0,003 81 0,001 0,001 0,001 50 0,001 20 0,000 9 0,001 
[-0.80;-0.75[ 7 0,000 14 0,000 0,000 0,000 6 0,000 5 0,000 1 0,000 
[-0.75;-0.70[ 20 0,000 9 0,000 0,000 0,000 3 0,000 4 0,000 2 0,000 
[-0.70;-0.65[ 55 0,001 23 0,000 0,000 0,000 9 0,000 4 0,000 1 0,000 
[-0.65;-0.60[ 12 0,000 16 0,000 0,000 0,000 12 0,000 8 0,000 0 0,000 
[-0.60;-0.55[ 17 0,000 19 0,000 0,000 0,000 15 0,000 4 0,000 3 0,000 
[-0.55;-0.50[ 29 0,001 12 0,000 0,000 0,000 21 0,000 12 0,000 3 0,000 
[-0.50;-0.45[ 56 0,001 27 0,000 0,000 0,000 13 0,000 7 0,000 5 0,000 
[-0.45;-0.40[ 35 0,001 30 0,000 0,000 0,000 19 0,000 18 0,000 3 0,000 
[-0.40;-0.35[ 124 0,003 80 0,001 0,001 0,001 32 0,001 23 0,001 3 0,000 
[-0.35;-0.30[ 110 0,002 88 0,001 0,001 0,001 44 0,001 27 0,001 8 0,001 
[-0.30;-0.25[ 197 0,004 125 0,001 0,001 0,001 58 0,001 43 0,001 11 0,001 
[-0.25;-0.20[ 347 0,008 239 0,003 0,002 0,002 87 0,002 69 0,002 16 0,001 
[-0.20;-0.15[ 784 0,018 564 0,006 0,004 0,004 166 0,003 106 0,003 20 0,001 
[-0.15;-0.10[ 1445 0,033 1419 0,016 0,009 0,009 345 0,006 249 0,006 52 0,003 
[-0.10;-0.05[ 4382 0,099 4153 0,048 0,042 0,042 1651 0,030 893 0,021 251 0,016 
[-0.05;0.00[ 0 0,000 14940 0,171 0,276 0,276 20027 0,362 18176 0,430 8258 0,533 
[0.00;0.00[ 30142 0,683 45821 0,524 0,383 0,383 15609 0,282 8741 0,207 1574 0,102 
]0.00;0.05] 1 0,000 12898 0,148 0,224 0,224 14948 0,270 12427 0,294 4898 0,316 
]0.05;0.10] 3698 0,084 4451 0,051 0,039 0,039 1487 0,027 895 0,021 240 0,015 
]0.10;0.15] 1183 0,027 1271 0,015 0,008 0,008 361 0,007 244 0,006 60 0,004 
]0.15;0.20] 620 0,014 515 0,006 0,003 0,003 132 0,002 95 0,002 23 0,001 
]0.20;0.25] 254 0,006 223 0,003 0,002 0,002 78 0,001 65 0,002 10 0,001 
]0.25;0.30] 149 0,003 118 0,001 0,001 0,001 50 0,001 30 0,001 7 0,000 
]0.30;0.35] 71 0,002 68 0,001 0,000 0,000 25 0,000 27 0,001 10 0,001 
]0.35;0.40] 86 0,002 44 0,001 0,000 0,000 22 0,000 13 0,000 3 0,000 
]0.40;0.45] 14 0,000 26 0,000 0,000 0,000 12 0,000 10 0,000 4 0,000 
]0.45;0.50] 43 0,001 21 0,000 0,000 0,000 14 0,000 16 0,000 4 0,000 
]0.50;0.55] 16 0,000 18 0,000 0,000 0,000 14 0,000 6 0,000 2 0,000 
]0.55;0.60] 11 0,000 15 0,000 0,000 0,000 7 0,000 4 0,000 2 0,000 
]0.60;0.65] 10 0,000 12 0,000 0,000 0,000 8 0,000 1 0,000 2 0,000 
]0.65;0.70] 16 0,000 17 0,000 0,000 0,000 7 0,000 5 0,000 0 0,000 
]0.70;0.75] 8 0,000 5 0,000 0,000 0,000 5 0,000 3 0,000 0 0,000 
]0.75;0.80] 8 0,000 5 0,000 0,000 0,000 9 0,000 6 0,000 0 0,000 
>0.8 64 0,001 50 0,001 0,001 0,001 43 0,001 19 0,000 10 0,001 
 #Obs:44 139 (14.00%) #Obs: 88 417 (27.83%) #Obs: 68 404 (21.78%) #Obs:  55 389 (17.63%) #Obs:  42 275 (13.46%)  #Obs: 15 495 (4.93%) 
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Table A.4 
Monthly Net Employment Changes by Sector 
Sector  
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13,14   15,16 17,18,19  20,36 21,22 23,24,25,37 26 27 28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35  40 
<-0.8 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
[-0.80;-0.75[ 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
[-0.75;-0.70[ 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
[-0.70;-0.65[ 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
[-0.65;-0.60[ 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
[-0.60;-0.55[ 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 
[-0.55;-0.50[ 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
[-0.50;-0.45[ 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 
[-0.45;-0.40[ 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
[-0.40;-0.35[ 0,002 0,002 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000 
[-0.35;-0.30[ 0,002 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000 
[-0.30;-0.25[ 0,003 0,003 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,001 
[-0.25;-0.20[ 0,004 0,005 0,002 0,003 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 
[-0.20;-0.15[ 0,010 0,009 0,004 0,006 0,005 0,005 0,006 0,002 0,006 0,003 
[-0.15;-0.10[ 0,021 0,017 0,011 0,013 0,011 0,012 0,010 0,008 0,014 0,007 
[-0.10;-0.05[ 0,062 0,051 0,043 0,053 0,050 0,041 0,050 0,035 0,051 0,023 
[-0.05;0.00[ 0,151 0,215 0,315 0,224 0,234 0,260 0,266 0,300 0,256 0,302 
[0.00;0.00[ 0,510 0,424 0,364 0,446 0,442 0,416 0,405 0,364 0,389 0,488 
]0.00;0.05] 0,137 0,175 0,207 0,180 0,189 0,203 0,198 0,231 0,199 0,141 
]0.05;0.10] 0,060 0,048 0,034 0,048 0,044 0,040 0,039 0,036 0,047 0,019 
]0.10;0.15] 0,019 0,016 0,009 0,010 0,011 0,010 0,010 0,008 0,014 0,006 
]0.15;0.20] 0,007 0,009 0,003 0,005 0,004 0,003 0,004 0,004 0,006 0,002 
]0.20;0.25] 0,004 0,005 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,003 0,002 
]0.25;0.30] 0,002 0,003 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,000 
]0.30;0.35] 0,001 0,002 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000 
]0.35;0.40] 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 
]0.40;0.45] 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.45;0.50] 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.50;0.55] 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.55;0.60] 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.60;0.65] 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.65;0.70] 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.70;0.75] 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
]0.75;0.80] 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
>0.8 0,000 0,002 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,000 
 4.36% 13.11% 20.73% 12.10% 6.20% 8.20% 8.89% 2.33% 23.29% 0.8% 
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Table A.5 
Monthly Sales Changes 
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<-0.8 17408 0,055 0,055 0,055 0,113  
[-0.80;-0.75[ 2048 0,007 0,062 0,007 0,013  
[-0.75;-0.70[ 2264 0,007 0,069 0,007 0,015  
[-0.70;-0.65[ 2536 0,008 0,077 0,008 0,016  
[-0.65;-0.60[ 2938 0,009 0,087 0,009 0,019  
[-0.60;-0.55[ 3437 0,011 0,098 0,011 0,022  
[-0.55;-0.50[ 3967 0,013 0,110 0,013 0,026  
[-0.50;-0.45[ 4595 0,015 0,125 0,015 0,030  
[-0.45;-0.40[ 5627 0,018 0,143 0,018 0,037  
[-0.40;-0.35[ 4424 0,014 0,157 0,014 0,029  
[-0.35;-0.30[ 7749 0,025 0,181 0,025 0,050  
[-0.30;-0.25[ 9615 0,031 0,212 0,031 0,063  
[-0.25;-0.20[ 11602 0,037 0,249 0,037 0,075  
[-0.20;-0.15[ 14394 0,046 0,295 0,046 0,094  
[-0.15;-0.10[ 17150 0,055 0,349 0,055 0,112  
[-0.10;-0.05[ 20160 0,064 0,414 0,064 0,131  
[-0.05;0.00[ 23832 0,076 0,489 0,076 0,155  
[0.00;0.00[ 171 0,001 0,490    
]0.00;0.05] 22927 0,073 0,563 0,073  0,143 
]0.05;0.10] 20744 0,066 0,629 0,066  0,129 
]0.10;0.15] 17917 0,057 0,686 0,057  0,112 
]0.15;0.20] 15022 0,048 0,734 0,048  0,094 
]0.20;0.25] 14422 0,046 0,780 0,046  0,090 
]0.25;0.30] 10229 0,033 0,812 0,033  0,064 
]0.30;0.35] 8336 0,027 0,839 0,027  0,052 
]0.35;0.40] 6917 0,022 0,861 0,022  0,043 
]0.40;0.45] 5638 0,018 0,879 0,018  0,035 
]0.45;0.50] 4865 0,015 0,894 0,015  0,030 
]0.50;0.55] 3951 0,013 0,907 0,013  0,025 
]0.55;0.60] 3436 0,011 0,918 0,011  0,021 
]0.60;0.65] 3019 0,010 0,927 0,010  0,019 
]0.65;0.70] 2626 0,008 0,936 0,008  0,016 
]0.70;0.75] 2196 0,007 0,943 0,007  0,014 
]0.75;0.80] 2028 0,006 0,949 0,006  0,013 
>0.8 15929 0,051 1,000 0,051  0,099 
 #Obs: 314 119      
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Table A.6 
Monthly Sales Changes by Firm Size 
20<n  4920 <≤ n  9950 <≤ n  199100 <≤ n  499200 <≤ n  500≥n  
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s
+
∆
−
 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
<-0.8 3051 0,0752 4820 0,0593 3262 0,0516 2288 0,0446 1575 0,0401 503 0,0346 
[-0.80;-0.75[ 318 0,0078 564 0,0069 361 0,0057 271 0,0053 204 0,0052 78 0,0054 
[-0.75;-0.70[ 385 0,0095 572 0,0070 436 0,0069 310 0,0060 218 0,0055 71 0,0049 
[-0.70;-0.65[ 364 0,0090 725 0,0089 484 0,0077 360 0,0070 291 0,0074 82 0,0056 
[-0.65;-0.60[ 467 0,0115 785 0,0097 601 0,0095 401 0,0078 324 0,0082 71 0,0049 
[-0.60;-0.55[ 558 0,0138 880 0,0108 696 0,0110 490 0,0095 379 0,0096 102 0,0070 
[-0.55;-0.50[ 573 0,0141 1073 0,0132 785 0,0124 550 0,0107 429 0,0109 250 0,0172 
[-0.50;-0.45[ 678 0,0167 1221 0,0150 903 0,0143 679 0,0132 519 0,0132 161 0,0111 
[-0.45;-0.40[ 781 0,0193 1572 0,0193 1158 0,0183 820 0,0160 630 0,0160 189 0,0130 
[-0.40;-0.35[ 857 0,0211 1736 0,0213 1285 0,0203 993 0,0193 765 0,0195 231 0,0159 
[-0.35;-0.30[ 959 0,0236 2020 0,0248 1613 0,0255 1223 0,0238 913 0,0232 319 0,0220 
[-0.30;-0.25[ 1154 0,0285 2512 0,0309 1991 0,0315 1580 0,0308 1140 0,0290 405 0,0279 
[-0.25;-0.20[ 1344 0,0331 2942 0,0362 2371 0,0375 1967 0,0383 1464 0,0372 519 0,0357 
[-0.20;-0.15[ 1665 0,0410 3613 0,0444 2895 0,0458 2477 0,0483 1839 0,0468 711 0,0489 
[-0.15;-0.10[ 1900 0,0468 4218 0,0519 3367 0,0532 3012 0,0587 2321 0,0590 891 0,0613 
[-0.10;-0.05[ 2251 0,0555 4831 0,0594 3927 0,0621 3528 0,0687 2774 0,0706 1160 0,0799 
[-0.05;0.00[ 2706 0,0667 5738 0,0706 4556 0,0720 3987 0,0777 3296 0,0838 1417 0,0975 
[0.00;0.00[ 351 0,0087 649 0,0080 563 0,0089 469 0,0091 372 0,0095 135 0,0093 
]0.00;0.05] 2643 0,0652 5419 0,0666 4280 0,0677 3853 0,0751 3229 0,0821 1290 0,0888 
]0.05;0.10] 2277 0,0561 4795 0,0590 4024 0,0636 3499 0,0682 2880 0,0732 1133 0,0780 
]0.10;0.15] 1860 0,0459 4185 0,0515 3545 0,0560 3068 0,0598 2444 0,0622 931 0,0641 
]0.15;0.20] 1628 0,0401 3781 0,0465 3006 0,0475 2587 0,0504 1897 0,0482 740 0,0509 
]0.20;0.25] 1376 0,0339 3107 0,0382 2567 0,0406 2102 0,0410 1593 0,0405 587 0,0404 
]0.25;0.30] 1206 0,0297 2752 0,0338 2111 0,0334 1683 0,0328 1237 0,0315 476 0,0328 
]0.30;0.35] 1039 0,0256 2214 0,0272 1765 0,0279 1453 0,0283 973 0,0247 338 0,0233 
]0.35;0.40] 896 0,0221 1933 0,0238 1510 0,0239 1093 0,0213 824 0,0210 252 0,0173 
]0.40;0.45] 748 0,0184 1553 0,0191 1247 0,0197 919 0,0179 642 0,0163 189 0,0130 
]0.45;0.50] 711 0,0175 1372 0,0169 1040 0,0164 766 0,0149 578 0,0147 160 0,0110 
]0.50;0.55] 605 0,0149 1117 0,0137 871 0,0138 621 0,0121 451 0,0115 127 0,0087 
]0.55;0.60] 554 0,0137 963 0,0118 721 0,0114 533 0,0104 400 0,0102 112 0,0077 
]0.60;0.65] 493 0,0122 849 0,0104 630 0,0100 441 0,0086 344 0,0087 113 0,0078 
]0.65;0.70] 406 0,0100 715 0,0088 551 0,0087 442 0,0086 289 0,0074 92 0,0063 
]0.70;0.75] 374 0,0092 597 0,0073 490 0,0077 301 0,0059 242 0,0062 92 0,0063 
]0.75;0.80] 343 0,0085 572 0,0070 422 0,0067 287 0,0056 236 0,0060 79 0,0054 
>0.8 3040 0,0749 4917 0,0605 3229 0,0510 2277 0,0444 1606 0,0408 520 0,0358 
 #Obs:40 561 (13.98%) #Obs: 81 312 (28.02%) #Obs: 63 263 (21.80%) #Obs:  51 330 (17.69%) #Obs:  39 318 (13.55%)  #Obs: 14 426 (4.97%) 
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Table A.7 
Monthly Hours per Employment Changes 
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of 
Observations 
 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Cumulated 
Frequency 
Frequency 
Conditional on:  
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Frequency 
Conditional on:  
( ) 0
2
1
>
+
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hh
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<-0.8 6411 0,020 0,020 0,022 0,043  
[-0.80;-0.75[ 763 0,002 0,023 0,003 0,005  
[-0.75;-0.70[ 887 0,003 0,026 0,003 0,006  
[-0.70;-0.65[ 952 0,003 0,029 0,003 0,006  
[-0.65;-0.60[ 689 0,002 0,031 0,002 0,005  
[-0.60;-0.55[ 626 0,002 0,033 0,002 0,004  
[-0.55;-0.50[ 701 0,002 0,035 0,002 0,005  
[-0.50;-0.45[ 825 0,003 0,038 0,003 0,006  
[-0.45;-0.40[ 1013 0,003 0,041 0,003 0,007  
[-0.40;-0.35[ 1471 0,005 0,046 0,005 0,010  
[-0.35;-0.30[ 2093 0,007 0,052 0,007 0,014  
[-0.30;-0.25[ 3137 0,010 0,062 0,011 0,021  
[-0.25;-0.20[ 4699 0,015 0,077 0,016 0,032  
[-0.20;-0.15[ 9272 0,030 0,107 0,032 0,063  
[-0.15;-0.10[ 17262 0,055 0,162 0,059 0,117  
[-0.10;-0.05[ 27797 0,088 0,250 0,095 0,188  
[-0.05;0.00[ 69386 0,221 0,471 0,238 0,469  
[0.00;0.00[ 22555 0,072 0,543     
]0.00;0.05] 70416 0,224 0,767 0,242  0,490 
]0.05;0.10] 24525 0,078 0,845 0,084  0,171 
]0.10;0.15] 13490 0,043 0,888 0,046  0,094 
]0.15;0.20] 10011 0,032 0,920 0,034  0,070 
]0.20;0.25] 5714 0,018 0,938 0,020  0,040 
]0.25;0.30] 3513 0,011 0,949 0,012  0,024 
]0.30;0.35] 2020 0,006 0,956 0,007  0,014 
]0.35;0.40] 1662 0,005 0,961 0,006  0,012 
]0.40;0.45] 1119 0,004 0,965 0,004  0,008 
]0.45;0.50] 793 0,003 0,967 0,003  0,006 
]0.50;0.55] 655 0,002 0,969 0,002  0,005 
]0.55;0.60] 696 0,002 0,971 0,002  0,005 
]0.60;0.65] 678 0,002 0,974 0,002  0,005 
]0.65;0.70] 933 0,003 0,977 0,003  0,006 
]0.70;0.75] 832 0,003 0,979 0,003  0,006 
]0.75;0.80] 582 0,002 0,981 0,002  0,004 
>0.8 5941 0,019 1,000 0,020  0,041 
 #Obs: 314 119      
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Table A.8 
Monthly Hours per Worker Change by Firm Size 
20<n  4920 <≤ n  9950 <≤ n  199100 <≤ n  499200 <≤ n  500≥n  
( )
2
1 tt
t
hh
h
+
∆
−
 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
Number 
Obs. 
Unconditional 
Frequency 
<-0.8 623 0,0154 1616 0,0199 1212 0,0236 1212 0,0236 851 0,0216 295 0,0206 
[-0.80;-0.75[ 70 0,0017 178 0,0022 132 0,0026 132 0,0026 109 0,0028 46 0,0032 
[-0.75;-0.70[ 96 0,0024 208 0,0026 134 0,0026 134 0,0026 108 0,0027 39 0,0027 
[-0.70;-0.65[ 90 0,0022 216 0,0027 174 0,0034 174 0,0034 128 0,0033 39 0,0027 
[-0.65;-0.60[ 60 0,0015 154 0,0019 122 0,0024 122 0,0024 117 0,0030 38 0,0027 
[-0.60;-0.55[ 71 0,0018 142 0,0017 116 0,0023 116 0,0023 84 0,0021 27 0,0019 
[-0.55;-0.50[ 75 0,0018 155 0,0019 119 0,0023 119 0,0023 116 0,0030 47 0,0033 
[-0.50;-0.45[ 94 0,0023 180 0,0022 134 0,0026 134 0,0026 123 0,0031 45 0,0031 
[-0.45;-0.40[ 111 0,0027 219 0,0027 179 0,0035 179 0,0035 159 0,0040 85 0,0059 
[-0.40;-0.35[ 161 0,0040 353 0,0043 243 0,0047 243 0,0047 209 0,0053 95 0,0066 
[-0.35;-0.30[ 249 0,0061 467 0,0057 379 0,0074 379 0,0074 297 0,0076 158 0,0110 
[-0.30;-0.25[ 355 0,0088 760 0,0093 552 0,0108 552 0,0108 465 0,0118 246 0,0172 
[-0.25;-0.20[ 574 0,0142 1144 0,0141 754 0,0147 754 0,0147 702 0,0179 326 0,0228 
[-0.20;-0.15[ 1186 0,0292 2501 0,0308 1489 0,0290 1489 0,0290 1177 0,0299 466 0,0325 
[-0.15;-0.10[ 2312 0,0570 4639 0,0571 2707 0,0527 2707 0,0527 2062 0,0524 950 0,0663 
[-0.10;-0.05[ 3994 0,0985 7927 0,0975 4233 0,0825 4233 0,0825 3227 0,0821 1372 0,0958 
[-0.05;0.00[ 6911 0,1704 16972 0,2087 12689 0,2472 12689 0,2472 9614 0,2445 3030 0,2115 
[0.00;0.00[ 7304 0,1801 6728 0,0827 1476 0,0288 1476 0,0288 1164 0,0296 258 0,0180 
]0.00;0.05] 6983 0,1722 17337 0,2132 12492 0,2434 12492 0,2434 9305 0,2367 2927 0,2043 
]0.05;0.10] 3230 0,0796 6692 0,0823 3668 0,0715 3668 0,0715 2705 0,0688 1169 0,0816 
]0.10;0.15] 1808 0,0446 3588 0,0441 2166 0,0422 2166 0,0422 1686 0,0429 708 0,0494 
]0.15;0.20] 1396 0,0344 2793 0,0343 1551 0,0302 1551 0,0302 1223 0,0311 560 0,0391 
]0.20;0.25] 640 0,0158 1461 0,0180 990 0,0193 990 0,0193 845 0,0215 257 0,0179 
]0.25;0.30] 419 0,0103 867 0,0107 638 0,0124 638 0,0124 488 0,0124 240 0,0168 
]0.30;0.35] 208 0,0051 457 0,0056 370 0,0072 370 0,0072 309 0,0079 134 0,0094 
]0.35;0.40] 193 0,0048 398 0,0049 284 0,0055 284 0,0055 245 0,0062 111 0,0077 
]0.40;0.45] 126 0,0031 254 0,0031 213 0,0041 213 0,0041 167 0,0042 71 0,0050 
]0.45;0.50] 93 0,0023 200 0,0025 133 0,0026 133 0,0026 133 0,0034 47 0,0033 
]0.50;0.55] 73 0,0018 142 0,0017 128 0,0025 128 0,0025 109 0,0028 43 0,0030 
]0.55;0.60] 82 0,0020 158 0,0019 129 0,0025 129 0,0025 106 0,0027 43 0,0030 
]0.60;0.65] 64 0,0016 173 0,0021 119 0,0023 119 0,0023 106 0,0027 44 0,0031 
]0.65;0.70] 104 0,0026 231 0,0028 164 0,0032 164 0,0032 128 0,0033 53 0,0037 
]0.70;0.75] 95 0,0023 219 0,0027 166 0,0032 166 0,0032 123 0,0031 47 0,0033 
]0.75;0.80] 61 0,0015 131 0,0016 123 0,0024 123 0,0024 97 0,0025 31 0,0022 
>0.8 650 0,0160 1652 0,0203 1152 0,0224 1152 0,0224 831 0,0211 279 0,0195 
 #Obs: 13.98% #Obs: 28.02% #Obs: 21.80% #Obs:  17.69% #Obs:  13.55%  #Obs: 4.97% 
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Table A.9 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
(Aggregate series based on micro data from Portuguese industrial firms) 
tADF-statistic* 
  
tN  tS  tW  tHS  
 
tSPURT
 
Whole Sample -0.489 -2.214 -2.650 -2.186 -1.689 
Small Firms -1.310 -2.701 -1.903 -2.599 -2.689 
Large Firms -1.394 -2.718 -3.219 -2.078 -2.417 
Notes: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test is specified as: 
∑
=
−−
+∆++=∆
k
i
tititt yyy
1
10 εββα , with the number of lags k chosen according  
tothe Schwarz Criterion. The null hypothesis is that the series are not stationary. 
* 5% Critical Value = -3.444 
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Table A.10 
Results of the Preisach Model 
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Total Hours of Work ( )tTH - Sample: 1995:01-2005:12 Dependent 
Variables Aggregate series for all sample Aggregate series for firms with fewer than  
20 workers 
Aggregate series for firms with more than  
500 workers  
Cons   10.850 
14.087 
(0.000) 
 
12.281 
11.590 
(0.000) 
 
17.148 
4586 
(0.000) 
 
7.482 
13.845 
(0.000) 
 
11.759 
10.293 
(0.000) 
 
12.11 
1238 
(0.000) 
 
11.82 
10.32 
(0.000) 
 
11.27 
7.525 
(0.000) 
 
16.14 
2623 
(0.000) 
 
tS  0.295 8.180 
(0.000) 
 
0.228 
4.593 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.301 
8.699 
(0.000) 
 
0.022 
0.303 
(0.761) 
 
- 
 
0.207 
3.769 
(0.000) 
 
0.234 
3.251 
(0.002) 
 
- 
 
tHS   
- 
 
 
0.0003 
1.944 
(0.054) 
 
0.001 
6.645 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.001 
4.182 
(0.000) 
 
0.001 
10.172 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
-0.0001 
-0.573 
(0.597) 
 
0.0004 
1.903 
(0.059) 
 
T  
 
-0.002 
-27.18 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-20.825 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-19.961 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-17.604 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-18.393 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-21.57 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-13.724 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-11.011 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-10.213 
(0.000) 
 
2R  
 
0.893 0.896 0.879 0.781 0.807 0.807 0.779 0.779 0.761 
DW  
 
0.831 0.904 1.148 0.829 0.755 0.752 0.819 0.817 0.861 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration Test 
Statistic 
-3.353 -3.617 -2.774 -3.0481 -2.960 -1.922 -3.553 -3.534 -3.585 
         
-3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 MacKinnon 5% Critical Value 
         
Trace Test Statistic 
 
13.880 
 
31.78 13.20 18.41 42.18 15.42 20.58 46.02 16.49 
5% Critical Value 25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively.  
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Table A.11 
Results of the Linear Play Model 
Dependent variable – Logarithm of Aggregate Total Hours of Work ( )tTH - Sample: 1995:01-2005:12 Dependent 
Variables Aggregate series for all sample Aggregate series for firms with fewer than  
20 workers 
Aggregate series for firms with more than  
500 workers  
Cons   10.850 
14.087 
(0.000) 
 
11.628 
11.101 
(0.000) 
 
17.205 
1825 
(0.000) 
 
7.482 
13.845 
(0.000) 
 
10.505 
13.137 
(0.000) 
 
12.195 
1969 
(0.000) 
 
11.82 
10.32 
(0.000) 
 
8.821 
4.238 
(0.000) 
 
17.189 
1559.5 
(0.000) 
 
tS  0.295 8.180 
(0.000) 
 
0.259 
5.325 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.301 
8.699 
(0.000) 
 
0.108 
2.114 
(0.037) 
 
- 
 
0.207 
3.769 
(0.000) 
 
0.349 
3.532 
(0.006) 
 
- 
 
tSPURT   
- 
 
 
0.070 
1.241 
(0.217) 
 
0.290 
6.708 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
0.225 
3.306 
(0.001) 
 
0.341 
8.270 
(0.000) 
 
- 
 
-0.151 
-1.344 
(0.181) 
 
0.192 
4.393 
(0.000) 
 
T   -0.002 
-27.18 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-25.260 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-22.384 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-17.604 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
-17.916 
(0.000) 
 
-0.001 
-18.161 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-13.724 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-11.917 
(0.000) 
 
-0.002 
-15.402 
(0.000) 
 
2R  
 
0.893 0.892 0.867 0.781 0.779 0.771 0.779 0.767 0.839 
DW  
 
0.831 1.068 1.411 0.829 0.922 0.922 0.819 0.965 1.379 
Engle Granger 
Cointegration Test 
Statistic 
-3.353 -4.108 -3.874 -3.0481 -3.724 -3.760 -3.553 3.534 -3.419 
         
-3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 -3.553 4.211 -3.553 MacKinnon 5% Critical Value 
         
Trace Test Statistic  13.880 40.20 25.504 18.41 42.85 17.08 20.58 43.83 28.189 
5% Critical Value 25.87 
 
42.91 
 
25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 25.87 42.91 25.87 
We report for each variable the estimated coefficient, the t-statistic and the p-value respectively. * Significant at 5%
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Table A.12 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
(Manufacturing aggregate series from EUROSTAT and OECD) 
Country   
 
tN  tS  tW  tHS  tSPURT  
t-statistic -2.458 -1.506 -1.903 0.346 -0.394 Austria 5% critical-value -2.887 -2.887 -2.887 -2.887 -2.888 
t-statistic 1.123 -1.562 - -0.797 -0.700 Belgium 5% critical value -2.884 -2.884 - -2.884 -2.885 
t-statistic -2.526 -0.850 -3.860 -1.157 -1.498 Canada 5% critical value -2.886 -2.884 -2.884 -2.885 -2.885 
t-statistic -0.961 0.237 0.518 2.232 -0.003 Czech 
Republic 5% critical value -2.9165 -2.917 -2.840 -2.917 -2.917 
t-statistic -0.585 -2.922 -1.621 -1.395 -1.609 Denmark 5% critical value -2.840 -2.884 -2.884 -2.884 -2.889 
t-statistic -1.322 -1.632 -2.258 -0.545 1.229 Finland 5% critical value -2.887 -2.887 -2.884 -2.884 -2.885 
t-statistic 1.629 -1.323 -1.463 -0.875 -0.756 France 5% critical value -2.885 -2.884 -2.889 -2.884 -2.886 
t-statistic -1.590 -0.225 -0.988 1.015 0.121 Germany 5% critical value -2.885 -2.884 -2.884 -2.884 -2.885 
t-statistic 0.668 -1.661 -2.978 -0.177 -1.791 Hungary 5% critical value -2.894 -2.895 -2.895 -2.899 -2.894 
t-statistic -0.672 -2.625 -0.063 -2.333 -2.31 Japan 5% critical value -2.885 -2.885 -2.885 -2.885 -2.885 
t-statistic -1.365 -0.771 -1.437 0.011 -0.020 Luxembourg 5% critical value -2.884 -2.885 -2.885 -2.884 -2.885 
t-statistic -0.212 -2.062 -1.464 -1.675 - Netherlands 5% critical value -2.886 -2.885 -2.887 -2.885 - 
t-statistic -2.49 -1.037 0.314 0.629 -1.100 Poland 5% critical value -2.884 -2.889 -2.885 -2.899 -2.884 
t-statistic 2.195 -2.876 1.114 -1.790 -2.702 Portugal 5% critical value -2.884 -2.885 -2.885 -2.884 -2.885 
t-statistic -2.205 0.362 -0.770 1.086 +0.853 Slovak 
Republic 5% critical value -2.893 -2.894 -2.887 -2.893 -2.895 
t-statistic -0.701 -0860 -0.428 -0.213 -0.449 Slovenia 5% critical value -2.894 -2.894 -2.894 -2.893 -2.895 
t-statistic -1.894 -1.510 - -1.526 -0.832 Spain 5% critical value -2.887 -2.884 - -2.884 -2.886 
t-statistic 2.591 -2.273 - -1.996 -0.978 UK 5% critical value -2.884 -2.884 - -2.884 -2.886 
t-statistic -0.749 -2.115 -1.243 -1.336 -2.151 USA 5% critical value -2.885 -2.885 -2.884 -2.885 -2.885 
Notes: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test is specified as: ∑
=
−−
+∆++=∆
k
i
tititt yyy
1
10 εββα , 
with the number of lags k chosen according to the Schwarz Criterion. The null hypothesis is 
that the series are not stationary. 
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Table. A.13 
Activity Sectors and Code Numbers 
 
Activity Sector Code Numbers 
Mining 
 
13 and 14 
Food, Tobacco and Beverages 
 
15 and 16 
Textile, Leather and Shoes 
 
17,18 and 19 
Furniture and Wood 
 
20 and 36 
Paper and Printing 
 
21 and 22 
Chemicals, Petroleum and Rubber  and Plastic 
Products 
23, 24, 25 and 37 
Non Metallic Mineral Products 
 
26 
Primary Metals 
 
27 
Machinery, Fabricated Metals, Motors and Cars 
and Other Transport Material 
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 
Electricity and Gas 
 
40 
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Table. A.14 
List of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
tN : Aggregate employment. 
tY : Aggregate real product. 
tS : Aggregate sales. 
tH : Average number of hours of work per employee. 
tTH : Total number of hours of work. 
tP : Aggregate price level. 
tW : Aggregate wage rate. 
tHY  Hysteresis transformation of real product 
tHS  Hysteresis transformation of sales 
T  Time trend. 
tn : Firm level of employment. 
ty : Firm level of output. 
th : Firm average number of hours of work per employee. 
tth : Firm total number of hours of work. 
dh : Firm minimum allowed number of hours per employee. 
uh : Firm maximum allowed number of hours per employee. 
tw : Firm wage rate. 
jH : Fixed hiring cost. 
jF : Fixed firing cost. 
i : Nominal interest rate. 
µ : Nonrecurring single stochastic change in price. 
δ : Time discount factor. 
wψ  Measure of phase (hysteresis transformation of real wages)   
sψ  Measure of phase (hysteresis transformation of sales)   
uφ : Measure of the tightness of overtime regulations. 
dφ : Measure of downward hours flexibility. 
tV : Net present value. 
tPLAY : Proxy of the band of inaction estimated according to algorithm in section 
IV.2.2.2. 
tSPURT  Filtered variable calculated according to algorithm in section IV.2.2.2.  
tSσ  Proxy of uncertainty. 
tHI  Proxy of the flexibility of the adjustment of hours of work. 
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Program 1 
Program to Compute Strong Hysteresis Transformation of Input Variables according to the 
Preisach Model (written in MATLAB) 
 
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
% STRONG HYSTERESIS (FOR LABOR ECONOMICS) 
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
% based on     : A test for strong hysteresis, 
%                by L. Piscitelli, R. Cross, M. Grinfeld and H. 
Lamba 
%                Computational Economics 15: 59-78, 2000 
% written by   : Paulo Vasconcelos and Paulo Mota 
% first version: 30/01/2006 
% last revision: 09/03/2006 
% INPUT        : v      = time series vector 
% OUTPUT       : T(t)   = trapezoidal areas at period t 
%                T_P(t) = T(t) in percentage 
%                                       at the end creates the output file "res.txt" and 
plots        the hysteresis transformation  
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
  
% --- get data and initial information ---------------------------
----- 
clear; load v.dat; n=length(v); a0=abs(max(v)); b0=abs(min(v)); 
M=zeros(1,n); m=M; T=M; tp=M; tm=M; % preallocating for speed  
  
% --- compute areas ---------------------------------------------- 
for t=1:n 
   k=1; [M(k),tp(k)]=max(v(1:t)); 
   if   min(v) > 0, T(t)=(M(k)-b0)^2/2; 
   else T(t)=(M(k)+b0)^2/2; 
   end 
   tt=tp(k);  
   while (tt<t), 
      [m(k),tm(k)]=min(v(tp(k):t)); tm(k)=tm(k)+tp(k)-1; 
      T(t)=T(t)-(M(k)-m(k))^2/2; 
      if   tm(k)<t 
           [M(k+1),tp(k+1)]=max(v(tm(k):t)); 
tp(k+1)=tp(k+1)+tm(k)-1; 
           T(t)=T(t)+(M(k+1)-m(k))^2/2; tt=tp(k+1); k=k+1; 
      else tt=tm(k); k=k+1; 
      end 
   end 
end 
  
% --- compute T in percentage and writes the result in res.txt 
file --- 
T_P_total=max(T); T_P=(T/T_P_total)*100; 
fid = fopen('res.txt','wt'); fprintf(fid,'%12.8f\n',T_P); 
fclose(fid); 
         
% --- hysteresis plot -------------------------------------------- 
plot(v,T_P); xlabel('input'); ylabel('hysteresis transformation of 
input') 
%-----------------------------------------------------------------  
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Program 2 
Program to Compute Strong Hysteresis Transformation of Input Variables according to the 
Göcke Model (Written in MATLAB) 
 
 
%% LINEAR PLAY HYSTERESIS IN A REGRESSION FRAMEWORK (FOR LABOR 
ECONOMICS) 
 
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
% based on     : Exchange rate uncertainty and employment:  
%                an algorithm describing 'play', 
%                by Ansgar Belke and Matthias Gocke, 2001 
%                Applied Stochastic Models in Business and 
Industry 17, pp. 181-204,  
% written by    : Paulo Vasconcelos and Paulo Mota 
% first version: 30/06/2006 
% last revision: 17/05/2007 
% INPUT        : x = time series vector (log s), s=sales 
%                y = time series vector (log e), e=employment 
%                u = time series vector of std of log e 
% OUTPUT       : spurt and play 
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
%% --- get data and initial information -------------------------- 
disp('... Reading data and initialize') 
  
% read data 
load y.dat; % employment log data 
load x.dat; % sales log data 
load u.dat; % std of employment log data 
  
% variables initialization 
m=size(x,1); % sample size 
d_x=zeros(m,1); d_x(1)=0; for i=2:m; d_x(i)=(x(i)-x(i-1)); end; 
  
% find first estimation quarter 
figure(1); plot(x); ylabel('Sales'); 
sinal=sign(d_x(2)); j=2; 
while sign(d_x(j))==sinal, j=j+1; end 
istart=j-1; % extremum is at position j-1 
if sinal<0, fprintf('minimum is %6.2f at position 
%d\n',x(istart),istart); 
else fprintf('maximum is %6.2f at position 
%d\n',x(istart),istart); end 
iend=m; n=iend-istart+1; % nb. elements in analysis 
fprintf('total nb. of elements is %d and nb. of sample points is 
%d\n',m,n) 
  
% define grid for const. play 
%g_prec=0.002; g_min=0; g_max=0.2; g=g_max/g_prec; % for const 
play 
disp(' '); 
disp('introduce data for constant play:'); 
g_min=input('min. (default= 0.0) -> '); 
if isempty(g_min); g_min=0.0; end 
g_max=input('max. (default= 0.2) -> '); 
if isempty(g_max); g_max=0.2; end 
g_prec=input('grid precision (default= 0.002) -> '); 
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if isempty(g_prec); g_prec=0.002; end 
g=g_max/g_prec;   % nb of points for const play 
  
% define grid for the var. play 
%h_prec=0.002; h_min=0.0; h_max=0.2; h=h_max/h_prec; % for var. 
play 
disp(' '); 
disp('introduce data for variable play:'); 
disp('note: to look only for constant play, choose grid 
precision=max')  
h_min=input('min. for var. play (default= 0.0) -> '); 
if isempty(h_min); h_min=0.0; end 
h_max=input('max. for var. play (default= 0.2) -> '); 
if isempty(h_max); h_max=0.2; end 
h_prec=input('grid precision for var. play (default= 0.002) -> '); 
if isempty(h_prec); h_prec=0.002; end 
h=h_max/h_prec;   % nb of points for var. play 
if h == 1, u=zeros(m,1); end; % special case to look only for 
constant play 
  
% initialize more auxiliar variables 
play_const=zeros(1,g+1); play_var=zeros(1,h+1); 
R2=zeros(g+1,h+1); betas=zeros(g+1,h+1,3); 
  
%% --- Grid search ----------------------------------------------- 
disp('... Grid search') 
for i=1:g+1      % loop for constant play 
    for j=1:h+1  % loop for variable play 
        gamma=g_min+(i-1)*g_prec; delta=h_min+(j-1)*h_prec; 
        play(istart:iend)=gamma+delta*u(istart:iend); 
        play_const(i,1)=gamma; play_var(1,j)=delta; 
        spurt = play_fun(play,d_x,istart,iend,sinal); 
        % perform R2 computation 
        X=[ones(n,1) spurt(istart:iend) (1:n)']; 
        [R2(i,j),betas(i,j,:)]=my_R2(y(istart:iend),X); 
    end  % end loop for variable play 
end  % end loop for constant play 
  
%% search for highest R2 
disp('... Results') 
% max is at r2_max, located at i_max, j_max 
[r2_max_vec,i_max_vec]=max(R2);  
[r2_max,j_max]=max(r2_max_vec); i_max=i_max_vec(j_max); 
% convertion from position to data 
fprintf('position of max. (const,var) play = 
(%d,%d)\n',i_max,j_max); 
fprintf('R2 max = %d\n',R2(i_max,j_max)) 
play_c=g_min+(i_max-1)*g_prec; fprintf('play_constant = 
%d\n',play_c); 
play_v=h_min+(j_max-1)*h_prec; fprintf('play_variable = 
%d\n',play_v); 
  
%% --- output ---------------------------------------------------- 
% run again to find spurt for better R2 (less ) 
d_x=zeros(m,1); d_x(1)=0; for i=2:m; d_x(i)=(x(i)-x(i-1)); end; 
gamma=g_min+(i_max-1)*g_prec; delta=h_min+(j_max-1)*h_prec; 
play(istart:iend)=gamma+delta*u(istart:iend); 
spurt = play_fun(play,d_x,istart,iend,sinal); 
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%% --- output plots ---------------------------------------------- 
% plots 
figure(2); plot(spurt); ylabel('Spurt'); 
figure(3); plot(play(istart:iend)); ylabel('Play'); 
figure(4); 
if h == 1, % special case to look only for constant play 
    plot(play_const(:,1),R2); 
    xlabel('constant play=gama'); ylabel('R2'); 
else 
    mesh(play_var(1,:),play_const(:,1),R2);  
    xlabel('delta'); ylabel('gama'); zlabel('R2'); 
end; 
  
%% --- output files ---------------------------------------------- 
fid = fopen('spurt.txt','wt'); 
fprintf(fid,'%12.8f\n',spurt(istart:iend)); 
fclose(fid); 
fid = fopen('play.txt','wt') ; 
fprintf(fid,'%12.8f\n',play(istart:iend)) ; 
fclose(fid); 
 
 
 
 
Program 3 
Auxiliary Program to Compute R2  (Written in MATLAB) 
 
 
 
function [R2,beta]=my_R2(y,X) 
% computes R2. 
% I uses QR factorization in order to insure better numerical 
behavior. 
  
ny2=size(y,1)*mean(y)^2; 
[Q,R]=qr(X); 
beta = R\(Q'*y); 
R2=(beta'*X'*y-ny2)/(y'*y-ny2); 
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Program 4 
Program to Estimate a Time-Varying Intercept Version of a Labor Demand Equation 
(written in GAUSS) 
 
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
% Time-Varying Intercept Labor Demand 
%----------------------------------------------------------------- 
% written by   : Manuel M. Martins and Paulo Mota 
% first version: 30/01/2006 
% last revision: 09/03/2006 
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----*/ 
/* data file: portugal.txt (n; s; t)  */ 
 
new; 
cls; 
        gosub dataread; 
        gosub filter;  
 gosub smoothing;     
        gosub results; 
 
end; 
 
/*****************************************************************
******/ 
/* SUBROUTINES 
*********************************************************/ 
/*****************************************************************
******/ 
 
DATAREAD: 
 
library pgraph, optmum; 
#include optmum.ext; 
#include gradient.ext; 
 
optset; 
         _opgtol=0.00001; 
         _opstmth="newton stepbt"; 
         _opmdmth="bfgs stepbt"; 
         _opmiter=10000; 
  _opusrgd=&gradre; 
    _grnum=20; 
         _grsca=0.4; 
         _grstp=0.5; 
 
load pu[]=portugal.txt; 
 
pu=reshape(pu, rows(pu)/3, 3); 
 
t=rows(pu); 
 
e=pu[.,1]; 
y=pu[.,2]; 
ti=pu[.,3]; 
 
uc=zeros(t,3); 
alphall=zeros(3,1); 
Puall=zeros(3,3); 
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Ppall=zeros(3,3); 
Trans=zeros(3,3); 
smooth=0; 
 
vs=zeros(1,t); 
resids=zeros(t,1); 
 
vas=zeros(1,t); 
residas=zeros(t,1); 
 
 
return; 
 
FILTER: 
param=zeros(3,1); 
vparam=zeros(3,1); 
gam=zeros(t,1); 
vs=zeros(1,1); 
 
hpari=  11.189334 | 
       54.413693  ; 
   
{hparf, logl, g, retcode}=optmum(&L, hpari); 
save hparf; 
 
He=hessp(&L, hparf); 
 
Cov=inv(He); 
 
return; 
 
 
SMOOTHING: 
 
smooth=1; 
 
call L(hparf); 
 
rpall=rows(puall); 
cpall=cols(puall); 
 
 
Puall=Puall[cpall+1:rpall,.]; 
Ppall=Ppall[cpall+1:rpall,.]; 
Alphall=Alphall[cpall+1:rpall,.]; 
 
rpall=rows(puall); 
 
Alphas=zeros(rpall,1); 
 
Alphas[rpall-cpall:rpall]=Alphall[rpall-cpall:rpall]; 
 
nobs=rpall/cpall; 
 
i=nobs; 
do while i > 1; 
 i=i-1; 
 Pstar=      Puall[(i-
1)*cpall+1:i*cpall,.]*Trans'*inv(Ppall[i*cpall+1:(i+1)*cpall,.]); 
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 Alphas[(i-1)*cpall+1:i*cpall]=  Alphall[(i-
1)*cpall+1:i*cpall] 
       
 +Pstar*(Alphas[i*cpall+1:(i+1)*cpall]-Trans*Alphall[(i-
1)*cpall+1:i*cpall]); 
    
   
endo; 
Alphas=reshape(Alphas, nobs, cpall); 
ucs=zeros((t-nobs),1)|Alphas[.,cpall]; 
 
return; 
 
RESULTS: 
 
tvalues=hparf./diag(sqrt(Cov)); 
 
print "hparf                   t-values                  p-
values="; hparf~tvalues~cdfn(tvalues); 
print "param="; param; 
print "param p-values="; cdfn(param./sqrt(vparam)); 
 
/* Jarque-Bera test for normality (Judge et al., pp. 890-92) */ 
 
vs=vs'; 
rvs=rows(vs)-1; 
vs=vs[2:rvs+1,.]; 
 
u3=real(meanc(vs^3)); 
si2=stdc(vs)^2; 
u4=real(meanc(vs^4)); 
 
b1=u3./(si2^(3/2));              /*skewness measure */ 
b2=u4./(si2^2);                   /*kurtosis measure */ 
 
lamb=rvs*((b1^2)./6+(b2-3)^2./24); 
 
print "NORMALITY"; 
    print "Jarque-Bera statistic=   ";; lamb; 
    print "Jarque-Bera significance=";; cdfchic(lamb,2); 
 
return; 
 
PROC(1)=L(hpar); 
local   cut, logl,F, Z, Q, H, i, alphal, alphap, alphau, Tr, Pp, 
Pu, Pl, slogf, sv2f, v, va,ve,lambda,vsn, 
 miu, varin, vare ; 
 
vs=zeros(1,1);  /* storing standardized residuals to compute 
normality test */ 
vas=zeros(1,1);/* storing one-step-ahead prediction error of dinf  
                    to compute MSE dinf in table 2            */ 
 
vare=(hpar[1]/1000)^2; 
varin=(hpar[2]/10000)^2; 
 
Q=zeros(3,3); 
Q[1,1]=varin; 
 
H=zeros(1,1); 
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H[1,1]=vare; 
 
Tr=eye(3); 
 
i=1; 
 
cut=i; 
 
alphal= 4.5552584    | 
   0.35226555   | 
 -0.0018051622; 
 
Pl=0.05^2*eye(3); 
 
slogf=0; 
sv2f=0; 
 
alphall=zeros(3,1); 
Puall=zeros(3,3); 
Ppall=zeros(3,3); 
 
do while i < t; 
 
   i=i+1;   
 
Z = 1~y[i]~ti[i]; 
  
    alphap = Tr*alphal; 
               
  Pp = Tr*Pl*Tr'+Q; 
 
  F = Z*Pp*Z'+H; 
 
  v=(e[i])-(Z*alphap); 
 
   alphau=alphap+Pp*Z'*inv(F)*v; 
 
  Pu=Pp-Pp*Z'*inv(F)*Z*Pp; 
 
  alphal=alphau; 
   
  /*storing useful information: */ 
 
  uc[i,.]=alphau[1:3]'; 
 
  {va,ve} = eigv(F);   
  lambda=zeros(1,1); 
  lambda=diagrv(lambda, va^(-1/2)); 
  vsn=(ve*lambda*ve')*v; 
  vs=vs~vsn; 
   
  if smooth==1; 
   Ppall=Ppall|Pp; 
   Puall=Puall|Pu; 
   alphall=alphall|alphau; 
   Trans=Tr; 
  endif; 
   
  Pl=Pu; 
  slogf=slogf+ln(det(F)); 
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  sv2f=sv2f+v'*inv(F)*v; 
vas=vas~v; 
 
endo; 
 
logl=0.5*(slogf+sv2f); 
param=alphau; 
vparam=diag(Pu); 
 
retp(logl); 
endp; 
 
